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Abstract.
The increasing efforts within the European Union to harmonise
intellectual property law also lead to the approximation of
some aspects of unfair competition law. Despite these
efforts, common standards for unfair competition law are
still not present.
To find a common legal norm defining the scope of
protection of trade marks and related intangibles in unfair
competition law, similarities and differences between various
national unfair competition provisions are explored in the
light of the Paris Convention.
Setting aside the clear examples of tortious behaviour
in competition, the difficulty surrounding the definition of
clear norms in other unfair competition cases is recognised.
Protection of intangible subject matter on an other basis
than tort can lead to idiosyncratic and circular reasoning.
It is shown that property theories and policy decisions have
to be dismissed as the sole basis in the determination
whether protection is due.
The author describes how a legal concept bearing close
resemblance to tort can overcome these problems. He describes
and argues for an action for 'malign competition', based on
the concept of unjust enrichment.
In examining selected legal systems in more detail,
several key aspects of the proposed action appear to be in
operation already, albeit not recognised.
Selected cases from several jurisdictions are
subsequently tested according to the model of the proposed
action for malign competition. It is demonstrated that the
legal reasoning is more satisfactory, offering a clear norm
and takingway the old idiosyncrasies. Where the outcome on
the basis of the same facts is different, it is shown that
this is the result of a more satisfactory implementation of
the notions of preemption and equitable remuneration than is
currently employed.
The fact that the principle of unjust enrichment is
universally recognised will in the opinion of the author
advance the prospects for future harmonisation.
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1Introduction.
This thesis focuses on competition law relating to issues of
intellectual property and related intangibles. The subject
material discussed in the thesis comprises formally
recognised forms of property, such as copyright, patent and
trade mark, but it predominantly focuses on all related forms
of, commonly termed, quasi-property rights and interests or
'	 ,badges of trade. The term badge of trade is therefore
applied to all the subject material that does not enjoy
formal recognition as an intangible of intellectual property.
In today's global market the importance of safeguarding free,
but fair competition in the market becomes ever more
paramount. The varying degree to which restraints can be
imposed on the freedom to compete has been determined by the
implementation of the antagonistic policies of laissez faire
and market intervention. At present there are clear
indications that the desire to safeguard free competition
through minimum intervention features high on the policy
agenda. The inclusion of the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of
Intellectual Property) in the GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) negotiations on a world level prove a
clear wish to provide a basic level playing field for world
competitors.
Closer to home, the harmonisation efforts of the European
Commission in the field of intellectual property law have
transformed the law in the Member States, so that a more
homogenous European picture now emerges.
One area of intellectual property law has however proven to
be too elusive to standardise, let alone harmonise: unfair
competition law. Despite the fact that common standards do
exist, (the Paris Convention being the main exponent) unfair
competition law remains an elusive area of law that is hard
to categorise. A recent study by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) entitled: 'Protection against

3It is understandable that codification and harnionisation of
unfair competition law has turned out to be a haphazard
enterprise, depending on whether separate issues of unfair
competition could be taken into account in the larger
framework of harmonisation, 5 or have been given special
consideration in the form of special statutes.6
Where clear and well defined tortious liability for certain
forms of market behaviour commonly associated with the
prevention of confusion or avoidable confusion in the
marketplace is absent however, the general description of
unfair competition appears to serve as a catch all (France)
or nothing (the United Kingdom), seemingly dependent on
jurisdiction or even the mood of the judge. The fact that
common law is determinative (also in civil law systems) in
the assessment and objectivisation of the respective general
unfair competition clauses only obscures matters even
further. Judges appear to deliberately disguise the way in
which decisions are reached, but this is probably due to
their infinite familiarity with their legal system, so that
explanations seem superfluous.
Yet in unfair competition law the importance of reasoned
judgements is paramount in defining that elusive
'unfairness'.
Attempts to provide clear norms outside of the confusion
paradigm are not new. In many jurisdictions numerous new
property rights are created to augment the existing
11 EIPR 311; J. Adams: "Is There a Tort of Unfair Competition? Legal Protection of
Advertising Campaigns and Merchandising" [1985] JBL 26-33; A Booy: "A Half-way House
for Unfair Competition in the United Kingdom - A Practitioner's Plea" [19911 12 EIPR 439-
441; For an Australian common law view see also J. Lahore: "The Herchel Smith Lecture
1992: Intellectual Property Rights and Unfair Copying: Old Concepts, New Ideas" [1992] 12
EIPR 428-433; and C. Elliott: "The Common Law: Unfair Competition and Sul Generis
Legislation. A Time for Reappraisal" [19921 Jan/Feb 20 TMW 25-30.
5Think of the inclusion of protection against dilution in the First Council Directive of 21
December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks
(89/ 104/EEC).
6Think of the inclusion of the unfair extraction right in the Amended proposal of 4 October
1993 for a Council Directive on the legal protection of databases (Corn (93) 464 final-SYN 393)
[1993] OJ C3081 1 or the 'unfair advantage' clause in the proposed Directive on Comparative
Advertising amending Directive (84/450/EEC).
4traditional intellectual property rights. 7 The sweat of the
brow doctrine and arguments of analogy are used to validate
the expansion of rights, which has found its clearest
exponents in various proposals for unfair copying statutes.8
Resistance against ever increasing monopolies however has so
far prevented these proposals from becoming any more than
they are; proposals.
This thesis attempts to provide guidance in those cases where
tortious liability is not self evident or where boundaries
are not clearly demarcated. As soon as an act of creating
confusion or avoidable confusion in the marketplace can not
be shown, courts and legislatures are at pains to provide an
adequate basis for liability.
But rather than looking for an 'ever increasing range of
property rights within or analogous to traditional
intellectual property', 9 I will look for general concepts
that can support liability in unfair competition cases.
Central to the thesis is the proposition that liability in
unfair competition cases on the basis of tort is not all
encompassing. In those cases where the boundaries of the
definition of a tort are stretched, the basis for liability
becomes weak. This means that sweat of the brow and analogy
alone do not provide sufficient additional basis in the
TIn The Netherlands this development is attributed to the inroads that the sweat of the brow
doctrine has made. See J. Spoor: "De gestage groei van merk, werk en uitvinding" (1990)
Tjeenk Willink.
8See C. Elliott: "The Common Law: Unfair Competition and Sui Generis Legislation. A Time
for Reappraisal" [19921 JanfFeb 20 TMW 25-30 for a description of Australian proposals;
Vereniging voor Auteursrecht: "Rapport studiecommissie bescherming sweat of the brow-
prestaties" December 1993 for a description of Dutch proposals; and C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual
property on Procrustes' bed: Observations on a French Draft Bill for the Protection of
'Reserved Creations'. f1992J 12 EIPR 438-444 inFrench proposals. For a more detailed
description and critique see 6.3.2.2 and 6.5.2.3 below.
9see J. Lahore: "The Herchel Smith lecture 1992: Intellectual Property Rights and Unfair
Copying: Old Concepts, New Ideas" [1992] 12 EIPR 428-433, who at 433 concludes he prefers
a general law of unfair copying above an "ever increasing range of property rights within or
analogous to traditional intellectual property", because this analogy trail leads to a situation in
which:
.[T]he basic concepts themselves lose their focus, and the policy justification
for granting intellectual property rights in the first place, that is, the reward
and incentive to the creator balanced against technological, commercial or
cultural development for society, becomes increasingly under challenge.
5assessment of tortious liability to warrant an injunction or
the award of damages in these cases, as they do not prevail
over the basic safeguard against expanding monopolies, namely
the doctrine of preemption.
It is for this reason that I will explore the possibilities
of placing more emphasis in the law of unfair competition on
a general conception that is related to tort, namely unjust
enrichment.
6Methodology.
Apart from the general introduction and conclusion this
thesis consists of seven chapters. At the end a fold-out is
also provided containing all the diagrams and models
otherwise contained in the main text.
The aim of the thesis is the search for a general principle
underlying the law of unfair competition, resulting in a
model for a novel approach towards the assessment of
liability in cases of unfair competition. As such the thesis
attempts to provide an alternative or augmentation to the
traditional principle of prevention of confusion or avoidable
confusion in the marketplace. As a result the thesis is a
predominantly theoretical exercise, with practical examples
of the application of the model in chapter seven. In my
argumentation I have taken the liberty to draw from a wide
range of sources and jurisdictions.
Despite the fact that the thesis is written from an English,
common law perspective, actual description of common law
unfair competition law is limited. This is due to the fact
that a general law of unfair competition is not recognised at
common law. For, as far as English law is concerned, most of
the concepts and principles described in this thesis have no
equivalent. From a comparative point of view it is therefore
impossible to describe English law beyond the well defined
principle of passing off and other economic torts. Since a
lot has been written on the law of passing off and other
economic torts, 10 I will refrain from doing so.
Also, I will not give an exhaustive comparative overview of
unfair competition laws in the European Union, as this would
repeat the huge work carried out by the Max Planck Institute.
A reference to the series 'Das Recht des unlauteren
Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgeineinschaft', a six volume work edited by E.
Ulmer will suffice.
What I will do is give a comparative overview of those
10Most notably C. Wadlow: "The Law of Passing Off" (1990) Sweet & Maxwell.
7instances in which the general norm of unfair competition has
been applied to cases in which the traditional norm of the
prevention of creation of confusion or avoidable confusion is
absent.
In Chapter One the common norms, general principles and the
legal basis of unfair competition law in various countries
will be discussed.
Chapter Two covers the way in which the application of a
general principle of unfair competition is justified and
which criteria are relied upon to make a general clause more
specific.
Chapter Three deals with the way in which the general
principle of tort falls short of the aim to transcend the
common norms, of which the prevention of avoidable confusion
is the main paradigm. An attempt is made to find another
generic conception than tort on which to base the action of
unfair competition. With the principle of unjust enrichment
as a possible replacement for tort, the subsequent part of
chapter three is used to describe and shape an action on this
basis. This action is called 'malign competition'.
Given the difficult nature of the action for unjust
enrichment in English law, deliberation is also given to the
specific problems of the action at common law, most notably
the level of cognisance on the part of the defendant that is
needed to impose liability.
Chapter Four deals extensively with the problem of imputing
knowledge to a defendant for the purpose of imposing
liability. The area of constructive trust -is used as a
valuable parallel to find methods and an existing practice to
deal with cognisance problems. Since the area of constructive
trust is reliant on principles of unjust enrichment as well,
the parallel seems only fitting.
Chapter Five deals with principles of cognisance in
intellectual property law, so as to bridge the gap that
exists between the area of constructive trust and matters of
intellectual property law.
Chapter Six investigates the state of the law in the selected
jurisdictions of France, Germany and The Netherlands. These
three countries were chosen because they represent varying
8approaches to providing a legal basis for unfair competition
law and the resulting scope of protection and remedies that
are available on this basis. The proximity of the new model
of malign competition to these existing jurisdictions will
also be discussed, to show that the elements that make up the
new action are already present in these civil law systems.
In Chapter Seven practical examples of the application of the
action for malign competition are given. Drawing from actual
civil and common law case examples, the action is tested as
to its practical applicability, consistency and rationale.
Despite the fact that much of the action has been exemplified
with civil law source material, a common law perspective is
retained and the remedies resulting from liability in the
action for malign competition are discussed in a common law
setting.
9Chapter 1: Unfair Competition, its Legal Basis.
Introduction to Chapter One.
In this chapter the international dimension and
	 the
principles of unfair competition law will be set out.
As such the international superstructure of the Paris
Convention will be the starting point (1.1). Then its
principles in various jurisdictions will be traced.
In giving a concise description of the structure of unfair
competition law in selected countries, the differences in the
legal basis for unfair competition law will show (1.2 &
1.2.1). Two distinctive groups are discerned.
(i) Systems in which unfair competition law is based on
common law principles. The countries France, The Netherlands,
Italy and the United Kingdom are briefly discussed in 1.2.1.1
to 1.2.1.4 as examples of this approach.
(ii) Systems in which unfair competition law is based on a
special law. The countries Belgium, Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain and Greece are briefly
discussed in 1.2.2 to 1.2.2.7 as exponents of this approach.
Because selected exponents of these two approaches will be
dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Six (France 6.3.1 to
6.3.2.2, Germany 6.4.1 to 6.4.2.2 and The Netherlands 6.5.1
to 6.5.4.2), a third and residual group of countries will be
discussed in more detail at this point. This third category
consist of countries with a concurrent approach to common law
and special law principles, but also of systems that
encompass certain hybrid forms of common law and civil law
principles. As examples the United States, Canada, South
Africa and Israel are discussed in 1.2.3 to 1.2.3.4.
In discussing the basis for unfair competition law in these
various jurisdictions on the basis of their respective
approach to unfair competition law, certain problems
involving the way in which the legal rule in unfair
competition cases is found, like the principle of preemption
or the use of policy considerations in decision making are
explained and illustrated with case law examples from these
10
different jurisdictions. The fact that these problems are
discussed in a national context, rather than a universal one,
does not mean the problem is not present in the whole field
of all national unfair competition laws, on the contrary! The
problems are universal, but some problems have been discussed
more extensively, or to greater detail in some jurisdictions
than in others.
1.1 Unfair Competition, International Principles.
Protection against unfair competition has found its
recognition in Article l0bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, which obliges member
states to protect their nationals and award equal treatment
to nationals of fellow signatory states. 11
 Acts in competition
contrary to honest business practices are described as
unfair. 'Honest' is a flexible notion 12 , but notably a number
of acts that are always considered to be unfair are described
in Article l0bis(3). These acts involve confusing or
misleading the customer and discrediting the competition.
Other acts involving badges of trade (like appropriating
someone else's advertising campaign or program or shop
format), not expressly mentioned in Article lObis, can
11Article l0bis:
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such
Countries effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with
the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a
competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade f such a nature as to discredit the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, oUi
competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable
to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the
characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
12This inherent flexibility is both the strength and the weakness of a general provision for unfair
competition. See how this flexible notion has been used as a cornerstone for unfair competition
law in civil law systems in subsequent sections 1.2 below, and see how it has been a drawback
in the development of unfair competition in the British Common Law system. See 1.2.1.4
below.
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frequently be described as acts of unfair free riding 13 on the
back of another's achievement.14
wipo15 maps out the acts which may be recognised as unfair
competition on the basis of Article lObis of the Paris
Convention as follows:
1) Acts expressly mentioned in Article lObis.
- Causing confusion
as to commercial source
as to affiliation
as to sponsorship
by means of
indications
product shapes
- Misleading
- Discrediting competitors
by statements of fact
by false statements
2) Acts not expressly mentioned in Article lObis
- Violation of trade secrets
- Free riding
Dilution
Exploitation of another's reputation
Slavish imitation
Parasitic acts
- Comparative advertising
Misleading
13The act is defined in the WIPO document "Protection against Unfair Competition", WIPO
Publication No. 725(E) 1994 at 55 as:
.EA]ny act that a competitor or another market participant undertakes with
the intention of directly exploiting another person's industrial or commercial
achievement for his own business purposes without substantially departing
from the original achievement.
14See: "Protection against Unfair Competition", WIPO publication No.725 (E), 1994, p.48, 54-
60.
15 "Protection against Unfair Competition", WIPO Publication No. 725(E) 1994
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Discrediting
- Other acts of unfair competition
Nuisance advertising
Exploitation of fear
Undue psychological pressure
Sales promotion
Impeding market activities
Where exploitation of another's achievement becomes
inequitable, unfair competition law acts provides a
corrective remedy. This means that the mere fact that
another's achievement is being exploited, does not call for
any impediment on the basis of unfair competition provisions.
On the contrary, appropriating and building on others'
achievements is the cornerstone of cultural and economic
development. The axiom of freedom to copy epitomises the
principles of the free market system.
In order to protect legitimate interest in the market,
however, a legislative framework of protection in the form of
inter alia trademark, patent, design and copyright protection
has been devised in order to regulate markets. Based on
statute, this framework forms the only method in principle to
obtain a monopoly that frees its owner from competition.
Unfair competition law, however, gives protection in addition
to this framework on the basis of additional factors. These
factors are mainly aimed at the regulation of market
behaviour rather than the protection of market interests.
This makes it possible to award protection on the basis of
these additional factors to other achievements than those
that are protected by statute. In this way it is possible to
rely on these additional factors of unfair competition to
protect those achievements that are normally preempted from
protection.
The principle of free and unrestrained competition, however,
prevails, so that it is more correct to say that unless an
achievement is specified by statute, it will be preempted
from protection. An achievement will remain preempted from
protection, unless additional factors of unfair competition
apply.
Achievements that generally come within the category of
13
permanent preemption fall into this category due to the
following factors.
The achievements can consist of subject matter that is
capable of being protected by specific industrial property
legislation, where the regime is not used. Unregistered
subject material capable of registration may fall into this
category.
Secondly, subject matter that has been protected by
industrial property legislation for the time period provided
for by this legislation, is generally considered to be in the
public domain.
Thirdly, appropriation of subject material covered by a
monopoly is often preempted if the particular use is not
covered by the terms of the lex specialis.
The question whether preemption should be applied for certain
achievements is sometimes answered by the express inclusion
or exclusion of a preemption norm in statutes, so that it is
clear what subject matter is susceptible to protection on the
basis of unfair competition law. In the United States the
doctrine of preemption is given an extra dimension, because
of the dual competence of federal and state legislatures in
industrial property matters.16
As such, unfair competition law encompasses subject matter
that is not covered by dedicated legislation. Indications as
to what achievements are protected can often be found in the
legislation itself. The most common categories of
achievements expressly listed are those seen as needing
protection in the period prior to the enactment of the
legislation. Four stages can be discerned.
(1) A situation in which no legislation covers the subject
material and no protection is available.
(ii) A situation in which the subject material is covered by
a general clause on unfair competition. In this case the
facts surrounding appropriation of the otherwise trivial or
transient subject material amount to a novel way of
misappropriation through a cumulation of acts that become
tortious, or a novel act or way to compete unfairly.
16See 1.2.3.1.2 on Federal preemption below.
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(iii)A situation in which the subject material is expressly
covered by specific unfair competition legislation. These are
usually small identifiable subject areas where the
competitive and behavioural environment surrounding the
subject material is regulated.
(iv) A situation where the subject material is covered by
dedicated legislation. The subject material is individual and
usually stands out as a property interest. This regulated
environment generally leads to the subject material being
preempted from protection under wider notions of unfair
competition law.
Another possibility for invoking unfair competition law
occurs in those circumstances where enhanced protection over
and above the protection granted by a special law is sought.
In these cases a claim on the basis of the lex specialis and
unfair competition law converges for protection of subject
material susceptible to protection from both. In these cases
the specific circumstances under which protection is granted
under the two different regimes differ, as do the interests
that are addressed by protection.
It is also possible to award protection by means of unfair
competition law to those achievements that are preempted.
Preemption occurs when subject matter has either at one point
been covered by a lex specialis, or has not been covered at
all, or has been expressly excised from the specific
legislation. These achievements are normally deemed to be in
the public domain. They may, however, attract protection on
the basis that the interests that are addressed by unfair
competition law differ from those that are addressed by the
lex specialis, thus shifting the rationale for protection.
Dilution of the distinctive quality or advertising value of
a mark, misappropriation of a reputatio-n--s1avish--imitation
and parasitic acts have become distinct forms of unfair
competition that trigger general and all encompassing
protection.
The diagram shows the possibilities for protection for
certain types of achievements, or subject material.
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Subject	 No	 General	 Specific	 Special
material	 legis-	 unfair	 unfair	 law
	
lation	 competition competition
Nothing	 No	 X	 X	 X
protec-
tion
Transient	 X	 Cumulation	 X	 X
or Trivial	 or
Novel act
Identi-	 X	 Preemption Provision	 X
fiable	 unless	 determines
other	 terms and
interests	 scope
Individual	 X	 Preemption	 X	 Laws
unless	 determine
other	 terms and
interests	 scope
Represented in the diagram is a range of subject material:
transient is the material that in itself can not attract
protection, but when appropriation of this material is
quantified in time through cumulation, appropriation may
amount to a tort under a general provision for unfair
competition.
trivial is the material that has not previously been of
importance in terms of protection, but that may be recognised
as a new tort under a general provision for unfair
competition.
identifiable is the material that has been recognised as an
act of unfair competition. It may exist in specific codified
form, where boundaries for both subject material itself and
the scope of protection it is capable of attracting is
clearly demarcated. The application of general unfair
competition law is preempted, but there may be protectable
interests that fall outside of the ambit of the specific
provision.
individual is the material that is dependent for its
16
existence on special legislation. By its nature the right
associated with the individual subject material is one of
property. The legislation determines the terms and scope for
recognition and protection of the rights in the material. The
application of general unfair competition law is preempted,
but there may be protectable interests that fall outside of
the ambit of the special law.
1.2 Unfair Competition, Its Legal Basis.
Unfair competition provides a means to counter the
undesirable effects of misuse of another's exploits, or in
the words of Pitney J. 'One should not reap where one has not
sown'. 17 It aims to protect fairness in competition and to
secure the freedom of competition structures, thus main-
taining healthy competition as the foundation of the free
enterprise system. Unfair competition, therefore, encompasses
all aspects of industrial property law. As a result, its
rationale is based upon general principles.
It is precisely this general principle which has been both
the strength and the weakness of the doctrine of unfair
competition. The elasticity of its concept has made it
possible to award protection to the fruits of someone's
ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour on a case to case
basis. This is useful to describe a situation in which unfair
acts are only limited in type and method by man's ingenuity18
and can not possibly be encapsulated by statutory provisions.
In this sense unfair competition law is neither a substitute
for statutory provisions, nor is it a means of merely
expanding the scope of protection awarded by statutory
monopoly rights.19
The weakness originates from the—fact that-,----to--accommodate
protection in a diversity of cases, a general formulation of
the rationale of unfair competition is used. This means that
17Jntejol News Service v. Associated Press (248 US 215 at 239. 1918)
18E Sell: "The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition" [19581 11 Vand.LR 483.
19KH Fezer: "Trademark Protection under Competition Law", [1988] 19 IIC 192 at 207.
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it is up to the courts to decide what is fair or unfair in
the marketplace.
In order to overcome this inherent weakness, we can see
attempts by legislatures to integrate the general principles
of unfair competition in the wider framework of the the legal
system or to legislate expressly for certain competititive
acts or subject material, so as to increase the objectivity
of the general principles of unfair competition law.
In an historical perspective of unfair competition law two
main approaches for providing protection against unfair
competition can be discerned. 20
 First of all there are legal
systems where protection is predominantly based on a general
provision in the civil code 21
 or on the law of passing off and
trade secrets. 22
 Secondly there are countries where specific
legislation23, or specific provisions within broader
statutes, 24
 predominantly form the basis for the doctrine.
Mixes or hybrids between these two forms are also possible,
but the emphasis lies on either one of these two approaches.
There is, however, also a residual category. This category
consists of countries that have concurrent and unmerged
provisions governing unfair competition law. 25
 This is brought
about by a split in common law and legislation, augmented by
the division in the prerogative of federal and state
jurisdiction. In theory this leads to four distinct sources
for unfair competition law. On the state level there is state
common law and legislation and on a federal level there is
20See the WIPO document "Protection against Unfair Competition", WIPO Publication No.
725(E) 1994 at 19-21.
21 W1P0 gives France, Italy and The Netherlands as examples.
22W1P0 gives the United Kingdom as an example.
23W1P0 mentions Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finjand, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Peru,
the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
24W1P0 mentions Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Hungary, Mexico, Peru,
Rumania and Venezuela.
25 p cites countries with a federal state structure and exemplifies it with the situation in the
United States of America.
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federal legislation and common law. 26 Another category
represented in the residual category consists of the systems
that have hybrids of common and civil law principles.
1.2.1 The Civil Code Principles, Common Law and Case Law
Approach.
In the follow sections a concise description is given of the
way in which unfair competition law is shaped in those
countries that do not have specific legislation to cater for
protection against unfair competition law. In the following
section the common element is the fact that liability for
unfair competition is based on general principles of tortious
liability. We will see that the ambit of protection is
determined by the way in which tortious liability has been
shaped by the courts. In this sense civil law judges have
been much more prepared to interpret a general provision
describing tort containd in the respective civil codes in
such a way that liability in unfair competition cases is seen
as the result of a general and more or less coherent tort of
unfair competition that regulates various types of market
behaviour.
In common law systems, on the other hand, liability for an
act of unfair competition is the result of the satisfaction
of requirements that make up a narrowly defined tort, so that
liability is only accepted under one specific head of tort.
A general tort of unfair competition is therefore absent.
1.2.1.1 France.
In France27 the courts developed a universal law28 of unfair
26Leaving aside the question whether there is such a thing as federal common law, Erie
Railroad Company v. To,npkins, 304 US (1938).
27For an overview see: A. Maitland Hudson: "France Practical Commercial Law", (1992)
Longman, at 43-46; G. Ripert and R. Roblot: "Traité de Droit Commercial", (1988) Libraire
Génrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 13th ed., Vol.1 at 318 et seq.; R. Krasser, 6. Sallerin
and U. Schatz: "France", IV in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft" ("La repression de Ia concurrence
déloyale dans les Etats membres de Ia C.E.E."), Ulmer ed. (1977) Carl Heymanns Verlag.
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competition on the basis of Article 1382 of the French Civil
Code. This general provision states that damages are payable
in compensation for the perpetration of unlawful acts. The
act can be unintentional for it to be considered a fault that
obliges indemnification. A plaintiff will have to establish
that unfair trade practices have been used, that damage has
been caused and that the damage is a result of the trade
practices in question.
In unfair competition terms this principle has been used to
recognise the right of an entrepreneur to retain the
clientele he has acquired, without creating monopolies that
would impair the basic principle of freedom of commerce. The
requirement of 'fault' is not only expressed in a tort, but
also in a right against the possible poaching and diversion
of customers. 29 The interpretation of the general provision
in the Civil Code for the purposes of 'concurrence déloyale'
therefore addresses both the sanctions available in case of
tortious acts and the protection of a right.
This principle is perhaps best expressed in a distinct form
of competition, namely the 'concurrence parasitaire', which
deals with the behaviour with which an enterprise follows in
the wake of another enterprise in order to exploit the same
group of clientele at the expense of the former. 3° This can
involve profiting from another's reputation or other
achievement in commerce or technique. The difference from
other forms of 'concurrence déloyale' lies in the fact that
confusion on the part of the public does not necessarily form
an ingredient in 'concurrence parasitaire', with dilution of
28For 'concurrence déloyale' as applied to trade marks see: A. Chavanne and J. Burst: 'Droit
de Ia propriét industrielle", 3 ed. (1990) Dalloz, at 583-595, 696-751 and 772-775.
29This principle is far removed from English practice, where the taking of another man's market
is not considered to be a tort. For a statement of this principle see: Hodg/dnson & Corby Ltd.
and Roho Inc. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd. [1995] FSR 169 per Jacob J.:
I turn to consider the law and begin by identifying what is not the law. There
is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a man's market or customers.
Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own. There is no
tort of making use of another's goodwill as such. There is no tort of
competition.
30Court of Appeal: Cass. corn., 17 mai 1982, 553.
See P. Le Tourneau: 'le parasitisme dans tous ses états" [1993] 42 RDS 310-414.
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the distinctive quality of a badge of trade as a prime
example of the effects of this approach. It has even led to
the formulation of a new and wide principle, albeit poorly
developed, of the 'abuse of the freedom of commerce' ,31
1.2.1.2 The Netherlands.
Although the Dutch law 32 contains several special provisions
that deal with competition, the doctrine of unfair
competition is based on a general clause in the civil code.
Article 1401 of the old Civil Code and its interpretation by
the Dutch Supreme Court in the Lindebaum/Cohen decision of
19l9 describes the duty of care to be observed in society
towards person or property. 34 Article 6:162 sub 2, contained
in Book 6 on the law of obligations, of the 1992 Civil Code
follows the wording of the Supreme Court, making it a tort
to:
a) infringe a right by;
b) acting, or failing to act, contrary to a legal obligation;
or
c) acting, or failing to act, contrary to what is, under
unwritten law, proper behaviour in society.
As far as intellectual property law is concerned, the first
criterion does not play a substantial role. Rights in
31 Court of Appeal: Corn, 22 octobre 1985, Bull. cass., 1985, 4, n° 245.
32For an overview see: "The Netherlands Practical Commercial Law", W. Hoyng, J. Roelvink,
F. Schlingmann, (1992) Longman, 171-175.; L. Baeumer and W. van Maanen: "Niederlande",
Part II, vol. 2 in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", Ulmer ed. (1967) Carl Heymanns Verlag.; F. Henning-
Bodewig: "Das neue (alte) Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs der Niederlande", [1993] GRUR
mt. 126-133.
33HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, 161, deciding that an unlawful act is an act or omission wbicli
violates another person's right, or conflicts with the defendant's statutory duty, or is contrary
either to good morals or to the care which is due in society with regard to another's person or
property. The facts of the case involved the printer Cohen who had bribed his competitor's
employee to divulge with business practices at Lindebaum printers.
For a general overview on the law of obligations in The Netherlands see D. Fokkema and A.
Hartkamp: "Law of Obligations" in "Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers", J.
Chorus, P. Gever, E. Hondius, A. Koekoek ed., 2d ed. (1993) Kiuwer, Chap 8.; G. Samuel
and J. Rinkes: "The English Law of Obligations in Comparative Context", (1991) Ars Aequi
Libri, 37-40.
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intangibles are dealt with in specific intellectual property
legislation. The scope of protection derived from the right
granted by the specific legislation is enshrined in these
specific statutes. Article 6:162 sub 2 is therefore preempted
from extending the scope of protection conferred by these
special Acts, unless additional rights, that the specific Act
does not provide, are claimed.
The second criterion revolves around the notion of a legal
obligation. A legal obligation can arise out of statutes. In
this sense the criterion converges with the first. This means
legal obligations arising out of statutes, by-laws and
administrative Acts. 35 There is, however, no liability in
those cases where the rule allegedly violated did not serve
to protect the interest of the competitor or if the damage
suffered lies outside its scope of protection.36
The third criterion has turned out to be the most versatile
one for the development of unfair competition law. It has
enabled the courts, without express consent from the
35 As such the Criminal Code contains a general provision prohibiting unfair competition (328
bis), the Civil Code contains a provision against misleading advertising (6:194-196)
36Article 6:163 Dutch Civil Code.
This principle is also recognised in English law. See Gouriet v. Union of Postal Workers [1977]
3 All ER 70 and Rickless v. United Artists Corporation [1988] QB 40, [1987] FSR 362 to the
question whether section 1-2 of the 1958 Dramatic and Musical Performers' Protection Act did
operate to confer a civil remedy in favour of the performers of dramatic and musical works as
well as to impose criminal liability upon persons who infringed the provisions of sections 1 of
this Act, which reads:
'Subject to the provisions of this Act if a person knowingly (a) makes a record
directly or indirectly from or by means of the performance of a dramatic or
musical work without the consent in writing of the performers or (b) sells or
lets for hire or distributes for the purposes of trade or by way of trade
exposes or offers for sale or hire a record made in contravention of this Act
or (c) uses for the purposes of a public performance a record so made he shall
be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable on summary
conviction to a fine ...'
Per Browne-Wilkinson V.C. at 57:
'If, as I think, the right to consent vests in the personal representatives after
the death of the performer I can see no compelling reason for limiting the
section in the way suggested, Like the judge I consider that the Act of 1958
was not passed just to protect the performer's interests by prohibiting the
reproduction of a performance which might damage the performer's chances
of getting further employment; the Act is to protect performers generally.
Although the protection of his reputation and future employment is important,
so is the protection of a performer's economic interests by ensuring that he
is paid for the use of his performance.'
The principle was affirmed in Grower v. BBC [1990] FSR 595.
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legislature, to hold certain behaviour in society
unacceptable on the basis of civil law principles of good
faith, reasonableness and fairness. Both the development of
commercial and consumer law are in this way integrated in the
Dutch law of obligations.
The result of the Dutch practice with regards to unfair
competition is that the distinction between civil and
commercial law is academic, since for both the same general
provisions apply.37
1.2.1.3 Italy.
Article 2598 of the 1942 Civil Code contains three sections
that provide for protection against acts of unfair
competition that take place in a competitive environment.38
The first section provides relief in situations in which the
consumer is likely to be confused ('confusione'). The
protection against confusion includes the inability of the
consumer to distinguish between products and situations in
which products are being slavishly imitated ('iinitazione
servile').
The second section describes slanderous or defamatory acts
('denigrazione').
The third section is a general clause, prohibiting all
business conduct likely to damage someone else's goodwill.
In the first two instances the likelihood of damage is held
to be the presumed result of the acts covered in the
sections, but in the third section the likelihood of damage
has to be proven by the plaintiff. This has led to a shift of
emphasis from the first two sections to the third. This
37G. Samuel and J. Rinkes: "The English Law of Obligations in Comparative Context", (1991)
Ars Aequi Libri at 49-50. F. Henning-Bodewig: "Das neue (alte) Recht des unlauteren
Wettbewerbs der Niederlande", [1993] GRUR mt. 126-133 at 132.
38FOr an overview see: R. Barbalich: "Italy, Practical Commercial Law", (1992) Longman at
30-34.; G. Schricker: "Italien", Part V in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs
in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", Ulmer ed. (1965) Carl
Heymanns Verlag,; K. Schaltenberg: "Die Bekampfung irreführender und unlauterer Werbung
in Italien: die neuere Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts und der Werbeselbstkontrolle", (1988)
Carl Heymanns Verlag at 7-35.
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facilitates in principle the establishment of a general law
of unfair competition, with the acts described in section one
and two as specific examples of unfair behaviour. 39 This means
that all acts in competition can be judged against the
principles of fair conduct in trade. Despite the expanding
interpretation of the general clause and the related growth
of a body of law on unfair competition, however, its
independent status is not yet clear. This is because the
relationship between the torts of unfair competition and the
ordinary provisions in the Civil Code on extra-contractual
liability (Article 2043 et seq.) has not been made clear.
This lack of clarity does on the other hand make it possible
for acts that are committed outside of a competitive
relationship to be tried on the basis of Article 2043. This
makes it possible for third parties like consumers to bring
actions.
1.2.1.4 The United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom 4° is the odd one out in so far as it does
not recognise a law of unfair competition 4' in the sense that
there is no general principle that underlies a body of law
governing competition. 62 Because of this lack of coherence the
39K. Schaltenberg: "Die Bekampfung irreführender und unlauterer Werbung in Italien: die
neuere Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts und der Werbeselbstkontrolle", (1988) Carl
Heymanns Verlag at 15, where he describes the slow shift in interpretation of section three from
a mere addition to the first two sections, to an all inclusive provision.
40Hartwig Graf von Westerholt und Gysenberg: "Vereinigtes Konigreich von GroBbritannien
und Nordirland", Part VI in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", Ulmer ed. (1981) Carl Heymanns
Verlag.
41 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. and Roho inc. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd. [1995] FSR 169 per
Jacob J.:
There is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a man's market or
customers. Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own.
There is no tort of making use of another's goodwill as such. There is no tort
of competition.
42Bulmer lid. v. Bollinger S.A. [1977] 2 CMLR 625, CA per Buckley L.J.:
Although injury to a plaintiff's goodwill in his trade or business is a necessary
ingredient of a cause of action in passing-off, it is not alone sufficient to give
such a cause of action, for goodwill can be injured by perfectly legitimate
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law can be characterised as a patchwork of various torts and
regulations. The tort that comes closest to a general
principle, 43 and is most important where badges of trade are
concerned, is the law of passing of f. 64 This tort is the
expression of the common law principle that no one is allowed
to pass off his products as those of someone else. As such
the tort is designed to prevent confusion in the marketplace.
It does this to protect the goodwill of the trader. Relief
can be obtained in those cases in which this goodwill is
damaged, or likely to be damaged, as a result of a
misrepresentation made by the defendant. 45
 A defendant is free
to enter the market that the plaintiff has established, but
he may not deceive the customers or consumers that constitute
this market, 46 nor may he spread malicious falsehoods,47
competition. To give rise to such a cause of action the defendant's conduct
[...] must be of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate E. . .1 What
conduct then will the law regard as illegitimate? So far as I know, no judge
has attempted at any time to define this. No doubt, this is wise, for conduct
which the court may regard as calculated unfairly to prejudice the goodwill of
another business may take many varied forms.
43Erven Warnink B. V. v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) lid. [1980] RPC 31 per Diplock Li. at
91-97:
Unfair trading as a wrong actionable at the suit of other traders who thereby
suffer loss of business or goodwill may take a variety of forms, to some of
which separate labels have become attached in English law. Conspiracy to
injure a person in his trade or business is one, slander of goods another, but
most important is what is generally and nowadays, perhaps misleadingly,
described as passing-off. the forms that unfair trading takes will alter with the
ways in which trade is carried on and business reputation and goodwill
acquired.
44See C. Wadlow: "The Law of Passing Off", (1990) Sweet & Maxwell, especially at 22-3 1.
45Erven Warnink B. V. v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) lid. [1979] AC 731 per Diplock L.J. at 742
with reference to Spalding v. Gamage (1915) 84 U Ch 449:
Spa/ding v. Gamage and later cases make it possib'e to identify five
characteristics which must be present-iw'order--to--create-a valid cause of
action for passing-off: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the
course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of
goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the
business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably
foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business
or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a quia timet
action) will probably do so.
46Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd and another v Wards Mobility Services Ltd. (Ch . D) [1995] FSR 169:
At the heart of passing off lies deception or its likelihood, deception of the
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injuring the plaintiff's goodwill or business reputation.
In spite of appeals from several authors, 48 the acceptance of
the concept of unfair competition at common law does not seem
to be at hand. 49 As far as badges of trade are concerned one
might feel that the EC Directive on Trade Marks and the
consecutive White Paper in the UK have filled many of the
gaps that existed in the protection of trade marks. 50 This
might be true for many signs which fall within the broad
definition of trade mark;
ultimate consumer in particular. Over the years passing off has developed
from the classic case of the defendant selling his goods as and for those of
the plaintiff to cover other kinds of deception, e.g. that the defendant's goods
are the same as those of the plaintiff when they are not, e.g. Combe -v-
Scholl [1980] RPC 1; or that the defendant's goods are the same as goods
sold by a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member when they are
not, e.g. Advocaat [19801 RPC 29. Never has the tort shown even a slight
tendency to stray beyond classes of deception. Were it to do so it would enter
the field of honest competition, declared unlawful for some reason other than
deceptiveness. Why there should be any such reason I cannot imagine. it
would serve only to stifle competition.
4TFor malicious falsehood see: Ratc1ffe v. Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 in conjunction with
Defamation Act 1952 s.3.
48G. Dworkin: "Unfair Competition: Is the Common Law Developing a New Tort?" [1979] 9
EIPR 241-247;H. Brett: "Unfair Competition - Not Merely an Academic Issue?" [1979] 11
EIPR 295-296; J. Lahore: "The Pub Squash Case. Legal Theft or Free Competition" [1981] 2
EIPR 54-56; G. Dworkin: "Passing Off and Unfair Competition: An Opportunity Missed"
[19811 44 MLR 564-567; P. Burns: "Unfair Competition a Compelling Need Unmet." [1981]
11 EIPR 311; J. Adams: "Is there a Tort of Unfair Competition? Legal Protection of
Advertising Campaigns and Merchandising" [1985] JBL 26-33; A Booy: "A Half-way House
for Unfair Competition in the United Kingdom - A Practitioner's Plea" [19911 12 EIPR 439-
441; For an Australian Common Law View see also J. Lahore: "The Herchel Smith Lecture
1992: Intellectual Property Rights and Unfair Copying: Old Concepts, New Ideas" [1992] 12
EIPR 428-433; and C. Elliott: "The Common Law: Unfair Competition and Sui Generis
Legislation. A Time for Reappraisal" [19921 JanfFeb 20 TMW 25-30.
49See as to the possible reason why P. Burns in "Unfair Competition a Compelling Need
Unmet." [1981] 11 ELPR 311 came to the conclusion that a need is unmet, see J. Adams:
"Unfair Competition: Why a Need is Unmet." [1992] 8 EIPR 259-261, where he argues that
the English adversarial system requires a well defined action, which hard to reconcile with a
general provision of unfair competition.
See also L. Harms: "Unfair Competition in an Adversarial System" [19931 2 EIPR 74, who
points to that fact that it is not the adversarial system, but the ability of the courts to make value
judgements that determines the evolution of unfair competition law. In this respect he refers to
the South African hybrid system where Roman Dutch law is mixed with English law. See in this
respect also 1.2.4.3.
50For an overview of the Trade Marks Act 1994 see A. Firth: "Trade Marks The New Law"
(1995) Jordans.
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any sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words,
including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or
their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.
Other badges of trade however, like image, advertisements and
slogans, which dominate much of today's marketing exercises,
stand out as an area of controversy. English law has great
difficulty in recognising these business assets as subjects
of property or quasi-property rights capable of attracting
protection from misappropriation.51
This reluctance stems from the fact that unfair competition
law attempts to encompass all aspects of industrial property
law. As a result its rationale is based upon general prin-
ciples. To accommodate protection in a diversity of cases, a
general formulation of the rationale of unfair competition is
used. This means that it is up to the courts to decide what
is fair or unfair in the marketplace. The judges in common
law countries have been reluctant to do so, 52 because this
51 y • Cornish: "Unfair Competition? A Progress Report" [1972] 12 JSPTL 126 at 129-136.
On the other hand, however, analogy to traditional concepts of intellectual property law has
proven to increase the range of protectable subject matter. An example can be found in the 1989
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, Ch 48 s. 213-264, where copy-like protection is awarded
to unregistered functional or aesthetic designs for a fifteen-year period. This use of analogy has
been termed the 'broadest derogation from free-market principles in the history of intellectual
property law', which makes the resistance in the United Kingdom to embrace the doctrine of
unfair competition law unconvincing. See J. Reichman: "Legal Hybrids between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms" [1994] 94 Col.LR 2432-2558 at 2465 and at 2490 in discussing
protection against product simulation:
[TIhe reason that the United Kingdom, in particular, lacks an unfair
competition law to perform similar functions is that it formally subscribes to
strict free-market principles in accordance with which product simulation is a
right rather than a wrong. The use of copyright law to close this antipiracy
gap is thus both hypocritical and economically counterproductive since
copyright law cuts back on free competition even more than a general purpose
misappropriation law need do.
52Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd and another v Wards Mobility Services Ltd..
Chancery Division, [19951 FSR 169:
Some think that copying is unethical; others do not. Often the copyist of
today becomes the innovator of tomorrow. copying is said by some to be part
of the lifeblood of competition, the means of breaking de facto market
monopolies and keeping down the price of articles not protected by special
monopolies such as patents or registered designs. Others say that copyists are
parasites on innovators. None of this matters. Certain it is not the law that
copying as such is unlawful: the common law (and I am concerned with the
common law) leans against monopolies.
Appeals were made to such notions as 'riding on the back of Roho', or 'taking
Roho's market'. Indeed evidence was led that a Ward's salesman actually said
27
would impose ambiguous moral standards upon business conduct,
thus interfering with competition.53
In this apprehension entrepreneurial productivity can not be
appraised legally unless specific legislation sets the
boundaries of any monopoly right given. 54 A monopoly right as
such can only emanate from a proprietary interest, a
classification in which ingenuity, knowledge, skill and
labour are not readily recognised. 55 This is certainly true
in the common law jurisdictions, where Dixon J. said that the
courts:
have not in British jurisdictions thrown the protection of an injunction around
all the intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange, which may
flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources whether in
the organisation of a business or undertaking or in the use of ingenuity,
knowledge, skill or labour. This is sufficiently evidenced by the history of the
law of copyright and by the fact that the exclusive right to invention, trade
marks, designs, trade names and reputation are dealt with in English law as
special heads of protected interests and not under a wide generalisation.56
1.2.1.5 The Civil Code Principle and Common Law Approach;
Conclusion.
The common law approach is different from the civil code
approach in that there is no underlying and unifying
principle of unfair competition. The common law shares the
way in which the legal rule is made with the civil law
general principle approach. Tort forms the basis for
liability in both instances. Despite this fact, however, the
that 'Ward's were riding on the back of Raymar in order to achieve better
sales of their cushion.' [...1 But it does not matter. Even if it was said, it does
not amount to anything relevant. You can ride on the back of a competitor by
deceiving customers or by honest competition. One is unlawful, the other is
not.
53See for example Fry L.J. in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co. (1889), 23 QBD
598 at 625-626:
To draw a line between fair and unfair conduct in competition, between what
is reasonable and unreasonable, passes the power of the courts.
54Economic torts such as unlawful interference with trade, conspiracy to injure and injurious
falsehood however show that courts are capable of setting boundaries.
55D. Libling: "The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles" [1978] 94 LQR 103-119.
56 Victoria Park Racing Co., Ltd. v. Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, at 509.
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boundaries of tortious liability are rigid in the common law
system and are confined to certain acts such as passing off
and injurious or malicious falsehood.
The boundaries for tortious liability are much more fluid in
the civil law systems, where a general principle against
unfair competition is distilled from the general provision
describing tortious liability.
We have seen that the ratio for this difference can be found
in the reluctance of common law judges to expand tortious
liability beyond special heads of protected interests.
The wide and general principle against unfair competition
present in civil law systems does indeed seem ambiguous in
the light of the common law critique. In order to determine
whether this is really the case, we will have to look at two
possibilities to increase the objectivity of the general
principle.
In the first place we will look at the lex specialis approach
towards unfair competition. Statutory recognition of the
protectable interests may remove a lot of objections against
a general approach towards unfair competition law.
In the second place we will have to look at the way in which
a general clause is made more objective by the interpretation
of the clause within the boundaries of the legal system (see
Chapter Two).
1.2.2 The Lex Specialis Approach.
Drafting special provisions for unfair competition law may
remove some objections against basing an action for unfair
competition on a general clause, without the constraints of
recognised heads of tort. It can be noted in the description
of the system in the following countries-that-this-amounts to-
codification of certain tortious acts of unfair competition,
very much in accordance with the acts mentioned in Article
lObis of the Paris Convention.57
57See 1.1 above.
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1.2.2.1 Belgium.
Articles 1382-1384 of the Belgian Civil Code form the basis
of unfair competition law and have been developed along the
same lines as in French law. 58 In addition to this general
framework, however, the law of the 14th July, 1991 on trade
practices and on the information and protection of the
consumer came into effect on the 29th of February 1992. It
provides protection for the consumer against misinformation
with regards to pricing and product characteristics. The
misinformation may result from a geographical indication,
misleading or disparaging advertising. The law also prohibits
the creation of confusion in the marketplace and parasitical
competition.59
On the basis of the act relief can be sought in the form of
an injunction, leaving Articles 1382-1384 as a means to
obtain compensation for the damage suffered as a result of
unfair competition on the basis of the rules governing
contractual and non-contractual liability. In this way
certain types of behaviour are expressly regulated by
statute, leaving further development of the law of unfair
competition on the basis of the civil code to the courts.
Because of this particular structure, the Belgian law of
unfair competition forms a hybrid between the civil code
principles approach and lex specialis approach.
58S N. van Crombrugghe and G. Arendt: "Belgium and Luxembourg Practical and
Commercial Law", (1992) Longman at 28-32.; G. Schricker and B. Franq: "Belgien", Part II,
vol. 1 in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", Ulmer ed. (1967) Carl Heymanns Verlag.
59For parasitical competition see the description under the French section at 1.2.1.1 above and
6.3.2 below.
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1.2.2.2 Germany.
In Germany, 6° where the courts refused 61 to expand on existing
notions of fair competition, a special law on unfair
competition (UWG) was enacted in 190962 and was amended
several times. 63 The act contains specific provisions 6' and
two general provisions of which §1 UWG 65 is the most
important. It is a general expression of the principle that
a claim to desist and a claim for damages is awarded in those
cases in which someone in the course of business acts in
conflict with 'bonos mores', good morals. In time the German
courts have used this provision to build a comprehensive body
of law governing the protection against unfair competition.
60For a history on the law of unfair competition in Germany see W. Gloy: "Die Entwicklung
des Wettbewerbsrecht und seiner Nebengebiete" in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hundertjahrigen Bestehen der Deutchen
Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier,
A. Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed. (1991) VCH, pp. 855-896.
See also V. Emmerich: "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 3"' ed. (1990) C.H.Beck
Verlag, 9-14; D. Reimer: "Deutschland", Part III in the series "Das Recht des unlauteren
Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", Ulmer ed.
(1968) Carl Heymanns Verlag.; H. Salger: "Germany, Passing Off: Protection against
Imitations under the Unfair Competition Act" in "WIPO Guidebook: Federal Republic of
Germany, Austria and Switzerland", B. Rüster ed. (1991) Matthew Bender; AIPPI Annuaire
19931111 at 1-17.
61 Reichsgericht 11.4. 1901 RGZ 48, 114.
62Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb. 7.6.1909.
63MoSt notably in 1969, when a general clause contained in § 3 UWG, dealing with confusing
statements in business, was expanded.
"Specific provisions deal with clearance sales, vague compound and origin indications, bribery
and bribability of employees and undertakers, endangerment of business and credit through
slander and defamation, abuse of certification marks, breach of confidentiality etc.
For a short history and text of the specific provisions see F.K. Beier G. Schricker and W.
Fikentscher: "German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust Laws", IIC studies vol. 6,
(1983) VCH.
65 "Wer im geschaftlichen Verkehr zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes Handlungen vornimmt, die
gegen die guten Sitten verstofien, kann auf Unterlassung und Schadenersatz in Anspruch
genommen werden."
For an overview see W. Hefermehi: "Die konkretisierung der wettbewerbsrechtlichen
Generalklausel durch Rechtsprechung und Lehre in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hundertjahrigen Bestehen der Deutchen
Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier,
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Within this body of case law five categories of unfair acts
can be distinguished, 67 namely fishing for customers,
obstructive practices, exploitation of reputation, breach of
law and disturbance of the market.
1.2.2.3 Austria.
Austria's law on unfair competition is structured along the
same lines as German 1aw. Section one of the Austrian Act
against unfair competition contains a general clause that
prohibits conduct in the competitive environment that offends
good morals.
1.2.2.4 Switzerland.
Switzerland is a country with a young law of unfair
competition, 69 which was enacted in 1986 and is remarkable in
several respects. First of all it approaches competition in
a positive light, defining it functionally. As becomes
apparent in the general provision of Article 1, the aim of
the Act is to warrant fair and undistorted competition in the
interest of all market participants.
The other remarkable feature is contained in Article 5, which
covers the undue use of another's achievement. It covers
achievements that are disclosed in offers, calculations or
plans on a basis of confidentiality or in the knowledge that
the disclosure has not been authorised. It also addresses
achievements in advanced state of marketability, where they
are usurped and capitalized upon, by a defendant who does not
make expenses of his own, by means of a technical
reproductive process. As such only materialised results of
A. Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed. (1991) VCH, pp. 897-937.
67A Baumbach and W. Hefermehi: "Wettbewerbsrecht" 16th ed. (1990).
For a general overview see M. Walter and P. Hallas: "Austria" in "WIPO Guidebook:
Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Switzerland", B. Rüster ed. (1991) Matthew Bender.
69For a general overview see C. Englert and A. Kerr: "Switzerland" in "WIPO Guidebook:
Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Switzerland", B. Rüster ed. (1991) Matthew Bender.
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labour are covered under this last head.70
The law is also used to obtain protection for trade names,
get-up, trade secrets, confidential information, for which
there are no provisions under federal law.
1.2.2.5 Luxembourg.
In Luxembourg competition law is regulated by several
specific laws. 71 These are : the Law of 5 July, 1929 on unfair
trading, dealing with trade secrets; the Law of 25 August,
1983 and the Law of 15 May, 1987, both dealing with consumer
protection; and the law of 27 November, 1986 listing a number
of trade practices and prohibiting unfair competition.
The latter provision contains an article on advertising
(Article 18). Furthermore Article 16 sets out those acts that
are held to be unfair trading. These acts are covered by a
general clause comprising acts that are contrary to honest
practices in industry and trade, but certain types of
behaviour leading to the creation of confusion by means of
false statements or otherwise are also expressly mentioned.
1.2.2.6 Spain.
Spain adopted an unfair competition act in 1991,72 that
provides detailed provisions concerning impropriety in
70A. Troller: "Gedanken zur Bedeutung des Leistungsschutzes im Entwurf für em neues
schweizerisches Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb" [1985] GRUR mt. 94-99 at 97
confines the scope of these achievements to apparatuses, machinery, printed products, sound
and image carriers, computer programmes etc. He states that happenings like sports events,
radio broadcasts and the like are not covered by the description, but continues to add that they
ought to be treated as such. He indicates as the reason for the inclusion the fact that these are
also materialised results of labour and therefore are worthy of protection_
See also J. Reichman: "Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms" [1994] 94
Col.LR 2432-2558 at 2474, who points to the shortcomings of the Act:
[T]he lack of a specific term of duration and of other particulars distinguishing
licit from illicit competition leave implementation of this statutory norm at the
mercy of the courts, and the Swiss courts have been unremittingly hostile to
the statute so far.
71 See N. van Crombrugghe and G. Arendt: "Belgium and Luxembourg Practical and
Commercial Law", (1992) Longman at 173-176.
See F. Pombo's report in [1991] 6 EIPR D-114 and [1991] 12 EIPR D-249-250.
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competition in the marketplace, extending to practices
harmful to both competitors and consurners. It includes a
general provision, 74 that qualifies those acts unfair that can
objectively be characterised as a violation of good faith.
It furthermore includes a provision against the exploitation
of another's reputation.tm
1.2.2.7 Greece.
In Greece the law of unfair competition 76 is based on Law
146/1914 pen athemitou antagonismou . It contains a general
article (Article 1) that contains a general provision
prohibiting acts that oppose morality. This general principle
can concur with specific provisions in the law on unfair
competition and other statutory rules like the trade mark
law, but it may also form the sole basis for action. Article
13 of L 146/1914 provides for an action in passing off in
case of use of a name, trade name, distinctive signs or
shapes, where confusion is likely to be created.
In those cases where dilution forms the nature of the
complaint and confusion as to the source of the product is
absent, however, relief can be obtained under the general
provision.
In addition to L 146/1914, L 1961/1991 provides for consumer
protection and protection against deceptive and unfair
advertising.
1.2.2.8 The lex specialis Approach; Conclusion.
We have seen that codification of principles of unfair
competition law follows Article lObis of the Paris Convention
quite closely. This is clearly the case in Belgium, Germany,
7'3Law 3/199 1 of 10 January on Unfair Competition: Chapter 1, Articles 2 and 3.
74Law 3/1991 of 10 January on Unfair Competition: Chapter 2, Article 5.
ThLaw 3/1991 of 10 January on Unfair Competition: Chapter 2, Article 12.
76For a short overview see: I. Rokas: "Greece, Practical Commercial Law", 1992 Longman at
21-26; N. Deloukas: "Commercial Law" in "Introduction to Greek law", K. Kerameus and P.
Kzyris ed., 2 ed. (1993) Kluwer/Sakkouias, at 186-195.
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Austria, Luxembourg, Spain and Greece. Expansions to Article
lObis can mostly be found in the field of confidentiality and
trade secrets. In Switzerland a particularly interesting
addition can be found in the protection that is given to
technical achievements insofar as they are the materialised
result of labour. Apart from these statutory recognised
protectable interests and tortious acts, a large part of
unfair competition law still relies on a general clause. In
this instance it is not a general provision describing all
tortious acts, but a provision that indicates that an act of
unfair competition constitutes a tort.
Just like in the civil law general clause approach, such an
all encompassing principle against unfair competition is
dependent on the courts for its interpretation.
It would appear therefore that, despite the fact that the
legal basis in the two approaches discerned above differs,
the general civil law approach is not dissimilar from the lex
specialis approach in that the general clause containing the
principle of protection against unfair competition is present
in both approaches.
Codification of unfair competition law often amounts to
nothing more than a repetition of the norms of the Paris
Convention in national legislation.
As far as the acts contained in Article lObis are concerned,
the picture is quite universal. Acts that cause confusion,
mislead or discredit are prohibited in all systems described.
The fact that the legal basis lies in the well defined torts
of common law Britain, the civil code or special unfair
competition laws does not make much difference.
The schism occurs where unfair competition transcends these
common norms. This can happen in judgements on the basis of
a general clause, contained in th—civilcodear1npecial
legislation. It can, however, also happen by the fact that
statute awards protection to certain achievements that are
not contained in Article lObis of the Paris Convention. The
Swiss unfair competition act forms a poignant example of
expanding statutory protection and nionopolisation of
intangibles.
It is here that the civil law and common law systems diverge.
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The split between common and civil law we noticed before,
when the legal basis for protection against acts of unfair
competition were similar, is not remedied by codification.
1.2.3 The Concurrent Approach and Hybrids.
In this section the residual category of both the common law
and civil law hybrids as well as the concurrent approach will
be discussed. In the concurrent approach we will focus on the
enhanced difficulties that exist in these systems with unfair
competition law. Where hybrids are concerned we will look at
the way in which an attempt has been made to reconcile the
differences in outlook on monopolies and competition in the
common law system and the civil law system.
1.2.3.1 The United States of America.
Combinations of general civil code principles, case law and
special laws concerning unfair competition are common, even
in countries categorised under the headings above. In those
instances special provisions form an elaboration on the
general principle, or, conversely, the lex specialis contains
a general provision. In all these instances one system
complements the other in a more or less coherent structure.
In the concurrent approach, however, this coherence is not
self evident. In countries with a federal state structure,
state and federal legislative competence may diverge.
This leads to a situation where federal legislation, federal
common law77' and state legislation and common law cover the
same subject matter, often leading to legislation on a
federal level and a common law tort on a state level. This
can lead to a situation in which the existence or absence of
supreme federal legislation restricts the development of
state legislation. This is known as federal preemption.
77As to the existence of federal common law see Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 US
(1938), in which Justice Brandeis held that state law is applicable, unless the matter is dealt with
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, in essence denying the existence of federal
common law. See also R. David and J. Brierly: "Major Legal Systems in the World Today"
3 ed. (1985) Stevens & Sons, 414-421.
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1.2.3.1.1 The Unfair Competition Doctrine at Common Law in
the US.
Unfair competition originated in the United States of America
to regulate business methods and was seen as a compendium of
actions against improper business conduct. The term 'unfair
competition' is often used as a synonym for passing of fTh in
the United States, but unfair competition has also developed
in an autonomous doctrine of which the scope and
possibilities of application are only slowly materialising.
The term 'unfair competition' encompasses all methods that
are used in the competitive process. Unfair competition is
therefore nothing more than a head under which several
doctrines operate:
The types of cases labelled 'unfair' usually have specific doctrinal tags such
as palming off, infringement of trade name, disparagement, filching of trade
secrets and trade lists, plagiarism or lotteries. Many smack of deceit, fraud,
libel, violation of statutes, while others involve nothing more than a simple
appropriation of trade values. New cases which are not easily identified by
some specific tag are indiscriminately lumped together as 'unfair competition'
[...) In the area of advertising and the marketing of artistic and literary
products and performances, and attendant services, hurtful practices have
developed which do not readily fall under the general doctrine or any of the
more specific doctrines. Difficult to pinpoint doctrinally, these practices, too,
are termed 'unfair competition'.79
One of these categories finds its origin in several specified
torts, dependent on various general doctrines and can be
termed 'unfair business practices' or 'competitive methods'80.
The other category is of a more specific nature and is more
independent from general doctrines. Termed 'illegal
competition' 'to avoid the word 'unfair', which has emotional
and ethical implications peculiarly subject to the economic
bias of the person using the term' 81
 it is a tort sui
generis 82
78 for example R. Callmann: "Unfair Competition The Law of Trademarks and Monopolies"
4. ed. Callaghan.
L. Green: "Protection of Trade Relations under Tort Law" [19611 47 VLR 559 at 566.
80J. McLaughlin: "Legal Control of Competitive Methods" [19361 21 ILR 274-304.
81j McLaughlin: "Legal Control of Competitive Methods" [19361 21 LLR 274.
82R Callmann: "What is Unfair Competition" [194.01 28 Geo.LR 585 at 599.
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The first manifestation of Unfair Competition as an
autonomous doctrine was in the case of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 83 in which a quasi-property right
in news was recognised. Set against the backdrop of the first
world war's news coverage at the front, International News
Services found itself banned from gathering information at
the front lines, because of German sympathies. The company,
in order to publish their story on the West Coast, appropri-
ated the news gathered by Associated Press on behalf of its
members on the East Coast. This information was obtained by
bribing employees of the newspapers in belonging to the AP
group into passing on the stories to INS before they were
printed and, more importantly, by copying the stories from
AP's bulletin boards designed for the earlier editions on the
East Coast. INS would then run the story in its own papers,
without any acknowledgement of the source. Although AP was
successful in having the bribes and inducement enjoined by
the court at first instance, an injunction against the verba-
tim use without attribution was obtained upon appeal and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. In his opinion Pitney J.
recognised that AP had a quasi-property interest in its news
for the time it had novelty value against its direct conipeti-
tor INS. And that INS by appropriating AP's stories had
reaped where it had not sown, thus constituting the rule that
one can not usurp the fruits of another's labour precisely at
the point where the profit is to be gained, 'reaping without
sowing':
The fault in reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant as
against the public, instead of considering the right of complainant and
defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves. The right of the
purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratui-
tously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with
complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to
transmit that news for commercial use, in competition with complainant which
is what defendant has done and seeks to justify, is a very different matter. In
doing this, defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has
been acquired by complainant as the result of organisation and the
expenditure of labour, skill and money and which is saleable by complainant
for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is
endeavouring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating
to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the
83248 US 215 (1918).
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process amounts to an unauthorised interference with the normal operation
of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is
to be reaped, in order to divert a material proportion of the profit from those
who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with
any part of the expense of gathering news. The transaction speaks for itself,
and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair
competition in business. 84 Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material
out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in
the same field, we hardly can fail to recognise that for this purpose, and as
between them, it must be regarded as quasi-property, irrespective of the
rights of either as against the public.86
In this way the INS case has given an independent doctrinal
base to the law of unfair competition by introducing the
concept of unjust enrichment into it. The ratio for the
decision was that INS was prevented from appropriating AP's
news in competition, because it would thereby enrich itself
at AP's costs, because it did not share in the costs
necessary to gather the news. The specific tag devised for
this type of unfair competition was misappropriation.
In essence this definition reflects a code of ethical
business conduct to which the key is fairness or unfairness
in trading. It is this moral judgement that has met with
resistance, because of its inherent ambiguity. In the
dissenting opinion to the Associated Press case Brandeis J.
held that there is no coherent doctrine of property, but
merely specific interests that are protected either because
of statute or because for policy reasons the common law or
equity protects them. And that the inherent tension between
the monopoly principle and the principle of unrestrained
competition means that the "extension of property rights and
(...J correspondent curtailment of free use of knowledge and
of ideas" lies in the domain of public interest, so it can
only be dealt with by legislation.87
This opinion addresses the fundamental issue whether the
63 L.ed 211 (1918) at 221.
8563 Led 211 (1918) at 219.
R. Callmann: "He Who Reaps Where He has not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of
Unfair Competition" [1942] 55 Harv.LR 595 at 597.
871NS v. AP, 248 US 215 at 225, 246, 263-267 (1918).
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judges are capable of identifying the policies at stake in an
intellectual property dispute and whether the courts should
grant intellectual property rights themselves, or leave this
task to the legislature.
This is the reason why the INS doctrine has never gained a
broad application in the field of intellectual property.
1.2.3.1.2 Federal Preemption.
In the United States of America unfair competition provisions
on a federal level are limited, although article 43(a) of the
Lanham Act provides protection against many forms of
confusion and misrepresentation. Furthermore the Federal
Trade Commission, an agency whose five Commissioners are
appointed by the president, administers the FTC Acts. One of
these, the Unfair Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act (1967), was developed by the FTC and is a
suggested model for adoption as state legislation. As such it
was an expansion on the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(1964).
On a state level parts of either of these suggested pieces of
legislation have been enacted, creating a patchwork of rules.
In addition states have their own jurisdiction with regards
to unfair competition, either in the form of state common
law, or in the form of state unfair competition statutes. The
states are, however, not completely free to do as they
please. This is because the doctrine of federal preemption,
otherwise known as the Sears-Compco policy, 89 is active. This
principle that has been reaffirmed and extended by the
Supreme Court in Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats
Inc. 90
 Derived from the supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 91
 the doctrine of preemption nullifies state or common
The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act).
89Sears Roebuck & Co. v. St(ffel Co., 376 US 225 (1964); Compco Cop. v. Day-B rite Lighting
Inc., 376 US 234 (1964).
°489 US 141 (1989).
91 u.S. Const. art. VI ci. 2.
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law that is in conflict with the objectives of an Act of
Congress. Because of the fact that there is no federal
general statutory law of unfair competition 92 , the specific
issue of monopolisation of intangibles not protected by fede-
ral patent, copyright and trade mark provisions, is addressed
in these cases.
The thought behind federal preemption in intellectual proper-
ty matters is that in the competitive process copying is
permitted unless the subject matter is protected by a
(federal) statutory provision or unfair competition. In this
sense the federal legislature is the exclusive body to grant
a monopoly.
In the Sears and Compco cases93 federal patent law was held
to preempt state law prohibitions.
The Sears case revolved around a pole lamp that was copied by
the Sears Company and sold at a lower price than the
original, which was produced by the Stiffel Company. The
latter company sued on the basis of patent and unfair
competition law. The patent was invalidated because it did
not meet the standards of inventive step set out by the
Patent Act. Protection was however granted on the basis of
state unfair competition law. The Supreme Court reversed
state law decisions and held that:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying
of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be
to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law
has said belongs to the public.94
One element of state unfair competition law was singled out
as a field in which states were free to grant protection by
means of unfair competition law. Protection of the consumer
against confusion as to the source of a product was held to
be the exception to the preemption doctrine.
In Compco the copying of an unpatentedTlight systeiTiadbeen
92Sion 43(a) of the Lanhani Act is the only federal provision addressing unfair competition.
93Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-B rite Lighting
Inc., 376 US 234 (1964).
94Sears Roebuck & Co. v. St We! Co., 376 US 225 (1964) at 23 1-232.
95Sears Roebuck & Co. v. StWe( Co., 376 US 225 (1964) at 222.
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injuncted on the basis of state unfair competition law, be-
cause the plaintiff's patent was invalidated. The wording in
Sears was repeated, but the Supreme Court went on to say that
motives of the copier, non-functionality, secondary meaning
and confusion as to source are no arguments for a state to
prohibit copying of unpatented material or material not
susceptible to copyright.
This ruling seemed to have overruled the INS misappropriation
doctrine and reduced unfair competition law to a minimum96.
The conflict described in these cases arises where the same
subject matter is protected by state law, where federal law
does not protect it due to the fact that it does not satisfy
the criteria that make the subject matter eligible for
protection.
Another possibility, however, arises where subject matter is
protected by state law, whereas the federal law does not
provide protection at all. In the previous cases the court
could easily determine whether there is a conflict between
state and federal law. In this situation however the question
revolves around the intent of the federal legislature (Con-
gress) to preempt. The issue in this case is whether there is
an indication that Congress has carefully considered the
subject matter.97
In the case of Goldstein v. California 98 the question whether
copying of recorded materials, a matter left unattended by
Congress at the time, could be dealt with under state law,
was answered affirmatively. It was held that the failure of
Congress to include recordings in the Federal Copyright Act
did not display an obvious intent to leave this subject
material in the public domain. Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron
96R Dannay: "The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition" [1976]
67 TMR 132.
97P. Heald: 'Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption" [1991] 76
ILR 959 at 969.
98412 US 546 (1973)
412 US 546 (1973) at 564.
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Corp. 10° dealt with state law protecting trade secrets against
disclosure, but did not prevent others from replicating the
process by honest means. It was noted that trade secrets are
not in the public domain anyway, so that by offering
protection against trespass, no subject matter was
inonopolised, which would normally have to pass through the
federal legislative process.
It was submitted that these cases have modified the Sears-
compco doctrine to the extent that only those statutory and
unfair competition rights are preempted that are equivalent
to copyright or patent, where the subject material falls
within the scope of these federal laws101.
Trade dress, package configuration, characters, titles and
trade marks generally escape preemption.
First of all, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 102 provides a
means to overcome the Sears-Compco Doctrine. 103 This provision
aims to prevent unfair competition through false designation
of origin. In this way nonfunctional container shapes and
package configurations that have acquired secondary meaning
can be protected even though similar criteria under state
unfair competition law and passing off were held to be
preempted in the Sears and Corapco cases.
Relying on the subsequent Goldstein and Kewanee cases, the
lower courts have even allowed state statutory and unfair
competition provisions as the basis for injunctive relief
against copying.'°4
'°°416 US 470 (1974).
101 R. Dannay: "The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition"
[1976] 67 TMR 132 at 142.
102S. 43(a):
Any person who shall fix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, [...1
shall be liable to a civil action....
lO3 Hilmy: "Bonito Boats' Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage
Charade and the Lanham Act 'End Around'" [1991] 69 TLR 729 at 753.
'°4R. Dannay: "The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition"
[1976] 67 TMR 132 at 143-145, with an index of the relevant cases at 151 et seq.
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The Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed and extended the
preemptive decisions in Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats Inc.. 105 The case dealt with copying of functional
mechanical configurations and the replication of boat hulls
through direct moulding. Instead of having to construct a
model to create a mould to cast the hull of a boat, Thunder
Craft simply made a mould directly off one of Bonito's hulls.
This particular type of copying was prohibited under the
state unfair competition law of Florida.
This state provision did not prohibit the copying of an unpa-
tented article, (on the contrary, other forms of copying,
like reverse engineering, or building a similar mould were
permitted) but was seeking to prevent the misappropriation of
a valid business interest. The design of the hull itself was
and remained in the public domain. Thunder Craft, however, by
making a mould directly of f the original, appropriated to
itself some of the labour, skill and money invested by
Bonito, in a way that is detrimental to the competitive
process. Thunder Craft gained a competitive advantage over
other hull producers, not solely by sanctioned appropriation
of what was in the public domain, but by acquiring it in a
way that also appropriates the labour, skill, money and
business organisation that has gone into the transition of
the design from drawing board to physical entity, thus
cutting out any effort of creation, business expense or risk.
This method of copying can therefore be seen as misappropria-
tion on the basis of the rationale of INS v. AP106
In this case the result of skipping that part in the produc-
tion process, which is essential for the conceptualisation of
the final product, would lead to a decrease in development in
the area of hull manufacturing.
The Supreme Court, however, saw the protection granted by the
Florida unfair competition statute merely as a way to grant
'°489 US 141 (1989).
Compare with the South African case of Schultz v. Butt [1986] 3 SA 667; [1986] 11 EIPR D-
206 (also [19841 3 SA 568, [1984J 8 EIPR D-178-179). See 1.2.3.3 below for a descripton.
106A Devience Jr.: "Back to Open Season on American Product Ingenuity: Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft, Inc." [19901 24 JMLR 209 at 221.
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protection for an unprotectable design and subsequently held
the Florida statute to be preempted. In doing so the Supreme
Court addressed the Sears-Compco and Goldstein-Kewanee cases
by distinguishing between them according to their specific
subject matter. It held that the Goldstein and Kewanee cases
were mere exceptions to the general doctrine of Sears-Compco:
At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient
operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade
in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.. .EW]e believe
that the Sears Court correctly concluded that the States may not offer patent-
like protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain
unprotected as a matter of federal law. Both the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts
within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are
tools of creation available to all. They provide the baseline of free competition
upon which the patent system's incentive to creative effort depends. A state
law that substantially interferes with the enjoiment of an unpatented utilitarian
or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the
public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure
and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through
the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect incentive
efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress
over the last 200 years. We understand this to be the reasoning at the core
of our decisions in Sears and Compco and we reaffirm that reasoning today.107
Although the reasoning of Sears and Compco was repeated, the
subject matter in the Bonito Boats case is much wider and in
essence encompasses the whole of unfair competition law. The
language is also much stronger. Broad statements like
'patent-like protection' extending to all intellectual
creations make it mandatory to apply the preemption doctrine
to all state statute and unfair competition provisions
dealing with protection of subject matter for which there is
no federal match. This means that state anti-dilution,
misappropriation, publicity rights, royalty statutes and the
like are liable to preemption. 108
 The only exception to this
rule seems to be the special cases of Goldstein, Kewanee and
the general doctrine of passing of f.
The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the BonitöBoatase
has an overruling effect on all unfair competition law, but
is fatal for the doctrine of INS V. AP, since it makes it
107489 US 141 (1989) at 156-157.
108J. Wiley Jr.: "Bonito Boats: Uninformed but Mandatory Innovation Policy" [1989] 9 SCR
283 at 290 er seq.; P. Heald: "Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of
Preemption" [19911 76 ILR 959 at 988 et seq.
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impossible to create quasi-property rights without Congress'
endorsement. This reduces the practical impact of the INS
case to the appropriation of news.
1.2.3.2 Canada's Common Law and Quebec's Civil Code.
Canada takes up a special place in the concurrent approach.
This is because of the special position Quebec has in the
federal state structure of Canada. Quebec has a civil code,
whereas protection against unfair competition in other states
is based on common law. The basis for protection in Quebec
lies in its civil code of the first of January, 1994. It has
to be noted that Quebec civil law concepts are very much
influenced by substantive common law doctrines. Furthermore,
North American and English procedural conditions, under which
protection is ensured, are followed in Quebec. It is however
accepted in article 1457 of the Quebec Civil Code that
liability can arise in delict, contract or quasi-contract,
much as in France, leaving scope for development of unfair
competition law along similar lines as in France,
incorporating 'concurrence déloyale' and 'parasitaire'. Until
now this has, however, not happened. 109 An interesting
development, however, consists of the incorporation of the
law of unjust enrichment into unfair competition law. In
Promotivate International Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers
Ltd., 1 '° the case involved the disclosure of an idea to the
defendant for a lottery based on numbers printed in the
defendant's weekend TV guide. The plaintiff investigated the
feasibility and cost of printing at the defendant's request,
but no contract was entered into. Subsequently the defendant
did operate a lottery similar to the plaintiff's idea. The
Supreme Court of Ontario held that an action for breach of
contract and breach of confidence failed, because the
information given by the defendant lacked any originality and
was public knowledge. It did however grant relief by falling
109For an overview see M. Goudreau: "Protecting Ideas and Information in Common Law
Canada and Quebec" [19941 8 IPJ 189-216 at 205.
110 10 April 1985, 23 DLR 4th 196; [1985] 11 EIPR D-202.
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back on the law of obligations and held that the plaintiff
was entitled to damages on the basis of unjust enrichment.111
Due to the lack of success of the actual promotion, damages
were measured by the value of the time spent, on the basis of
the law of unjust enrichment.
1.2.3.3 South Africa: Passing of f, Unlawful Competition and
Policy Considerations.
Parallel to Quebec, Canada, the situation in South Africa
shows hybrid elements. In the field of unfair competition
law, the law of passing off is present and displays all the
hallmarks of common law passing off. English and Commonwealth
case law is indeed authoritative in the development of the
South African law of passing of f. 112 Although passing off as
such is very much a common law concept, common law is not the
basis for the action. This is where the influence of Roman-
Dutch law comes to bear. Passing off is part of the extended
field of application of the lex Aquilia, basis for the Roman
action for tortious liability, and is as such governed by
Aquilian liability.113
The implications are twofold. Not only does a faliback on
the lex Ag-uilia make it possible to extend liability beyond
the traditional English notions of passing of f, 114 it also
111 23 DLR 4th 196 at 200 per Holland J., who, in citing Nicholson v. Denis 57 DLR 3 699,
held that unjust enrichment:
[us part of what is now called the doctrine of restitution, which gives a
remedy to a plaintiff where it would be unjust to permit a defendant to retain
a benefit conferred at the plaintiff's expense. The relationship 'is usually [...l
marked by two characteristics, first, knowledge of the benefit on the part of
the defendant, and secondly, either an express or implied request by the
defendant for the benefit, or acquiescence in its performance'.
112G. Webster and N. PagefSouth African Lawof-Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition,
Company Names and Trading Styles", Third ed. (1986) Butterworths at 405-470.
1131t is interesting to note that the British Group, in their report for the AIPPI, made specific
reference to this 'overriding principle' in their assessment that the introduction into English law
of a tort of unfair competition would fill gaps in the law. AIPPI Annuaire 1993/111125-131 at
26 and 131.
114See G. Webster and N. Page: "South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition,
Company Names and Trading Styles", Third ed. (1986) Butterworths, who question, with
reference to the case of Erven Warn ink v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1980] RPC 31, the
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means that a much broader and indeed general concept of
unlawful competition is recognised. 115
 As such, an action in
unfair competition matters is generally available
notwithstanding the absence of precedent.116
For an action based on Aquilian principles to be successful,
some identifiable wrong has to be committed. This fault can
traditionally consist of intent (dolus) or negligence
(culpa). In a claim for damages in passing off, culpa,
consisting of proof that a reasonable man could have foreseen
that his conduct might cause deception or confusion resulting
in damage to the plaintiff's goodwill, was held to be
sufficient. 117
 Actions requiring intent comprise injurious
falsehood or boycott claims.
validity of the legal basis for the extension of the law of passing off in English law. At 411:
What purports to be an extension of the application of the tort is in reality a
transformation of the tort itself.
See also in this respect Lorimar Productions Inc. and others v. Sterling aothing Manufacturers
(Ply.) Ltd. [1981] 3 SA 1129 at 1138 and Fédération Internationale de Football v. Barlett
[1994] 4 SA 722 at 739-740.
115j Neethling, J. Potgieter and P. Visser: "Law of Delict" (1990) Butterworths, Ch. 7 at 259-
265.
116Dun and Bradsteet (Ply.) Ltd. v. S.A. Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Ply) Ltd.
[1968] 1 SA 209. The case involved the appropriation by defendants of information contained
in 'Credit Records', which were compilations of judgements of the Supreme Court and the
magistrates' courts of the Republic of South Africa that were distributed on a confidential basis.
With reference to English cases, the judge noted that an equitable action based on breach of
confidence did not exist in South African law, but in considering the American case of INS .v
AP, 248 US 215 (1918), R. Callmann's article 'He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown:
Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition', [1942] 55 Harv.LR 595 and Z. Chafee
Jr.: 'Unfair Competition', [1940] 53 Harv.LR 1289, Corbett J concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to Aquilian relief on the basis of unlawful competition. At 221:
[lit seems to me that where, as in this case, a trader has by the exercise of
his skill and labour compiled information which he distributes to his clients
upon a confidential basis E...l a rival trader who is not a client but in some
manner obtains this information and, well knowing its nature and the basis
upon which it was distributed, uses it in his competing business and thereby
injures the first mentioned trader in his business, commits a wrongful act vis-
à-vis the latter and will be liable to him in damages. In an appropriate case the
plaintiff trader would also be entitled to claim an interdict against the
continuation of such wrongful conduct. Although there is no precise
precedent in our law for this proposition, I am of the opinion that it is a well-
founded development of our law relating to unlawful competition in trade and
is in accordance with trends of legal development elsewhere.
See in this respect also Schultz v. Butt [1986] 3 SA 667 at 678-679.
117Link Estates (Ply) Ltd. v. Rink Estates (Ply) Ltd. [1979] 2 SA 276, a case involving rival
estate agents.
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For other claims the determination of the wrong has shifted
to boni mores, or considerations of public policy. Factors
such as honesty and fairness of the conduct, the morals and
business ethics of the economic trade section in question,
preemption or reliance on protection already extended by
statute to the area, the interest of free and unrestrained
competition, competitive nexus and international conventions,
are thought to be decisive. 118 The norm formed by these types
of considerations amounts to a policy decision and is
recognised as such. In Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd.
v. Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd. and Others,' 19 a general action
in unlawful competition was brought against four defendants
and involved a product called ghwamis, a blended half organic
fertiliser, that was unique to the plaintiff. The first
defendant, Pikkewyn, started a rival business with Atlas's
former managing director at the helm. Thereafter other staff
of Atlas defected to the news business, whilst still being
employed by Atlas. The Aquilian, all encompassing, action in
unlawful competition instigated by Atlas thus covered a whole
range of behavioural aspects ranging from the acquisition of
favourable contracts to industrial sabotage and appropriation
of trade secrets, know-how and confidentiality. In the
assessment of the unlawfulness of the defendant's actions,
the Court dismissed tests of unfairness and dishonesty,' 2° but
did accept as a legal standard the objective norm of public
policy.' 2 ' The plaintiff was successful on most counts.
118j Neethling, J. Potgieter and P. Visser: "Law of Delict" (1990) Butterworths at 261.
"[1981] 2 SA 173, [1981] 3 EIPR D-63-64.
120119811 2 SA 173 at 187-188, with particular reference to the English case of Mogul
Steamship Co. v McGregor (3ow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598,petfry_L.L_a,t 615:
[Tb draw a line between fair and unfair competition, between what is
reasonable and unreasonable, passes the power of the courts.
121 119811 2 SA 173 at 188:
This is the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores,
manifested in public opinion. In determining and applying this norm in a
particular case, the interests of the competition parties have to be weighed,
bearing in mind also the interests of society, the public weal. As this norm
cannot exist in vacuo, the morals of the market place, the business ethics of
that section of the community where the norm is to be applied, are of major
importance in its determination.
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The principle of public policy as the basis for the
establishment of wrong has not only become well established
in breach of confidence cases, 122 it has also been affirmed
by the Appellate Division in Schultz v. Butt 123 where taking
moulds of hulls and subsequent registration of a design
right 124 in the boat hull by the appellant was held to amount
to unfair and unjust competition on the basis that the design
evolved over a long period with considerable expenditure of
time, labour and money by the respondent. 125 It is interesting
to note that the injuria resulting in loss that forms the
basis for the Aquilian action was held to be the public
policy of the prevention of appropriation of the result of
labour, skill and money, a principle commonly associated with
unjust enrichment. 126 In the case of Bress Designs (Pty.) Ltd.
v. G.Y. Lounge Suite MFGS (Pty.) Ltd. 127 the element of time,
skill, effort and money spent on production of the lounge
suite at the centre of the dispute was also considered. The
plaintiff's investment had, however, been small, because he
had himself based the design on photographs of sofas in the
United States of America. It was, however, shown that there
was a history of animosity between the directors of the two
manufacturing companies and the defendant's behaviour could
not be seen in a normal competitive light in which the
legitimate pursuit of capitalistic profit leads competitors
to undercut one another's prices. The dominant motive of the
defendant to inflict harm was held to be the basis for
' 22See Prok Africa (Ply) Ltd. v. NiH (Ply.) Lid. [1980] 3 SA 687; LinzvoJve Electronic Systems
Ltd. v. Instrotech Ltd. and Escom [1992] 4 EIPR D-70; Knox D'Arcy Ltd. v. Ja,nieson [1992]
3 SA 520.
123119861 3 SA 667 (see also [1984] 3 SA 568).
124A registration which was subsequently cancelled due to lack of novelty and originality.
125 11986] 3 SA 667 at 683.
126Dun and Bradsteet (Pry) Ltd. v. S.A. Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Ply) Ltd.
[19681 1 SA 209; R. Callmann: "He Who Reaps where He Has not Sown: Unjust Enrichment
in the Law of Unfair Competition", 119421 55 Harv.LR 595.
127E19911 2 SA 455, a case involving the copying of the design of furniture in which no
copyright, nor design, subsisted. The case in passing off was also dismissed.
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successful action for unlawful competition.128
The criterion of public policy thus amounts to a balancing
act of various interests, where clear boundaries can not be
easily drawn. This is perhaps the reason why the Court in The
Concept Factory v. Heyf 29 felt it necessary to reiterate the
principle of free competition in its rejection of a claim for
unlawful competition on the basis that the copying of the
product of a trade rival which is in the public domain is not
per se unlawful. 130 The case involved the copying of a guide
containing businesses within a certain geographical area with
their telephone numbers in an identical format and layout.
The case was furthermore distinguished from Schultz v. Butt
on the basis that it is the idea and not the format of the
publication that makes that guide successful. The Court was
not convinced that the time and development that might ha'ie
gone into the development of the format was the result of
research or some kind of scientific process. 131 A case in
passing off could, however, not be made, because the
publications were not identical.
The principle of public policy and the bare criterion of boni
128119911 2 SA 455 at 475:
In my view a clear line should be drawn between acts of interference with the
interests of another when the object is the advancement of a person's own
interest and such acts whose sole or dominant purpose is the infliction of
harm for its own sake. whereas in law the advancement of ones own
economic interest is, generally speaking, a legitimate motive for action, there
can be no doubt that the community would condemn as cont4ra bonos mores
the malicious destruction-or jeopardising of a sound business through the
marketing of identical furniture at cut-throat prices for reasons of personal
vindictiveness.
This description displays remarkable similarities with the English cases involving the tort of
conspiracy to injure by lawful means. See Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v.
Veitch [19421 1 All ER 142; Lonrho plc v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. [19811 2 A!! ER 456;
Lonrhoplc v.Fayed [1991] 3 All ER 303; and Lonrhoplcv.Fayed (No 5)-f 1994] 1 All ER 188,
describing the requirements for the tort of conspiracy to injure by lawful means. The tort
consists of an agreement by two or more persons to do acts, which were lawful in themselves,
for the sole or predominant purpose of causing injury to the plaintiff and which in fact caused
injury to the plaintiff.
129[1994] 2 SA 105.
130[1994] 2 SA 105 at 116.
131[1994] 2 SA 105 at 117.
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mores as such have been criticised as being too vague,' 32 the
principle of competition was thought to be satisfactory.133
This so called 'competition principle' aims to bring about a
synthesis of economics and the law of unfair competition in
order to provide a rational yardstick to determine what is
lawful and what is not. Set in a competitive perspective 'the
competitor who delivers the best and/or most fair
performance, must be victorious; the one who delivers the
worst performance, must suffer defeat'.134
This position was considered in Payen Components CC v. Bovic
Gaskets CC and Others 135 and although the Court saw merit in
the 'competition principle', it did not cast the boni mores
criterion aside. 36 The criticism of vagueness was dismissed
with the argument that legal uncertainty is inherent in the
132j Neethling, J. Potgieter and P. Visser: "Law of Delict" (1990) Butterworths at 261; J.
Neethling: "Unlawful Competition and Schools" [1993] 110 SALJ 9-15, in discussing the cases
of Atlas Organic Fertilizers v. Pikkein Ghwano, Bress Designs v. Lounge Suite Manufacturers
and Schultz v. Butt at 10-11:
[Als the boni-mores criterion is so vague and wide, it does not in itself provide
a rational yardstick for the delimination of the conflicting interests of
competitors. A particular concretization of the boni-mores yardstick in regard
to the competition struggle is thus necessary.
133S H. van Heerden and J. Neethling: "Die Reg aangaande Onregmatige Mededinging"
(1983) at 72-77.
134H van Heerden and J. Neethling: "Die Reg aangaande Onregmatige Mededinging" (1983)
at 74:
Die wesentlike mededingingsprinsiep is dus dat die mededinger wat die beste
en/of billikste prestasie lewer, die oorwinning moet behaal; die een wat die
swakste prestasie bied, die neerlaag moer ly.
135 [1994] 2 SA 464. The case involved the copying of a catalogue containing a coding system
for gaskets. The claim for unjust competition was dismissed on the factual basis that the
plaintiff's coding system had become industry standard and was regarded as being in the public
domain.
136[19941 2 SA 464 at 474:
I am inclined to the view, however, that the competition principle should be
regarded as a policy consideration per se rather than as a yardstick for
establishing wrongfulness in the sphere of competition. However esoteric it
may sound, it is, in my view, the general considerations of justice, equity,
reasonableness, good faith and public policy which underlie the value
judgment required of a Court when it is called upon to establish whether or
not a competitor has indulged in unfair or unlawful competition.
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'vibrant dynamism of any growing, living legal system'137:
Potential legal uncertainty and the traditional judicial reluctance to indulge in
any form of law-making must bow before the community's desire, and right,
to see justice being done. If policy considerations are applied with the
necessary insight and restraint, they must have an eminently salutary effect
on legal development, on the one hand, and on the dispensing of justice, on
the other.138
In this way the open ended principle of public policy was
accepted as the norm for the determination of wrongfulness
in unlawful competition cases. In reaching his conclusion Van
zyl J. explicitly referred to the work of A. van Aswegen,39
who distinguishes four types of cases in which policy
standards are used. In the first type the application of a
policy consideration is implied in the open ended standard
set in the applicable legal rule. The second type involves
the extension of the area of application of existing legal
rules. 140
 The third type involves the alteration of existing
rules and in the fourth type policy concerns are used to
settle conflicts of applicable rules on specific facts, or of
contradictory consequences. She concludes that the nature of
the type of case determines the willingness, or reluctance,
of judges to rely on public policy considerations.
Furthermore she stresses the importance of embedding policy
considerations in the legal framework. As such the
combination of the judge's legal and moral expertise becomes
crucial. 141
137119941 2 SA 464 at 474.
138119941 2 SA 464 at 476.
139A. van Aswegen: "Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict" [1993] 56 THRI-IR 171.
140The case of Schultz v. Butt [1986] 3 SA 667 is mentioned in this category. A. van Aswegen:
"Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict" (19931 56 THRF{R 171-at 185.
141 A. van Aswegen: "Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict" [19931 56 THRHR 171 at
194-195:
Policy decisions should fit in with existing legal rules, standards arid
underlying principles of law and justice. Judges should explicitly identify and
discuss the policy considerations underlying their decisions and they should
consciously strive not to succumb to personal, partisan or idiosyncratic
preferences. Judges should apply the generally accepted legal views of the
community unless such views conflict with immanent principles of justice.
However, the reference to the generally accepted views of the community,
does not simply imply a type of majority view based on a simple opinion poll.
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1.2.3.4 Israel.
In Israel the development of unfair competition law is still
in its infancy. In order to give effect to Article 6 bis of
the Paris Convention, the use of the mark Boeing on travel
and tourism services was held to dilute the well known mark
of the aircraft manufacturer. This result was reached in
spite of the fact that an injunction on the basis of passing
off was not available. Instead the action was granted on the
basis of the law of unjust enrichment. 142 In the case of han
Lebvitsch v. A&Y Eliyahu BM and Rolex Industries Middle East
Import/Export, 143 the exclusive distributors of Parker and
Cross pens claimed that the importation by parallel importers
of genuine pens amounted to an unauthorised exploitation of
their goodwill. The Supreme Court held that this importation
was perfectly legitimate and that the law of unjust
enrichment did not form a basis for relief now that the
goodwill did not belong in the first place to the exclusive
distributors. The exclusive distribution right as such did in
the mind of the Court, not amount to a clear property right,
nor a right in rem. In an obiter dictum the Supreme Court
also held that the principle of unjust enrichment might under
certain circumstances be relied upon in cases of unfair
competition.
In 1994 the Tel Aviv District Court held that the imitation
of a dress design, that did not constitute passing off or
copyright infringement, 144 constituted unfair competition.145
It presupposes a reflection of inherent values accepted in the community and
apparent inter a/ia from the accepted legal standards and institutions of the
community. In the determination of such values the judges will, however,
have to rely on his or her own honestly held beliefs and opinions, thus
incorporating his or her intuition and legal feeling ('regsgevoel').
See in this respect also R. Posner: "The Jurisprudence of Skepticism" [1988] 86 Mich.LR 827-
891, especially at 862-863.
See also L. Harms, Acting Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of South Africa: "Unfair
Competition in an Adversarial System" [19931 2 EIPR 74.
142The Boeing Co. v. Boeing Travel and Tourism Ltd., District Court 1989, [1990] 1 EIPR D-5.
'(1983) RCA 37 1/89, 11990] 3 EIPR D-46.
was not possible to apply design law, because in Israel unregistered designs are not
recognised. Copyright is not applicable to designs due to a preemption clause, nor is passing
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It did so on the basis of the unjust enrichment act. 1t The
judge qualified the design as an asset that had not been
appropriated by the defendant from the plaintiff upon a right
of law. This behaviour was held to lead to unjust enrichment
and an injunction was granted for a period of five years,
equivalent to the initial period of protection of a
registered design.
A similar decision was reached in a case involving
patentable, but not patented, material. 147 With regards to the
period of protection, the court held that the circumstances
of the case should determine the term. The final outcome of
these cases, and the existence of the law of unfair
competition, is, however, far from certain, since the Supreme
Court still has to pass judgement on appeal. Some guidance on
the scope of these cases is necessary in any case, since the
general problems associated with the assessment of liability
on the basis of unjust enrichment in cases of appropriation
of intangible assets have also not been resolved.148
off applicable to designs.
l45	 S. Cohen's report on Ani,na Fashion Ltd v. Reuven Blan, Tel Aviv District Court, 1994
in [1994] 11 EIPR D-291 and [1995] 2 EIPR D-40.
146For a translation into English of the statute see [1993] RLR 2 13-214.
147Spal Sri v. Sagi and Others, Tel Aviv District Court 1994, [1995] 2 EIPR D-40.
148See S. Cohen's case report, [1995] 2 EIPR D-40:
[Tihe decisions raise serious questions, such as:
(1) Intellectual property law is a delicately balanced system of thresholds and
limited rights. The present decisions prohibit copying of any design, or using
unpatented technology withouftear rules a tolhreshotdsifor example
originality or novelty) ,without qualifications (for example functionality) and
without clear limits.
(2) The duration of the right is not entirely clear: primarily - when does the
right come to life? In the Anima case the judge ordered that the injunction will
be in effect for a period of five years, but did not calculate the period from
initial creation, or first publication, until the court order. And why not extend
it to the full period of registered designs (presently 15 years)?
(3) International rights and reciprocity: presumably unjust enrichment
protection would be granted to non-Israeli proprietors. But there may be no
reciprocity. This will create an unbalanced picture in terms of international
intellectual property protection.
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Conclusion to Chapter One.
In this chapter we have traced the legal basis for protection
against acts of unfair competition. Several conclusions can
be drawn.
(1) The way in which the legal basis for protection is
contained in a legal system is not determinative of the scope
of protection that is awarded in the legal system. Leaving
aside questions of levels of similarity in results, we have
seen that the principles of the Paris Convention are covered
in all countries described. The paradigm of the common norm
is the prevention of the creation of confusion or avoidable
confusion in the marketplace.
Where the common norms are transcended, however, both systems
relying on codification and systems relying on civil code
principles display a similar level of acceptance of a general
action against acts of unfair competition.
The common law system, despite sharing its reliance on tort
in the assessment of liability with several other countries,
does not recognise this general action.
(ii) The reluctance to accept a general action for unfair
competition stems from an opposition to ever expanding
monopolies and a strict adherence to the principle that
competition is free, unless special heads of protected
interests are infringed upon. This limits the scope of
protection to those intangibles that are recognised by
statute and those acts of competition that fall within the
narrow anibit of tortious liability.
(iii) Preemption is a principle that is employed to protect
the public domain from encroaching monopolies. The
application of the principle and the discussions on the
principle in the United States demonstrate that preemption is
applied to limit the application of both a general 'sweat of
the brow' doctrine and state legislation on unfair
competition matters. On a more hopeful note, however, it is
submitted that its application also demonstrates that it may
be possible to have a general 'sweat of the brow' or, indeed,
unfair competition doctrine, without a fear of excessive
monopolies.
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(iv) Policy arguments may be used to legitimise decisions by
judges about socio-economic questions. One of the objections
raised by common law judges against employing a general
action against unfair competition is that a legal decision
based on such an action would amount to a policy decision.
The discussion on this problem in South Africa, a country in
which the legal system displays hybrid elements, displays an
acceptance of the fact that any judge makes a policy decision
to a certain extent. The conclusion is that a judge is
competent to do so, provided the judgement is embedded in
the legal system and is reasoned, so that it can be accounted
for.
(iv) In the last section it is interesting to note that
successful transcendencies of common norms, resulting in
protection of otherwise not recognised achievements, have the
direct or indirect application of the principle of unjust
enrichment in common.
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Chapter 2: Making the General Clause Specific.
Introduction to Chapter Two.
In the previous chapter we have seen the legal basis of
unfair competition law in all its guises. We have identified
the problems associated with preemption and have described
the rationale behind a general provision against unfair
competition.
In this chapter the diverging attitudes towards and views on
the justification for decisions in cases of unfair
competition will be discussed. The steps that are taken in a
judicial process to go from a general norm to the specific
implementation of a general rule on a particular set of
factual acts will be covered. Property theories and policy
considerations are at the heart of the establishment of a
legal rule in unfair competition cases. The question asked in
this chapter is whether these criteria are sufficiently
objective to legitimise a decision, how this decision making
process works and whether there are sufficient grounds to
move beyond the universal norm that leads to tortious
liability for the creation of confusion or avoidable
confusion in the marketplace.
2.1 Unfair Competition, Finding Objective Criteria.
Reasons for the absence of a law of unfair competition in
common law systems lie mostly in the fact that judges are of
the opinion that general principles are not suited for
regulation of the marketplace. This is because the criteria
for the assessment of what is unfair behaviour in the
marketplace are thought to be ambiguous.
In civil law systems either the entire law of unfair
competition or a large part of it is based on general
sweeping statements, be they civil code provisions, or
general clauses in unfair competition laws. It is therefore
important to find objective criteria to create certainty in
the law.
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Many of the accepted actions in unfair competition put more
emphasis on the rights of a market participant and the
protection of his goodwill and business than on reprehensible
conduct by an infringer of these rights. In this sense the
law of unfair competition is often more a positive statement
of the plaintiff's rights, often expressed in terms of
property, than of obligations of the defendant. That is why
the answer for objective criteria might be found in
establishing the content and boundaries of these rights,
since they have obtained a property-like status. Objective
criteria might therefore be found in property law.
2.1.1 Property.
As far as the notion of property is concerned, it has to be
noted that the type of property we are dealing with here is
property in intangibles. This makes it fundamentally
different from rights in tangibles such as land or chattels.
Intangibles are solely man's creation and can not come into
being without the human factor, both for their conception and
its perception, because they are a representation of human
creativity and values. 149
 It was the right to commercial
exploitation of an intangible that found protection as a
property right in the INS case. It has to be noted that the
way in which this right came into being was by human effort:
the gathering of news.
It is the philosophy that the fruit of organisation and the
expenditure of labour, skill and money constitute a saleable
commodity out of which profits can be made. Human achievement
lies at the foundation of this proprietary concept. And as
such it can be given more credit in a moral sense than
property claims over natural resources. Appropriation by
others of this accomplishment is therefore a plain interfe-
rence with property rights. But the court also noted that the
nature of this property right differs from the ordinary in
the respect that it is only valuable to the parties in that
they are both seeking to make profit in the same field. This
149D Libling: "The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles" [1978] 94 LQR 103-119.
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is why the property right enjoined by AP is termed a 'quasi-
property' right.
The crucial difference between property and quasi-property is
therefore a conceptual one. Where as property confers a right
to exclude all others, quasi-property confers a right to
exclude only those who seek to enrich themselves by
appropriating the fruits of the labour that brought the right
into being in the first place. Quasi-property is therefore a
relative property concept.
This means that the question of the existence of the quasi-
property right is most prominent when two parties contest the
fruit of the labour of one of them. And whether this quasi-
property right is infringed in any way depends very much upon
the nature of the relationship between them.
An Anglo-Australian' 50 case stands in the way of the
recognition of a quasi-property right in intangibles. 15' This
is Victoria Park Racinq and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd.
v. Taylor and Others, 152 a case which was later confirmed in
another important case on unfair competition Moorqate Tobacco
Co. v. Phillip Morris Ltd. (No.2), 153 thus disowning previous
statements of sympathy for the law of unfair coinpetition54
150For Australian unfair competition law see AIPPI Annuaire 19931111 18-35 at 20.
151 SeeD. Libling: "The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles" [1978] 94 LQR 103-1 19
for a critical description of the case.
152(1937) 58 CLR 479.
153(1984) 156 CLR 414 at 444f. per Deane J.
	 -
154 Willard King Organisation (Ply) Lid. v. United Telecasrers Sydney Ltd. (1981) 2 NSWLR
547, Else-Mitchell J. at 552:
[l]f the protection from misappropriation F.. .1 of rights of a character here in
question entails an extension of the established conception of passing off, I
should not wish to count amongst the 'timorous souls' who would decline to
enlarge the ambit of the remedy or apply it to normal situations not known to
the common law and beyond the wildest imagination of the astute equity
lawyers of the last century. The evolution of new technical means of mass
communication, the growth of new categories of skill and expertise providing
almost infinite variety of services in the field of electronic transmission and the
attaching of commercial values to innominate rights which cannot be simply
characterised as 'proprietary' or 'contractual' seemed to me to require some
wider extension of protection which the old remedy of passing off afforded.
Whether this is ultimately to take the path of enjoining any practice which can
be described as 'unfair competition' as in the United States of America, I shall
not pause to consider or speculate, but it is worth observing that some basic
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and only allowing development in well specified areas such as
character merchandising155 or advertising.' 56 In the Victoria
Park case the plaintiff owned a race track on which it
organised racing events. The grounds were fenced off and the
plaintiff charged an admission fee, which constituted its
main source of income. Taylor, one of the defendants, owned
an adjoining piece of land on which he constructed a
platform, enabling a clear view of the activities taking
place on the course. Taylor thus made it possible for another
conceptions which have been applied by the highest courts of that country are
well in accord with both canons of equity and commendable principles of
commercial morality. If one were to simply adopt the principle that no man
should be allowed to misappropriate what equitably belongs to a competitor,
there would be little doubt that the plaintiff's claim ... ought to succeed...
Hexagon (Ply) Ltd. v. Australian Broadcasting Commission (1975) 7 ALR 233, Needham J. at
251 considered the cases of JBollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd [1959] 3 All ER 800; Vine
Products Ltd. v. Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. [1969] RPC 1 and John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Henry
Ost & Co. Ltd. [1970] 2 All ER 106 and concludes that:
The cases seem to assent that 'unfair competition' is an extension of the
doctrine of passing off, or, possibly, is a new and independent cause of
action. It consists of misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a
competitor.
' 55Henderson v. Radio Corp. (Ply) Lid. [1960] NSWLR 279, [1969] RPC 218; Pacific Dunlop
v. Hogan (1989) 87 ALR 14, involving a shoe manufacturer who parodied the 'knife scene'
from the well known Crocodile Dundee films in his advertising campaign. See also in this
respect Mirage Studios and Others v. Counter-Feat aorning Company Ltd. [19911 FSR 145 and
S. Chong and S. Maniatis: "The Teenage Mutant Hero Turtles Case: 'Zapping' English Law
on Character Merchandising Past the Embryonic Stage", [1991] 7 EIPR 253-257.
On the transformation of sign-vehicles into commodities see J. Gaines: "Superman and the
Protective Strength of the Trademark", pp. 173-192 in "Logistics of Television, essays in
Cultural Criticism", P. Mellencamp ed. (1990) BFI London.
l56 Cadbury-Schweppes (Piy) Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co. (Ply) Ltd. [1981] 1 All ER 213,
[1981] RPC 429, where relief was denied in a case where format and concept of the advertising
campaign of the defendant were the same as that of the plaintiff.
For a comment on the case see J. Lahore: "The Pub Squash Case. Legal Theft or Free
Competition" [1981] 2 EIPR 54-56; and G. Dworkin: "Passing Off and Unfair Competition:
An Opportunity Missed" [1981] 44 MLR 564-567. In these case comments regret is expressed
at the failure of the Privy Council to develop the law of passing off rnto ihe domain of unfair
competition. See also 7.4 below.
R&C Products v. Johnson & Sons (1993) 113 ALR 487, involving advertising that had previous
connections with another trader. The fact that the presenter and slogan were the same in
plaintiff's and defendant's advertisements were held to give rise to misrepresentation. Davies
J. at 493:
[hf advertising or get-up has acquired special signification, then the adoption
of elements of the advertising or get-up by another trader may give rise to a
misrepresentation. Then the question will be whether other steps have been
taken which sufficiently distinguish the one trade and its products from the
other trader and its products.
61
of the defendants, the Conunonwealth Broadcasting Corporation,
to comment upon the race on live radio from Taylor's
platform. As a result the attendances at the plaintiff's
events decreased. The plaintiff argued that it had a valuable
property right, which had originated from its power to:
'exclude the public generally from the right to see whatever
may be produced on the land by way of spectacle."57
Which goes to show that although the suit for an injunction
was based on nuisance and breach of copyright, a connection
with the INS case was sought. This was reflected in all the
opinions, however diverse.
The central issue in the case thus became whether the def en-
dants were guilty of 'nhisappropriating or abstracting some-
thing which the plaintiff has created and alone is entitled
to turn to value'. 158
 This was answered affirmatively by the
minority of the judges,' 59 but by majority the High Court of
Australia ruled that the taking by the defendants from the
plaintiff did not constitute a legal wrong. This basically
reflects the general opinion that there was no property right
in the spectacle and therefore there was nothing to be
protected.
Latham C.J. said that a spectacle 'cannot be 'owned' in any
ordinary sense of that word' 160
 and that '(amy person is
entitled to look over the plaintiff's fences and to see what
goes on in the plaintiff's land' •161 Should the plaintiff want
to prevent anybody from looking over his land, so it was
argued, he should simply build a higher fence.
Dixon J.'s opinion is more straightforward:
The fact is that the substance of the plaintiff's complaint goes to interference,
not with its enjoiment in land, but with the profitable conduct of its business.
If English law had followed the course of development that has taken place
in the U.S., the 'broadcasting rights' iii respect of the races might have been
protected as part of the quasi-property created by the enterprise, organisation
157(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 483.
158(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 509 per Dixon J.
159(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 501f. per Rich J. and at 518f. per Evatt J.
160(1837) 58 CLR 479 at 496 et seq.
161(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 494.
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and labour of the plaintiff in establishing and equipping a racecource and
doing all that is necessary to conduct race meetings.162
He then cites Brandeis J.'s dissent in International News
Service v. Associated Press 163 reflecting the opinion that
there is no coherent doctrine of property, but merely
specific interests which are protected either because of
statute or because for policy reasons the common law or
equity protects them. It lies in the nature of property to be
able to exclude others from appropriating it. The subject of
a property right in this case is a resource and it is
submitted that a resource can only be claimed as property if
it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory
control over the access of strangers to the various benefits
inherent in the resource. 1 In terms of the Victoria Park
case this means that since the owners of the land were not
able to prevent others from looking on their land, they could
not claim any proprietary interest in the spectacle taking
place on it.
It is submitted that this notion of property fails to distin-
guish between the resource of location and resource of the
spectacle. The resource in which a proprietary interest is
claimed is the work that has gone into staging the event. Not
being able to stop others from looking in does not mean one
should not be able to exclude others from the use of the
actual presentation, event, performance or spectacle.
I would agree that one can not claim property in the spec-
tacle in order to exclude an interested passer-by or indeed
neighbour. The situation does, however, become totally
different as soon as the objective of this watch becomes a
conunercial one. Or as Callmann puts it:
The general principle can be formulated as follows: If the event sought to be
broadcast occurs in a confined area, such as race track, theatre or sports
arena, as distinguished from public property, such as Street, park or river, the
sponsor or promotor of the event has exclusive control over the right to
broadcast a report of the activities therein. A violation of this right is improper
exploitation of another's business organisation, which is the rationale of INS.
162(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 508, 509.
163248 Us 215, 63 L. ed. 211 at 225 (1918).
'K. Gray: "Property in Thin Air" 11991] 50(2) CLI 252 at 268 et seq.
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It is also a trespass upon real property and a misappropriation of business
values. 166
This goes to show that the property right claimed is not an
absolute, but a relative concept. Only if the substance of
commercial value that is generated by business activities of
the plaintiff is exploited can the defendant enjoin
infringement on the basis of a proprietary interest.
Unfair competition does, therefore, not solely evaluate an
achievement as to its eligibility for protection, but looks
far more at the way in which it is exploited by a third
party. The relationship between the parties involved and the
behaviour of a defendant is the decisive factor in the
determination as to whether a party can actually invoke the
protection of a right equal to property. In other words, it
is the defendant's obligation that determines whether the
plaintiff has rights in a situation where pre-existing
property rights are not present.
This can only be achieved by looking at a competitive
situation on a case by case basis, where the judge has to
determine the level of 'unfairness'. It is at this point
where property concepts fall short in order to determine
whether a plaintiff has a claim at all. 1 Not only can the
concept of fairness not readily be defined in legal terms,
but to determine the boundary between what is property and
what is not on the basis of fairness is impossible. The
reason for the fact that the legal concept of property has
' 65R Callmann: "Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies" 4. ed. Callaghan par.
15.09.
1 See F. Cohen: "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" [1935] 35 Col.LR
809-849. In this article Cohen describes how legal theory and its concepts as creations of law
have the tendency not to allow for factors that lie outside of the legal realm or can not be
directly translated into it, to influence legal decision making. At 821:
Legal concepts (for example, corporations or property rights) are supernatural
entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.
Rules of law, which refer to these legal concepts, are not descriptions of
empirical facts (such as customs of men or the customs of judges) nor yet
statements of moral ideals, but are rather theorems in an independent system.
It follows that a legal argument can never be refuted by a moral principle nor
yet by any empirical fact. Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of
legal concepts, rules, and arguments, must be independent of both ethics and
of such positive sciences as economics or psychology. In effect, it is a special
branch of the science of transcendental nonsense.
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continued to dominate the field of unfair competition law is
aptly explained by Felix Cohen.' 67 He notes that judges want
to avoid taking sides upon issues of politics and economics
and therefore take refuge in legal concepts. In the case of
unfair competition law the concept of property is relied upon
to substantiate protection awarded to assets of commercial
value. 1 Following Cohen's argument, commercial value of a
sales device, the result of labour, skill and money, needs to
be translated into the legal concept of property, because
this is the only ground on which the creator of this right
can enjoin others from using it or depriving him of it. In
legal terms this means that the economic value of a sales
device does not depend upon a matter of fact, but on a matter
of law. An asset may be of subjective value, also when it is
in the public domain, but when you can't monopolise it, it
has no legal value as property.
The problem now lies in the fact that for these business
assets there is no statute, no interpreter nor dictionary, to
translate commercial value into property. This means that
the economic value of the sales device as a matter of law can
only depend on the protection that is awarded to it, whereas
16TCohen F.: "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" [1935] 35 CoI.LR 809-
849 at 815-816.
Legal language portrays courts as examining commercial words and finding,
somewhere inherent in them, property rights. It is by virtue of the property
right which the plaintiff has acquired in the word that he is entitled to an
injunction or an award of damages. According to the recognized authorities
on the law of unfair competition, courts are not creating property, but are
merely recognizing a pre-existent Something. The theory that judicial decisions
in the field of unfair competition law are merely recognitions of a supernatural
Something that is immanent in certain trade names and symbols is, of course,
one of the numerous progeny of the theory that judges have nothing to do
with the making of the law, but merely recognise pre-existent truths not made
by mortal men. The effect of this theory, in the law of unfair competition as
elsewhere, is to dull lay understanding and criticism-of what courts do in fact.
What the courts are doing, of course, in unfair competition cases, is to create
and distribute a new source of economic wealth or power.
1 J. Hughes: "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" [1988] 77 Geo.L.J. 287 at 306.
There is a very simple reason why the legal doctrines of unfair competition
and trade secret protection are inherently orientated toward the value-added
theory: they are court-created doctrines and people rarely go to court unless
something valuable is at stake. When intellectual property is created more
systematically, such as through legislation, the resulting property doctrines
seem less singularly oriented toward rewarding social value.
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the recognition of assets of commercial value as property
depends upon commercial and economic value. This is not only
legal reasoning in a vicious circle, 19 but it also makes it
impossible to create certainty in the law. The boundaries to
be drawn in order to determine whether or not a business
asset is economically valuable enough to be worthy of protec-
tion as a property right can not be defined as a legal rule
because the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta are based upon
recognition of legal notions of economic value translated
into the pre-existent entity: 'property'.
Common law is prone to this form of uncertainty regarding
unfair competition law despite the fact that it is an open
system" '° in the sense that it formulates a legal rule for
every particular case and is not tied down by interpretation
of fixed legal rules. The technique of distinguishing on the
basis of fact does make it possible to ascertain and
substantiate rules rather than applying pre-existing ones,
but these rules themselves are being discovered in a
theoretically pre-existent framework called common law and
are therefore constrained by the whole system of legal
reasoning. If it was not for this form of constraint
certainty in the law could not be achieved. The legal concept
of property as the yardstick for protectable interests is
therefore unsuitable to give concrete form to general unfair
competition provisions.
The problem does, however, get more complex if one looks at
the way in which legal decisions are reached. The general
169Cohen F.: "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" [1935] 35 CoJ.LR 809-
849 at 815.
170R David and J. Brierly: "Major Legal Systems in the World Today", Third ed. (1985)
Stevens, at pp.360-361 describe the Romano-Germanic legal family as a 'closed' system in
which every question can be resolved by interpretation of an existing rule of law. In contrast:
English law is an 'open' system: it has a method that can assure the
resolution of any kind of question that may arise, not substantive principles
which must, in all circumstances be applied. The technique of English law is
not one of interpreting legal rules; it consists, beginning with those legal rules
already enunciated, of discovering the legal rule -perhaps a new legal rule-
that must be applied in the instant case [...1 The English concept of the legal
rule, much narrower than the corresponding continental notion, is historically
explained by the fact that the common law was formed by judges and their
technique was one of making distinctions, rather than one of interpretation,
and this remains the basic approach of English law today.
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principle underlying the unfair competition doctrine calls
for a case-by-case appraisal of the factual situation. In a
system in which the factual elements of the case determine
the legal rule it is impossible to decide a concrete case on
the basis of a general proposition. 17' To work with a tricky
legal concept as property in order to determine whether the
factual situation of a particular case calls for the creation
of protectable interests is clearly an unconvincing way to
make the general proposition of unfair competition more
tangible.
This is not only true in common law. Civil law is also prone
to circular legal reasoning or transcendental nonsense. It is
furthermore a closed system, in the sense that legal rules
are codified, reliant on the interpretation of codified legal
rule. 172
 The fact that unfair competition is judge-made law,
makes it difficult to determine what the legal rule should
be, since codification of unfair competition law is often
nothing more than a general statement without specific
guidelines. It is up to the judge to give effect to the legal
rule contained in the general clause. Without specific
guidelines however the judge has to create the legal rule in
the light of the facts of the case. The competence of the
judge to create the legal rule himself, thus becoming
legislature-substitute, is not in legal dispute, because mere
existence of a general clause that provides relief from
unfair competition warrants this discretion. The judiciary
' 71 R David and J. Brierley: "Major Legal Systems in the World Today" Third ed. (1985)
Stevens, at 363:
To locate the true legal rule it would be necessary to wait for the court's
pronouncement that in the facts of a concrete case there was, or there was
not, unfair competition exposing that particular-businessman to some form of
legal reprimand. The English legal rule cannot therefore be separated from the
factual elements of the case, which alone enable its true meaning to be
understood. It is not disembodied in a legal statement.
' See H. Hart: "Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy" (1983) Oxford University Press, who
at 57-58 describes the teachings of legal positivism, two of which are the following notions:
The contention that a legal system is a 'closed logical system' in which
correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined
rules without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards; and
The contention that moral judgements cannot be established or defended, as
statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof.
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can however not create legal a rule out of the blue.Th The
general clause is an enactment of general principles of
legislation and should therefore be interpreted accordingly.
If one now takes the legal notions of property to establish
the legal rule for unfair competition cases, circular
reasoning is the unavoidable consequence.
That is why civil law has taken a different approach toward
unfair competition law. Notions of property are not decisive
in the establishment of protectable rights. Instead of
focusing on the establishment of a property right to warrant
protection for a plaintiff, consideration is given to the
behaviour of the defendant. We must stress again that despite
the fact that some valuable business asset must be present
for a competitor to take advantage of, it is not the presence
of the asset as such, but the fact that, and the manner in
which, a competitor has taken advantage of the asset that is
the decisive factor in the establishment of unfair
competition.
One can only start to think of or imagine a proprietary
interest, quasi-property or even property, at the point where
the conclusion is reached that there is a case for unfair
competition. It is only at this point that the factual social
situation has been completely translated into the legal
sphere. The application of the legal concept of property in
unfair competition cases, therefore, only makes sense in
purely legal argumentation and can not be used as the sole
basis to dismiss or acknowledge a claim for unfair compe-
tition.
17'3We have to note here that it is not disputed that a judge is competent to make a decision, but
that the controversy lies in how the decision is reached. It is on this subsequent level that
objective standards are asked for. The conflict lies therefore in the usurpation by the judges of
the prerogative of parliament to make policy decisions.
R. David and J. Brierley: "Major Legal Systems in the World Today", Third Ed. (1985)
Stevens, Chapter 5, pp.150-154; R. Posner: "The Jurisprudence of Skepticism" 119881 86
Mich.LR 827-891, especially at 862-863; and A. van Aswegen: "Policy Considerations in the
Law of Delict" [1993] 56 THRHR 171.
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2.1.2 How to Establish the Legal Rule in Unfair Competition
Cases?
In terms of criteria that determine the outlook of what is
fair and unfair in the marketplace, many of the expressly
mentioned acts in article lObis of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property point to a desire to
counter the excesses in competition. Within the categories of
behaviour that is not expressly mentioned however, the main
principle lies far more in the enforcement and guarantee of
free competition. 174 This is certainly true for the category
of free riding, where the interests of free trade are
epitomised in the seemingly antagonistic principles of the
freedom to copy, and the right to enjoy the fruit of one's
labour. It is in the weighing of this conflicts of interests
that in current legal thinking a functional approach to the
law of unfair competition emerges. In this sense it is not so
much the morally reprehensible conduct in competition that is
assessed, but the economic and social effects of certain
behaviour in the commercial arena.
So in order to determine what the legal rule for unfair
competition cases should be, it is essential to look at
economic and social facts that underlie the competitive game.
As demonstrated before, legal concepts of property as such do
not provide a solid basis to do this. Instead of searching
for business interests that can be protected as quasi
property rights, another approach can also be taken. If there
is such a thing as a business interest that might be
protectable as if it were a property right, the economic and
social circumstances in which this right may be exercised
become of utmost importance. Unfair competition provisions in
this view do not provide standards. t.oappraise the interest
at its eligibility for protection, but the provisions do give
guidance as to determine the equitableness of its
exploitation. This different outlook on unfair competition
provides a way to give form to a concrete legal rule underly-
176A principle that Is expressly recognised in the Swiss law on unfair competition, article 1. See
1.2.2.4 above.
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ing unfair competition law.
This position acknowledges the fact that unfair competition
arises out of a linear progression of events, where a
monopolistic status quo is affected by a competitive act,
leading to a distortion of that status quo. This results in
a newly established status quo, -be it socially or
economically more desirable or not- a new economic reality
that is the natural result of any competitive act.
A competitive act may be unfair of it distorts the way in
which the economic progress through competition develops. The
nature of the pre-existent status quo, the post-existent
status quo and the act that brought about the transition from
the former state to the latter, all these elements form part
of the equation that makes up fair or unfair competition.
All these factors must be part of the whole jigsaw and influ-
ence the way in which competitive behaviour is perceived, but
does not of itself define a determinative standard, let alone
a legal rule.
We have seen that categorisation as property may be a
consequence of protection through unfair competition law, but
that it can not be taken as a sole basis for weighing
interests. In a similar way acceptable means of competition
can not become unfair only because the outcomes of
competition have adverse political, social or economic
effects. lTh
 However, acceptable means of competition can be
175W Hefermehi: 'Konkretisierung der wettbewerbsrechtlicheGeneralklausel" [Giving concrete
interpretation to the generai competition clause], pp. 897-937 in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz
und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hunderjahrigen Bestehen der Deutchen Verei-
nigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier, A.
Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed., (1991) VCH, 2d vol. at p. 909, where he acknowledges
that unfair competition is not there to maintain the monopolistic status quo and that the results
of competition are therefore not decisive for the assessment of unfair competition cases:
The general clause however is not an instrument for the curtailment of
unwanted economic- or socio-political results of competition. It does not aim
to maintain competition in its state or its function, but the legitimacy of
competition [...1 From the consequences that competition by its very nature
can bring it is impossible to deduce the illicitness of competitive behaviour.
(translation)
DI. Gn.r.Ikj.&a.I lit j.docti kim Ir.itnan.tn
 ztt V.rhmnd.nin w,rtscMfti- od.r .I.c.ftipolsti.cti mmecwCaischt.r
W.ttb.w.rbsfo4.n. S.. b.zw.ckt n.dt di. Erh.fltm di. W.ttbsw.qbs in ssmnem1 Bestind odar ,.mnsr Fu,*tion.f&.g&sit. sandern
di. Iaut.rkeit des WEttbew.rb. I...I A.i den Fo4.n. di. dii W.ttbew.rb sesner N.tis n.ch mit ..th bnng.n kim. IBt s.ch dir
Unw.rt .ini. wsttb.w.rbljthen V.rhaft.r.i iicht hededen.
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unfair 176 if the result and method in which the accepted means
of competition is used, does not accord with a general
principle. 1 A general statement is needed to facilitate
weighing of all the interests involved in the equation. Thus
unfair competition law is commonly based on a judgeinent of
the competitive behaviour and its consequences in the light
of a general clause. In a simplified graphical presentation
the process looks like this:
Status quo -+ Competitive process - New status quo
/
General Clause Benchmark
'Fair'	 'Unfair'
In the top tier of the model, the status quo represents the
situation before appropriation by a defendant took place. The
competitive process is the progressive situation in which
acts of plaintiff and defendant are contained. The new status
quo is the situation resulting from the competitive process.
Political, social and economic elements are contained in both
the status quo situations on both sides of the competitive
spectrum.
In the second tier, the general clause benchmark is the scale
where the entire competitive progression from status quo to
new status quo is set against a legal rule.
176 flj in this respect of the cases involving slavish imitation or systematic copying. See
Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc. 489 US 141 (1989) and Schultz v. Butt [1986]
3SA667.
See also the English cases Crofter Hand Wovenliarrisfweed Co. Ltd. v. Veitch [1942] 1 All
ER 142; Lonrho Plc v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. [19811 2 All ER 456; Lonrho Plc v.Fayed
[1991] 3 All ER 303; and Lonrho plc v.Fayed (No 5) [19941 1 All ER 188, describing the
requirements for the tort of conspiracy to injure by lawful means.
177W Hefermehi: "Konkretisierung der wettbewerbsrechtliche Generalklausel" [Giving concrete
interpretation to the general competition clause], pp. 897-937 in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz
und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hunderjährigen Bestehen der Deutchen Verei-
nigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier, A.
Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed., (1991) VCH, 2 vol. at p. 910.
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Subsequently the fairness or unfairness of the competition is
established.
2.1.3 The General Clause and Legal Method.
For the general clause to have any authority it needs to be
embedded in and coherent with a body of law and the legal
framework. 178
 For the interpretation of its legal effect, laws
otherwise governing competition, such as special laws
governing intellectual property law and economic torts, are
of the utmost importance. If the result of granting
protection is similar to rights conferred by statutory provi-
sions, this in itself gives a strong basis to the protection
of the business asset. 1 Conversely the principles and
considerations that have shaped statutory provisions can
safely be applied to unfair competition cases. The principles
that otherwise govern unfair competition law are not that
much different from notions such as 'good faith' and
l78	 L. Wintgens: "Some Criticai Comments on Coherence in the Law" in "Coherence and
Conflict in law", P. Brouwer, T. Hot, A. Soeteman, W. van der Velden and A. de Wild ed.,
(1992) Kluwer/Tjeenk Willink at 109-137, who distinguishes three levels of coherence at 130:
First level coherence... is most closely linked to consistency or non-
contradiction between individual (i.e. judicial) norms. Second level coherence
referred to a choice of rules of the system with which judicial norms have to
be in accordance. This choice on the second level had to be supplemented
with a third level of coherence. This level provides justificatory arguments for
a rule choice, rule interpretation or new combinations between rules, since
neither this choice nor interpretation or combination of rules are unique
possibilities.
Third level coherence arguments are founded in an extra-legal theory, that
shapes the legal system in its operation on the second and the first level. The
role of consistency is not to be a necessary requirement for coherence on all
levels, but, on the contrary, continues, in a consistent way, on each level of
coherence, courses of decisions that have been shaped by sets of coherence
principles.
' 79Conversely it can also indicate the limits of protection for unfair competition in so far it does
not allow for protection to extend beyond that which is comparable with intellectual property
laws. This is current practice in The Netherlands, where the Supreme Court in Holland Nautic
v. Racal Decca 27 June 1986, BIE 1986 280, [1987] 3 EIPR D-50 was reluctant to award
protection for an achievement that was not covered by specific intellectual property provisions.
This shows that it is extremely hard to pass beyond the common norm of prevention of causing
confusion in the marketplace.
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'unconscionability' that govern contractual relations. 180 The
basic difference in the application of these principles, as
opposed to unfair competition law, is that the relationship
between parties is a contractual one. The existence of
contract and the inherent possibility for the court to assess
the relationship between parties on a fixed basis does,
therefore, seem to imply that general principles can be more
easily applied.
It is in this sense that the formulation of a general
principle on the basis of a factual situation is an accepted
practice. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 181 for example, does not
merely have as its consequence that a manufacturer of beer
has the duty not to allow snails to slither into its bottles
and yet 'duty of care' is a concept as general as unfair
competition. To base authority on this set of facts would
make it difficult to decide future cases and therefore
authority has to be predicated on generality. 182
 Yet it can be
very easily argued that the facts of this particular case do
not support a general concept.
So English Courts have shown themselves able to impose
liability on the basis of (forseeable) effect of conduct. In
unfair competition there is an additional element and here
the basic difficulty lies. Not only do the courts need to
weigh the interests of the parties involved, but also the
180R Shell: "Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An
Emerging Statutory Trend" [1988] 82 Nw.ULR 4, 1198-1254, where he notes the trend in
United States legislation to incorporate sweeping general clauses like 'good faith' in statutory
provisions governing contractual relationships, otherwise known as 'contort'. At 1209-1210:
Breach of commercial contract now affords the aggrieved party an additional
remedy: punitive damages. This new claim, like unconscionability. protects
parties in dependent, vulnerable positions in a commercial relationship.
'Contort' claims also seek to deter bad faith breaches of contract between-
parties of equal bargaining strength.
He continues to describe how a general test for unfairness is filled in by existing common law
jurisprudence and principles in a non-imperative way. At 1223-1224:
In short, the broad definitions of 'unfair' or 'deceptive' conduct relegate
traditional contract and tort categories to the status of helpful, but not
dispositive, analytic tools in the inquiry of commercial liability.
' 8 'Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
182j Farrar and A. Dugdale: "Introduction to Legal Method", 3 ed. (1990) Sweet & Maxwell,
at 77.
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interests of the general market mechanism. The basic conflict
therefore lies in the assessment of the interest of either
party and the creation of monopolies in the marketplace. In
unfair competition cases the relationship between the parties
also determines the method of the legal test, so that the
behaviour of parties becomes the most important factor.
An unwillingness to adopt unfair competition law 183 is closely
connected with the assessment of these interests. Two
difficulties stand out.
The first difficulty derives from the relationship between
the parties involved. Where the relationship is not a
contractual one, courts are generally reluctant to impose
obligations on non-parties. 1
 This is a general problem that
influences the whole law of obligations. It shall therefore
be addressed separately.185
The second one is that the weighing of interests leads to a
judge having to decide what is just or unjust. This amounts
to a policy decision, for which the judge is often thought
183See 1.2 above.
'See S. Stoijar: "The Law of Quasi-Contract" 2uid ed. The Law Book Company Ltd. 1989 at
2-3. With reference to Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005; Baylis v. Bishop of London
[1913] 1 Ch. 127; Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] AC 398; Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 504:
The whole basis of quasi-contract, as everyone knows, was for a long time
ardently debated between traditionalists and modernists (as they may be
called). The latter saw quasi-contract as the special category that Lord
Mansfield had said it was, usually one founded on natural justice or aequum
et bonum. To the traditionalists, on the other hand, this was too 'vague' or
'sloppy' a base; in their view, quasi-contract could only rest on an implied
contract, since, in Lord Sumner's words: 'all these causes of action are
common species of the genus assumpsit. All now rest and long have rested,
upon a notional or imputed promise to repay.
For the fixing of third parties with constructive trust see R. Goode: "Twentieth Century
Developments in Commercial Law" [1983] 3 Legal Studies 283-294 at 292.; D. Hayton:
"Personal Accountability of Strangers as Cconstructive Trustees" [1985] 27 MaI.LR 3 13-320.
and also C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee" [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-
291, at 120:
[Clonstructive trusteeship should not be imposed lightly The point requires
emphasis because there has been a regrettable trend in recent years to equate
liability as a constructive trustee with liability in the torts of negligence and
conversion.
185See Chapter 3 and especially 4 below.
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not to be competent. 1 This attitude is based on an outlook
on unfair competition law, where the establishment of a legal
rule is equated with notions of justice in society. Where
notions of fair and unfair behaviour were dismissed as
workable entities before, the same now happens on the level
of the legal rule where interests in society are weighed.187
Despite the fact that notions of justice for the weighing of
interests amount to a policy decision that ought to be
dismissed on the basis of the outlook above, practice shows
a different picture. The principle of boni mores has in fact
become a principle that permeates most legal systems. 1 A
1 Lord Reid in Pettit v. Pettit [1970] AC 777 at 794 describes this weighing of interests as
decisions over:
Matters which directly affect the lives and interests of large sections of the
community and which raise issues which are the subject of public
controversy, and on which laymen are as well able to decide as lawyers. On
such matters it is not for the courts to proceed on their view of public policy
for that would be to encroach on the province of Parliament.
187A. Ross: "On Law and Justice" (1958) Stevens and Sons p. 274-275 and at 280, where he
describes the fallacy of the attribution of validity to an argument based upon moral submissions
or declarations about justice or injustice:
To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the table: an emotional
expression which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate. That is no
proper way to mutual understanding. It is impossible to have a rational
discussion with a man who mobilises justice because he says nothing that can
be argued for or against.
His words are persuasions, not arguments. The ideology of justice leads to
implacability and conflict, since on the one hand it incites to the belief that
one's demand is not merely the expression of a certain interest in conflict with
opposing interests, but that it possesses a higher, absolute validity; and on
the other it precludes all rational argument and discussion of a settlement. The
ideology of justice isa militant attitude of a biological-emotional kind, to which
one incites oneself for the implacable and blind defence of certain interests.
Justice, therefore, cannot be a legal-political yardstick or an ultimate criterion
by which a law can be judged. To assert that a law is unjust is, as we have
seen, nothing but an emotional expression of an unfavourable reaction to the
law. To declare a law unjust contains no real characteristic, no reference to
any criterion, no argumentation. The ideology of justice has thus no place in
a reasonable discussion on the value of laws.
188T Mayer-Maly: "The Boni Mores in Historical Perspective" [1987] 50 THRHR 60-77, who
traces the principle from Roman law to Continental systems. Despite the fact that medieval
jurisprudence did not display much interest in the principle, the importance in today's law,
according to Mayer-Maly, can also serve to bring about a closer relationship between codified
law and common law countries.
See also in this respect Judge of Appeal at the Supreme Court of South Africa M. Corbett:
"Aspects of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of our Common Law" [19871 SAil 52-69,
where he gives an expose of the policy-making function the courts perform in the process of
developing the common law and adjusting it to the ever-changing needs of society, with at 60,
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plea founded on equitable interests is often based on notions
of justice. 189 A policy decision, however much covert, can
also become the prime basis for a judgement of the interests
in the relationship at hand.0
If the court can determine how the behaviour of one of the
parties affects the other and the market in general, there is
a strong basis to support general clauses and the general
standards contained therein. 191 Other statutory and common law
a description of Schultz v. Butt [1986] 3 SA 667.
189Lord Denning in Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 WLR 923, a case in which the design of
a carpet grip was disclosed in confidence during the course of negotiations for the manufacture
of the grip, at 931:
The law on this subject does not depend on any implied contract. It depends
on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in
confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it.
190S Lord Denning in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. [1973J 1 QB 27, [1972]
3 All ER 65, where the question was whether negligent acts by a contractor leading to loss of
profit can be recoverable:
At bottom I think the question of recovering economic loss is one of policy.
Whenever the courts draw a line to mark out the bounds of duty, they do it
as a matter of policy so as to limit the responsibility of the defendant.
Whenever the courts set bounds to the damages recoverable - saying that
they are, or are not, too remote - they do it as matter of policy so as to limit
the liability of the defendant.
[.. .1
The more I think about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into
its proper pigeonhole. Sometimes I say: 'There was no duty'. In others I say:
'The damage was too remote'. So much so that I think the time has come to
discard those tests which have proved so elusive. It seems to me better to
consider the particular relationship in hand, and see whether or not, as a
matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable, or not...
And with this guideline Lord Denning went on to consider the particular relationship between
the parties and reached a conclusion on the basis of weighing the interests of economic loss to
society and the individual parties. The practical outcome was that guilt of negligence on the part
of the defendant would lead to recoverable damages to person or property and economic loss
consequential on this damage. Loss independent of physical damage fell outside of the equation
on the basis of the weighing of economic and policy interests.
Since that time the boundaries of liability for economic loss caused by negligence have
fluctuated.
191 R. Posner: "The Jurisprudence of Skepticism" [19881 86 Mich.LR 827-891 at 861:
Partly because the growth of scientific knowledge may have increased the
factfinding capacities of the courts, and partly because courts are less
comfortable with harsh, 'inequitable' outcomes than they used to be, there
has been a long-term trend in law toward replacing rules with standards, that
is , with legal tests that try to take full account of the particular facts of a
dispute rather than attach determinative legal significance to one or a few
salient facts. Decision by standard appears to be intrinsically less predictable,
less 'objective,' more discretionary, than decision by rule. The appearance is
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actions and general principles governing contractual
relations are, however, only guidelines.
The acid test lies in the finding of a clear norm within the
legal system that is capable of translating social and
economic fact or moral and political desirabilities into
legal norms.
In Germany it is submitted that the norms and values
contained in the constitution are indicative of the way in
which the general clause in unfair competition cases should
be interpreted. 192 It is the task of the judge to distil from
the rulings in every single case a common denominator that is
in accordance with the constitutional norms a normative legal
rule. For judge-made law to have a long standing effect as a
legal rule that is universally applicable and therefore to
rise above the generality of the legislative clause, a
process of growth and ripening has to take place. Only a
substantial body of decisions can provide the necessary
security for the elevation of a general principle to a legal
rule. Reliance on constitutional principles is therefore
attractive, because it provides an opportunity to check the
merit of each judgement. Not only does the ruling have to fit
in with precedent, but also with basic norms that govern
society. This means that special consideration should be
given to rational argumentation and reasoned judgeinents in
every case, 193
 so that the train of thought displayed therein
to some extent deceptive.
192 y Hefermehl: "Konkretisierung der wettbewerbsrechti iche Generalklausel" [Giving concrete
interpretation to the general competition clause], pp. 897-937 in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz
und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hunderjahrigen Bestehen der Deutchen Verei-
nigung fir gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier, A.
Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed. (1991) VCH, 2 vol. at p. 914:
To make a general clause concrete, the sway of constiütiona1 tights and the
concept of morality contained therein are indicative. Competitive acts that are
not in accordance with the order of values of the constitutional rights, fall by
definition Out of the scope of fair competition. (translation)
FCw the Kothr.tii.i.unq der Gen...kJi.aeI i.t di. A tr swwkis,ç de. G,undietht. d m .en nun Ausdrucl
kommenden Weftvo.te1Iuriqen nctittaw.i..nd. Wettb.wecbehundlunen. die mit det We,tcqdntai de Gnsidr.d*. rwcM
vereinbir end. h.iten sic*r gnid*itxlrch nitht im RVimen des lautnen Wettb.werb..
193This is a need for internal rationality, which should not be confused with external rationality,
which is the purpose of legal rules, their adequacy, their moral acceptability and so on. See L.
Wintgens: "Some Critical Comments on Coherence in the Law" in "Coherence and Conflict in
Law", P. Brouwer, T. Hot, A. Soeteman, W. van der Velden and A. de Wild ed. (1992)
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is verifiable. 194 This is of the utmost importance for civil
law systems, since general practice in the judicial process
is to apply the legal rule contained in the legislation on
the factual situation presented before the Courts. In the
process of creation of a legal rule it is not possible to
rely completely on interpretation of similar existing legal
rules.
A similar technique is used by the English courts. This time
higher authority, albeit not as inviolable as a constitution,
can be derived from common law precedent or statute. The
KluwerlTjeenk Willink at 109-137, at 112 and 130:
Consistency is not a necessary requirement of coherence. They are not
separated but distinct qualities of a legal system, due to the distinction
between internal and external rationality.
194See Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht v. The Home Office (1970] AC 1004, 2 All ER 294 on
the method for the court to establish the existence of the duty of care to the public owed by
officers in charge of a youth at a 'borstal' detention centre. There was a duty to prevent an
escape by boys in their custody, which led to damage being inflicted upon a yacht which the
boys boarded upon their escape. Not only does Lord Diplock give his view on legal reasoning,
striking the rational balance between legal rule and legal fact, but he also considers the fact that
judges make policy decisions:
The court should proceed by seeking first to identify the relevant
characteristics that are common to the kinds of conduct and relationship
between parties which are involved in this case for decision and the kinds of
conduct and relationships which have been held in previous decisions of the
courts to give rise to a duty of care.
The method adopted at this stage of the process is analytical and inductive.
It starts with an analysis of the characteristics of the conduct and relationship
involved in each of the decided cases. But the analyst must know what he is
looking for, and this involves his approaching his analysis with some general
conception of conduct and relationships which ought to give rise to a duty of
care. This analysis leads to a proposition which can be stated in the form;
'In all the decisions that have been analyzed a duty of care has been held to
exist wherever the conduct and the relationship possessed each of the
characteristics A, B, C, 0, etc., and has not so far been found to exist when
any of these characteristics were absent.'
For the second stage, which is deductive and analytical, that position is
converted to:
'In all cases where the conduct and relationship possess each of the
characteristics A, B, C, 0, etc., a duty of care arises.' The conduct and the
relationship involved in the case for decision is then analyzed to ascertain
whether they possess each of these characteristics. If they do the conclusion
follows that a duty of care does arise iii the case for decision.
But since ex hypothesi the kind of case which we are now considering offers
a choice whether or not to extend the kinds of conduct which give rise to a
duty of care, the conduct and the relationship which is involved in it will lack
at least one of the characteristics A, B, C, or 0, etc. And the choice is
exercised by making a policy decision as to whether or not a duty of care
ought to exist if the characteristic which is lacking were absent or redefined
in terms broad enough to include the case under consideration.
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technique is expressed in the discovery of the legal rule or
new legal rules on the basis of existing legal rules that
have already been stated, and in judgements on a case by case
basis 195 by way of distinguishing is often employed.'96
2.2 The General Clause and its Legal Framework.
In the previous chapter some methods for deriving the legal
rule emanating from a general clause of unfair competition
has already been described. These slightly diverging ways
coincide with the way in which unfair competition law is
contained within a legal system.
2.2.1 Common norms.
Article lObis of the Paris Convention gives a universal
indication as to what the norms that determine the legal rule
are. 197 Most notable is the protection against confusion in
all its guises. Furthermore, specific legislation contained
in special statutes covering distinct areas of intellectual
property law is starting to become increasingly harmonised.
As such the European Regulation on the European Trade Mark,
the harmonisation Directive for the approximation of EU laws
195 L. Wintgens: "Some Critical Comments on Coherence in the Law" in "Coherence and
Conflict in Law", P. Brouwer, T. Hol, A. Soeteman, W. van der Velden and A. de Wild ed.,
(1992) Kluwer/Tjeenk Willink at 109-137, at 118:
Judicial decisions in common law systems, being bound by precedent, would
produce a high degree of first level coherence or horizontal coherence, since
inconsistencies between decisions are excluded by the rule of precedent.
Although consistency animates and shapes stare decisis, if things were simple
like that, a strong linear stare decisis case law system would develop, a
development that is clearly not in accordance with the growth of the common
law.
As to why this is not so see at 119:
Judges place themselves on a second level of cohetence when they take into
account, not only the rule to apply to a certain case, but also the fact that any
rule makes part of a whole set of rules, held together by their quality of being
legally valid.
Thus, there may appear in a legal system some inconsistencies on the first
level that can be justified in the name of second level coherence.
196Note that it is strange that the English courts have steered away from unfair competition law,
where their legal technique is best equipped to deal with shaping a legal rule out of a general
clause.
t97See 1.1 above.
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on trade marks and the proposed Directive on Comparative
Advertising have become authoritative sources for the
establishment of the legal rule.
The scope of the general clause however, by its nature, is
not confined to factual descriptions that are already
contained in legislation. The scope of protection on the
basis of a general clause frequently transcends the borders
of the domain covered by both the specifics of article lObis
and specific national legislation. It is for these
transcendences, that usually lie in the sphere of protection
of achievements, where additional frames of reference have to
be found.
2.2.2 Transcending Common Norms.
The notion of free riding in itself already contains many
helpful references. It involves an act that can be
characterised as taking undue advantage of, or free riding
on, another person's achievement recognised by consumers and
other market participants like dealers, trader and suppliers.
This exploitation of another's industrial or commercial
achievement is furthermore of such a nature that it does not
substantially depart from the original achievement. 198 This
principle is also contained in several laws on unfair
competition that have been discussed above and other laws on
intellectual property. As such the concept of dilution has
found its way into the EC Directive to approximate national
laws of Member States on trade marks. The concept of
di1ution 1
 is a form of free riding that does not lead to
deception as to origin of goods, but to a detrimental effect
on the distinctive character and unique quality of the mark
through association of the used sign with the trademark. This
means that, as a consequence, confrontation with the trade
mark does not spark off an immediate conscious or unconscious
98WIPO: "Protection against Unfair Competition", WIPO Publication No. 725(E) 1994 at 54-
55.
1 As first formulated by F. Schechter in 1927: "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection"
in 40 Harv.LR 813 or 60 TMR at 342.
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association in the minds of the public with the trademark
proprietor's product200 . The concept of dilution is closely
linked with the concept of misappropriation, which deals with
the free riding on another's reputation. Where dilution
protects the distinctive quality and advertising value of a
mark, misappropriation is an expression of the protection of
an expectation of quality associated with a particular mark.
As such both dilution and misappropriation are capable of
rising above the traditional requirement of confusion.201
These provisions describing specific acts of unfair
competition will be the first point of reference. Not only
are factual situations in which unfair competition may arise
described, but also norms, a number of which have already
been described above, that govern the competitive process.
When these parallels can, however, no longer be decisive, as
is the case with slavish imitation of technical or non-
technical achievements and parasitic behaviour, an additional
element to the competitive act is required in order to make
it 'unfair'. These additional elements are contained in such
notions as 'the worthiness of the achievement in terms of
attracting protection' and 'the justification for the
appropriation of the achievement' 202 Whereas the first notion
is commonly thought to be a requirement for sufficient
distinctiveness, 203
 the second notion is one that places
emphasis on the way in which the appropriation takes place.
The assessment of the behaviour of the appropriator in this
latter case falls back on tort law and other sources of legal
200As is, for example, the interpretation by the Benelux Court of Justice of the criterion for
trademark dilution in the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law; BeGH: 01-03-1975, NJ 1975,472
at 1492 (Claeryn/Klarein).
20 A. Kamperman Sanders and S.M. Manlatis:"A ConsumerTrade Mark Protection based
on Origin and Quality" [1993] 11 EIPR 406-414 for an appraisal of the various functions of a
trade mark.
202KH Fezer: "Der wettbewerbsrechtliche Schutz der unterriemerischen Leistung" in
"Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hundertjahrigen
Bestehen der Deutchen Vereinigung fur gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer
Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier, A. Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadie ed. (1991) VCH, pp. 939-970
at 964.
203W1P0: "Protection against Unfair Competition', WIPO Publication No. 725(E) 1994 at 58.
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obligation.
Status quo - Competitive process - New status quo
4	 1'
General Clause Benchmark
1) Infraction of other rule
2) Tort
3) Law of obligations
'Fair'	 'Unfair'
The top tier in the model shows the progressive dynamism of
the competitive process again. We have seen that an attempt
to define the legal rule at this level leads to circular
reasoning. When the entire competitive process is set against
the general clause benchmark, elements present in the top
tier can not be wholly determinative of the legal rule
contained in the general clause benchmark. Other factors have
to be present.
In giving substance to the general clause benchmark, other
rules can be relied upon. Treaties and legislation governing
specific areas of intellectual property and competition law
are both authoritative and compelling for a judge, since the
weighing of many of the social, economic and policy interests
has already resulted in a legal norm. The same is true for
tort, where reliance on the basic principles of law have
resulted in a legal norm. Reliance on this norm and the
careful expansion of it, within the limits of the legal
system, is certainly accepted.204
A third possibility lies in a failback on the law of
obligations, of which most notably the principle of unjust
enrichment has become of importance in unfair competition
law.205
204	 Erven Warnink v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1980] RPC 31.
205R Callmann: "He Who Reaps where he has not Sown: Unjust enrichment in the Law of
Unfair Competition" [1942] 55 Harv.LR 595.
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Conclusion to Chapter Two.
In this chapter the way in which the legal rule in unfair
competition cases is established has been discussed. We have
looked at criteria that can account for the application of a
general clause of unfair competition in specific factual
circumstances.
Several conclusions can be drawn:
(1) Property theories and the discretion of judges to make
policy decisions can not serve as the sole basis and
legitimisation for the application of a general norm against
unfair competition.
(ii)To escape from the circular reasoning that results from
the attempts to justify the monopolies that result from the
application of a general norm of unfair competition, a
functional approach towards unfair competition law has to be
adopted.
This results in a mode of establishing legal rule by taking
into account the economic reality of the competitive process,
the distortion of it and the nature of the relationship
between parties. This entire factual set of circumstances
then needs to be viewed against the general clause of unfair
competition.
(iii) The general clause needs to be embedded in and
consistent with the entire legal system. This means that a
general clause benchmark can only draw from a limited number
of legal sources to give it substance. These sources are
other rules dealing with intellectual- property and
competition law, tort and, in the third place, the law of
obligations. It is submitted at this point that the principle
of unjust enrichment could perform a vital function to
overcome the difficulties associated with analogy and tort.
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Chapter 3: Shaping a New Action; Malign Competition.
Introduction to Chapter Three.
This chapter explores the possibility of shaping a novel
action based on the existing principle of unjust enrichment.
Because the principle of unjust enrichment will feature
extensively in the subsequent part of the thesis and because
the recognition of the principle has been fraught with
difficulty in the common law systems, the Roman antecedents
of the action based on unjust enrichment, its development and
theoretical justification will be covered first. Then the
development of the doctrine of unjust enrichment in English
law will be described.
From section 3.3 onward the place of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment in unfair competition law is discussed. The
practice of justification by means of property theories of
protection in unfair competition cases beyond the recognised
categories of tortious liability are finally abandoned and
the possibility for a novel approach emerges.
In section 3.4 the basis for liability on the basis of the
doctrine of unjust enrichment is described at common law and
references to the particular application of the doctrine to
badges of trade are already made.
3.1 Unjust Enrichment as the Basis for Unfair Competition.
Property theories 206
 and policy decisions207
 have proven to be
too weak a basis to form the foundation for a unitary system
of unfair competition. In this chapter we will look at the
possibility of basing unfair competition provisions on the
principle of unjust enrichment.
In order to do so, the origins of unjust enrichment and the
position of this principle in various legal systems will be
206S 2.1.1 above on property.
207See 1.2.2 and 1.2.4.3 above for an outlook on policy considerations.
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traced. Drawing from various sources a specialised provision
of unfair competition based upon unjust enrichment is
formulated.
3.1.1 Unjust Enrichment.
In this section we will look at the history of the principle
of unjust enrichment in order to find a proper definition.
Central to the proposition of unfair competition is that
obligations arise out of a situation in which one competitor
acts to the detriment of another. In order to determine
whether an obligation does arise we will look first at the
sources of obligations as recognised in Roman law.208
Gaius submitted that 'Ornnis obligation vel ex contra ctu
nascitur vel ex delicto' ,209 contract or tort were held to be
the only sources of obligations. It was however realised that
this was not exhaustive and Gaius is said to have
reformulated his proposition taking on board a general
section: 'Obligationes aut ex contractu nascuntur aut ex
rnaleficio aut proprio quodam iure ex variis causaruin
figuris.' 21 ° This points to the possibility of obligations
being imposed on different grounds. It is in the later Corpus
luris Civilis, commissioned by emperor Justinian, that we
find specific actions based on the principles of unjust
enrichment. 211 The sources of obligations are also more
208For a historical overview see J. Dawson: "Unjust Enrichment. A Comparative Analysis",
(1951) Little, Brown and Co., Boston, p. 42-63.
209Gaius Institutiones (111,88).
210Gaius in Justinian Digesta (D. 44,7,1 pr.).
211 Examples hereof can be found in the Justinian Digests (D. 3,5,5,5), where Ulpianus
recognises an actio negotiorwn gestorwn (an action between principal and agent and other
parties to an engagement, whereby one person undertook the transaction of business for
another):
If someone has looked after my business, not for my benefit, but for his own,
than he has far more looked after his own, than my business, like Labeo has
written. (He who takes on management in order to plunder the case, seeks to
further his own gain not mine). Despite this, yes even more so, will he also
be held accountable with the actio negotiorum gestorum. Even though also he
himself, if he has made costs for my case, will have an action against me, not
for the amount he spent because he has unconscientiously meddled in my
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refined and include quasi-contracts and quasi torts: 'Ex
contractu, quasi contractu, ex maleficio, quasi maleficio' •212
Unjust enrichment, if recognised in Roman Law, would fall
into the category of quasi contract or quasi tort. Despite
the fact that a general action for unjust enrichment is
absent, we can find two sweeping statements on the basis of
natural law, made by Pomponius, which do embrace such a
principle: 'Nani hoc natura aequum est, neininem cum alterius
detrimento lien locupletiorem'. 2 ' 3 The medieval Roman
lawyers in their glossaries to the Justinian Corpus luris
Civilis did interpret the actions more widely, 214 but did not
use the general principle formulated by Pomponius to create
new actions, 215 let alone create a general action of unjust
enrichment.216
affairs, but for the amount with which I have been enriched.
Sad at Si guis ngoti. m.a gessit no,, mel contempl.tiof,e, sad sw ecñ cause. Labee scripsit suum aum potius guam meum nagotium gessissa
1gw enim depraedandi cause acced,t, sue lucre, non mao commedo SiudetI: sad nah,lo minus, immo magis at is tenebitur negotionam gestorum
action.. ips. tamen si c.aca rae mass aliguid impendetit, non in Id quad i abest, qua improbe ad nagotia mae accessit. sad I quod age
locupietior factus sum habet contra me actionam.
See also Africanus (D. 3,5,48).
212Justinian Institutes (I. 3,13,2).
2 " 3Pomponius in Justinian Digest (D. 12,6,14):
Natural justice requires that no one should be enriched at the expense of
another.
See also (D. 50,17,206).
214For this I have to refer to a Dutch study by J. Hallebeek and E. Schrage: "Grepen uit de
Geschiedenis van de Algemene Verrijkingsactie van het NBW" (1989) VU Uitgeverij
Amsterdam, Chap. 3, p 27-37.
215j Dawson: "Unjust Enrichment. A Comparative Analysis", (1951) Little, Brown and Co.,
Boston, at 65 on discussing the attitude of the glossators toward unjust enrichment. Despite the
fact that solutions connected with the principle were connected, unjust enrichment did not obtain
a universal status:
Disappointment will face any reader who expects to find that the Medieval
Roman lawyers sought to remake the legal order with the aid of these general
ideas.
216j Dawson: "Unjust Enrichment. A Comparative Analysis", (1951) Little, Brown and Co.,
Boston, at 3-5 on Pomponius' statement:
[Iti requires no warning to the reader that it is not intended to be a 'rule' but
merely 'a general guide for the conduct of the courts.'... [W]e have in
Pomponius' statement... a general principle of justice, at a high though not of
the highest level of abstraction. It expresses both an aspiration and a standard
for judgement.
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3.1.2 Restitutio.
Roman law was however not the only source that was studied in
medieval times. Canon law formulated its answer to the theme
of unjust enrichment: the 'restitutio'.
The restitutio, despite its similarities in outcome, is,
however, conceptually the opposite of unjust enrichment. It
does not seek to give an action to the person who finds
himself to be unjustly impoverished, but it imposes a
liability on the person who has complemented his wealth at
the other's expense to undo the enrichment on the basis of
moral arguments.
3.1.3 Corrective Justice.
The restitutio has therefore much in common with the
corrective justice system that was formulated by Aristotle.217
A crucial difference, however, is that the ethical standpoint
that Aristotle adopts differs in that it does not look at the
merits of the defendant or the plaintiff. 218 The corrective
justice system does not take a moral stance towards the
parties involved, 219 between themselves they are considered
217Aristotle: "Nicomachean Ethics", David Ross trans. rev. ed. (1980), Book V, Chap 4. at
115-117:
The judge tries to equalise things by means of a penalty, taking away from the
gain of the assailant.
218Aristotle: "Nicomachean Ethics", David Ross trans. rev. ed. (1980), Book V, Chap 4. at
115-117:
It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or
a bad man a good one..., the law looks only to the distinctive character of the
injury, and treats the parties as equal...
219T. Hol: "Balancing Rights and Goals" n "Coherence and Conflict in Law", P. Brouwer, T-
Hot, A. Soeteman, W. van der Velden and A. de Wild A. ed. (1992) Kluwer/Tjeenk Willink
at 91-106 at 101 and 103:
When it is difficult to find out who was given an entitlement to what, is not
the judge playing politics when he is deciding the case? When he is, should
he choose the principle of the maximization of wealth?...
Corrective justice demands giving each his due, when wrongly taken. What is his due
is protected by rights. However, when wrong is equated with inefficiency, there is a
chance that those rights will not be protected, when they should. That is because
rights in the economic analysis have no independent meaning, but are seen as a mere
function of wealth maximization.
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equals. The central point is that: 'If someone injures
another wrongfully, he has behaved unjustly irrespective of
his merit, relative to the victim's, evaluated apart from the
wrongful injury itself' •220 Corrective justice therefore seeks
to restore the balance that was upset by annulling wrongful
gains and losses. 221
 The problem with corrective justice is
that the wrong is not defined, 222 unlike the restitutio where
sin is the basis. In the corrective justice system there is
no means of deciding what type of behaviour should trigger
correction. 223
3.1.4 Restitutio and Unjust Enrichment.
Because of the alleviation of the detriment for the
plaintiff, the outcome of a successful action for unjust
enrichment and restitutio is the same. There are however
fundamental conceptual differences.
The restitutio looks at the moral duty of the recipient to
undo the enrichment by giving back what he has gained. Unjust
enrichment on the other hand looks at the action that the
aggrieved party has but the factor taken into account is the
recipient's conduct in the case of unjust enrichment. 224 To
220R Posner: "Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law", [1981] 10 JLS 187-206; J.
Coleman: "Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain", [1982] 11 JLS 421-440, at 191.
221 For an analysis seeR. Posner: "Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law", [1981]
10 JLS 187-206, supplying the economic reason for the duty of corrective justice.
222R Posner: "Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law", [1981] 10 JLS 187-206 at
193.
See also W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse", [1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 171-177 and 180 et seq.; B. Nicholas: "Unjustified
Enrichment in the Civil law and Louisiana Law", [1962] 36 Tul.LR 605-646 at 607, discussing
the corrective character of the unjustified enrichment:
Where the enrichment consists in the acquisition of a property right, the
doctrine can said to be corrective in the sense that before it can be invoked
there must already be in existence a rule of law which validates the enrich-
ment, and that the purpose of the doctrine is to correct and modify that rule.
And at 609 he distinguishes this character from the situation where there is no acquisition of
a property right involved. The enrichment remedy can then be said to be supplementary.
223R Wright: "Reclaiming Corrective Justice", [1992] 77 ILR, Claiming that notions of wrong
can be distilled from Aristotle's writing as a whole.
224See P. Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", rev. ed. (1989) Clarendon Press
Oxford at 17:
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enrich oneself at the expense of another is considered to be
sinful. The recipient can only redeem himself by restoring
the natural order to what it was before by giving back what
he has gained and thus rectifying his wrongdoing resulting in
absolution.
3.2 Development of the Sources of Unjust Enrichment.
As seen above there are three elements of unjust enrichment.
There is the general principle formulated by Pomponius, there
is the restitutio and there is corrective justice. Hybrids of
the three form the contemporary outlook on unjust enrichment
in civil law and the law of restitution in common law
countries. Civil law countries recognise a general principle
akin to the Pomponian formula. In Germany section 812 of the
Civil Code reads:
A person who acquires something without legal cause at the expense of
another as a result of an act performed by the latter, or in some other manner,
is bound to make restoration. This liability also exists when the legal ground
later falls away or where a result, which according to the content of the
juristic act was intended to be achieved by the performance, is not
achieved.226
The Swiss civil code follows a very similar formulation 226 and
also the Italian civil code 227 and even the U.S. restatement228
Restitution and unjust enrichment identify exactly the same area of law. The
one term simply quadrates with the other. That is, if one thinks of the area as
a square, the name at the top is unjust enrichment, the causative event, the
name at the side is restitution, the response.
225 German paragraph 812 BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB):
Wer durch die Leistung eines Anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf dessen
Kosten etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund erlangt, ist ihm zur Herausgabe
verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichtung besteht auch dann, wenn der rechtliche
Grund spater wegfallt oder der mit einer Leistung nach dem Inhalte des
Rechtsgeschâfts bezwegte Erfolg nicht eintritt.
See also B. Nicholas: "Unjustified Enrichment in the CiviLLaw and Louisiana Law"jl96j
36 Tul.LR 605-646 at 611-617 for a comprehensive overview of the development of German
unjust enrichment law.
226Swiss Article 61 Obligationsrecht:
Any person who is enriched without legal cause at the expense of another is
bound to make restitution.
War in ungerechtfertigter Weise aus dam Vermogen ames andern bereichert worden 1st, hat die
Bercicherung zurUckzuerstatten.
227The Italian Article 2041 Codice civile Italiano:
A person who has enriched himself without cause at the expense of another
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know a general formulation. The French law does not have a
general provision contained in the Code Civil, but it does
recognise the principle in jurisprudence. 229
 A similar
approach can be found on systems based on the French Code
Civil, like Quebec, 23° Louisiana, 1
 Belgium and, until
recently, The Netherlands.232
3.2.1 English Law.
In English law the recognition of the concept of unjust
enrichment has been controversial. 233
 Although specific
shall, to the extent of his enrichment, indemnify the other for his correlative
financial loss.
Chi. .enz. IN. iust. c.., ii I sirichito e demo di tea .lt,. person.. I tenuto nei limiti delt .rruchimento, a indennizeae que.t
ultim. della correlative dimintoione p.tnmoniale.
Article 2042:
An action for unjust enrichment can not be instituted if the person injured can
exercise another action to obtain compensation for the injury suffered.
Caraterre su..idario de11 azion.. lAzion. di wachimanto no a proponibile quando ii danne9glato pul e.ercit.re
 unultre .zione
per far.. irid.nnizzare del pre.udizio at.to.
228Restatement on the law of restitution, American Law Institute 1936. $ 160:
Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
$ 190:
Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and the
acquisition or retention of the property is in violation of his duty as fiduciary,
he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other.
229 R. David and H. Gutteridge: "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment", [1935] 5 CU
204-229; See also B. Nicholas: "Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law",
[19621 36 Tul.LR 605-646 at 618-646 for a description of the development of French unjust
enrichment law.
230J. Fine: "Cause in the Quebec Law of Enrichment without Cause", [1973] 19 McGLJ 453-
476.
231 B. Nicholas: "Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law", [1962] 36
Tul.LR 605-646.
232The new Dutch Civil Code, in force since the first of January 1992, does contain a general
provision, Article 6:212. See [19941 RLR 203-207.
233D O'Connell: "Unjust Enrichment", [1956] 5 AJCL 2-17 at 2:
The arguments for and against the existence of the doctrine in English law are
merely expressions of the far deeper difference between that school of
thought which seeks to expand the common law by reference to its ultimate
ethico-juridical principles, and that which is content to contain it within certain
clearly defined paths that permit of only limited deviation.
See however Lord Wright of Durley in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
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instances for recovery were recognised, a systematic approach
towards unjust enrichment remained absent.
Both the absence of the influence of Roman law and the struc-
ture of English law have partially led to the hesitation to
adopt the principle of unjust enrichment. 234 A third factor is
the application of principles of contract to quasi
contractual obligations. 5 In English law, tort, agreement or
presumed agreement remain the basis for obligation, 236 adding
to the difficulty of accepting a general principle of unjust
enrichment. 237 The way in which the courts have dealt with
situations of unjust enrichment have been based on quasi
contract; 238 implied contract and constructive trust. 239
 it is
Barbour Ltd. [1943] AC 32 at 63, where he declared that all civilized nations have to make
provisions for the restitution of unjust enrichment.
234D O'Connell: "Unjust Enrichment", (1956] 5 AJCL 2-17 at 3:
The analytical character of English jurisprudence has caused undue emphasis
to be placed on accumulation of decisions and dicta, so that in many aspects
the common law would seem to be an amalgam of actual data rather then an
epitome of values. The technique of the analytical jurist is to aggregate and
expand precedent until there is enough of it to warrant a generalisation.
235W Friedman: "The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law", [19381 CBR 243-272
& 365-386, at 246-247.
236w Buckland, A. McNairn and F. Lawson: "Roman Law and Common Law. A Comparison
in Outline", (1965) Cambridge at 330:
It seems in our law no more than a survival of the notion to be found in our
older books that there was no conceivable source of obligation in the common
law, except tort or agreement, so that if there was clearly no tort the thing
had to be linked with agreement.
237For a very clear historical overview see G. Fridman: "Restitution", 2"" ed. (1992) Carswell,
1-11, at 10-11:
The House of Lords misinterpreted history and failed to appreciate a
fundamental distinction that pervades and effects the whole law of restitution.
This is the difference between genuine implied contracts, when there is a
Contract that is implicit in the actions of the parties, not expressed in their
words., and obligations implied or imposed by law. The latter are also based
upon the factual situation in which the parties find themselves, but they have
nothing to do with the implication of any agreement. To appreciate the
viability and significance of restitution as a distinct branch of law, therefore,
implied obligations must be distinguished from implied contracts.
238R David and H. Gutteridge: "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment", 11935] 5 CU 204-
229 at 223 on the reason for the fact that unjust enrichment as a broad and general principle has
not been accepted in English law:
[Ojur law of quasi-contract, such as it is, has developed along a channel
which was carved out for it by indebitatus assumpsit, and that this has proved
to be too restricted to permit of the growth of remedies of a non-contractual
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therefore not unjust enrichment that triggers relief, but
another entity. This is why English law does not speak about
the principle (unjust enrichment), but about the remedy:
restitution.
Restitution is the legal reply to the various more or less
developed concepts that generally operate under the heading
of quasi contract. 240 As a concept, restitution, being a legal
reply to a number of claims, differs from unjust enrichment,
being a causative event. Restitution as a concept lies much
closer to the restitutio.
It is only since Lord Goff and Gareth Jones' book on the Law
of Restitution 241 that an effort has been made to establish a
connecting and underlying principle of unjust enrichment.
That terminology and mode of thought has not changed,
however, can be seen in the opening remarks of the fourth
edition:
The law of restitution is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual or
otherwise, which are founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment.
Restitutionary claims are to be found in equity as well as law.242
Despite this fact, recognition by the courts of a generalised
nature... [T]he traditional classification of forms of action forced all claims into
the contractual class of obligations, and the result is that although English law
sometimes allows a right of recovery to the impoverished party, it has steadily
refused to recognize any general obligation to restore profit which is the
nature of an unjustified enrichment.
239W Friedman: "The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law", [1938] CBR 243-272
& 365-386 at 247-253 depicts the reliance on quasi contract in the development of unjust en-
richment. At 377-380 he examines quasi contracts, constructive trust and several statutory and
judicial remedies and finds the recurring underlying principle of unjust enrichment.
See also Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Fourth ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1993, at 3-
11.
240See Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour lid. [1943]
AC 32 at 61:
It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to
prevent a man from retaining the money of some benefit derived from another
which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English
law are generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now
recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been
called quasi-contract or restitution.
241 Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", First ed. (1966), Second ed. (1978), Third ed.
(1986), Fourth ed. (1993), Sweet & Maxwell.
242Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet & Maxwell, at 3.
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right to restitution in English law seems imminent 243 and the
constant string of publications on the subject 244 seem to
suggest that this may only be a matter of tinie. 245 A
theoretical framework is already present since Professor
Birks' work 'An Introduction to the Law of Restitution'246
provides a coherent structure. Covering the whole field of
quasi-contract, torts and other wrongs that have had
restitution as a potential or actual outcome, he has managed
243Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Third ed. (1986) Sweet& Maxwell, after quoting
Lord Diplock's statement at the time, that the law of unjust enrichment is not likely to develop
further, in Orakpo v. Manson investments Ltd. [1978] AC 95 at 104, state their view regarding
unjust enrichment as a general principle at 15-16:
But, although all restitutionary claims are united by the principle of unjust
enrichment, it has been said that 'no general doctrine of unjust enrichment is
recognised in English law'. In our view the case law is now sufficiently mature
for the courts to recognise a generalised right to restitution. Indeed there are
decisions, including those of the House of Lords, which can be best explained
on the simple ground that the court had considered that the plaintiff should
succeed because the defendant had been unjustly enriched.
In the Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet & Maxwell, the development of case law has progressed to the
extent that Goff and Jones state at 14-15:
The case law now demonstrates that the courts recognise that the principle
of unjust enrichment unites restitutionary claims, and that the law is not
condemned to 'no further growth in this field'. This growth will continue.
244R. David and H. Gutteridge: "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment", [1935] 5 CII 204-
229.; W. Friedman: "The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law", [1938] CBR 243-
272 & 365-386.; W. Holdsworth: "Unjustifiable Enrichment", [1939] 55 LQR 37-53; Goff and
Jones: "The Law of Restitution", First ed. (1966) Sweet & Maxwell.; P. Birks: "An
Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1985) Clarendon Press, Oxford.; J. Beatson: "Benefit,
Reliance and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment", [1987] 4 C.L.P. 71-92.; A. Burrows: "Free
Acceptance and the Law of Restitution", [1988] 104 LQR 576-599.; G. Mead: "Free
Acceptance: Some Further Considerations", [1989] 105 LQR 460-467.; M. Garner: "The Rule
of Subjective Benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment", [1990] 10 OJLS 42-65.; J. Beatson:
"The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment", (1991) Clarendon Press, Oxford.; "Essays on the
Law of Restitution", A. Burrows ed. (1991) Clarendon Press, Oxford.; A. Burrows: "The Law
of Restitution", (1993) Butterworths; P. Birks: "The Structure of the English Law of Unjust
Enrichment", Inaugural lecture for the assumption of the professorship of the CPO chair at the
University of Nijmegen, 2 November 1994.
2455ee G. Jones: "The Law of Restitution: the Past and the Future" 1-16 in "Essays on the Law
of Restitution", Burrows A. ed. (1991) Clarendon Press, Oxford, at 3 describes the prerequisite
for acceptance by the courts regarding the elements, whose contents is still unclear, that make
up unjust enrichment:
Certainly its acceptance is dependent upon scrupulous analysis of the
interrelated concepts of benefit, at the plaintiff's expense, and unjust to
retain. Courts must be persuaded that they can be given firm and meaningful
content from the examples of judgements which are structured and seen to
be founded on principle.
246(1985) Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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to uncover the principles that underpin the general doctrine
of unjust enrichment. One of the most important observations
that he makes is that restitution and unjust enrichment cover
the same area of law. 247 Unjust enrichment as an independent
legal doctrine is, however, not the same as restitution.
Restitution as a legal reply can also be triggered by wrongs,
be it tort or otherwise.
This is reflected in the distinction that is made between
restitution for an enrichment by subtraction and restitution
for wrongs. 248 In the doctrine of unjust enrichment,
subtraction is the autonomous basis for action. The
plaintiff's claim to restitution addresses the shift in a
benefit from the plaintiff to the defendant. The term
subtraction is applied to a situation in which the defendant
has obtained a benefit, and that this enrichment came from
the plaintiff.249
Restitution for wrongs on the other hand is the response to
a situation in which a primary right has been violated by a
breach of duty. 25° Despite the fact that there might be a
247p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", Third ed. (1989) Clarendon Press,
Oxford, at 17:
One term simply quadrates with the other. That is, if one thinks of the area
as a square, the name at the top is unjust enrichment, the causative event,
and the name at the side is restitution, the response.
248p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 23-24 distinguishes between unjust enrichment by substraction and unjust enrichment
by a wrong, which he later modifies at 42-43. There he noted that restitution is available for
unjust enrichment (by substraction) and as a remedy and secondary right for wrongs. Restitution
in the latter category is a sanction for a breach of duty of a primary right.
See also Lord Goff and G. Jones: "The Law of Restitution",Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet &
Maxwell, who at 69-72 distinguish three types of restitution claims: a) Where the plaintiff
himself conferred the benefit on the defendant. b) Where the defendant has received the benefit
from a third party. c) Where the defendant has acquired the benefit through his own wrongful
act.
249See P. Birks: "The Structure of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment", Inaugural lecture
for the assumption of the professorship of the CPO chair at the University of Nijmegen, 2
November 1994 at 10-17.
250Examples can by found in Reading v. A.G. [1951] AC 507, where a Sergeant took a bribe
to guide smugglers of illicit drugs through road posts in Cairo on the authority of his uniform.
Although the money would not have accrued to the British Crown, the Crown could rely on the
wrong, a breach of duty and was successful in its claim to restitution.
See also Boardnian v. Phipps [19671 2 AC 46, where Boardman had obtained shares for himself
through his position as trustee. Despite the fact that the trust was not deprived of getting the
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theme of unjust enrichment, it is not the foundation claim
from which the restitutionary remedy springs. As soon as the
wrong has been established, the defendant's position is such
that he is under a moral obligation to undo the gain he has
acquired. This might then be translated into a principle of
unjustified enrichment, but it is in essence nothing more
than a remedy for those cases where the wrong consists of a
breach of a duty.251
3.3 Unjust Enrichment and Unfair Competition.
The principle of 'unfair competition', in its broad meaning,
consists of a whole range of possible actions. Where badges
of trade are concerned, the possible forms of action in an
infringement case can be divided into two possible forms. The
first and most straightforward is the action in 'passing
off'. With its clearly defined ambit, passing off is a well
established action. Cases of 'unfair competition' that fall
outside of the special requirements that shape passing off or
injurious falsehood are also being referred to as unfair
competition. Passing off and other economic torts such as
injurious falsehood are said to be a species of 'unfair
competition', but the nature of the residual category,
whether involving badges of trade or not, of unfair competi-
tion is less clear. One aspect of this category is that in
order to render it actionable, some adverse effect on
competition in the market 252
 has to be present. To prevent
confusion they are hereafter referred to as 'malign
shares, Boardman was in breach of his duty by making personal acquisitions on the basis of his
position. The breach of fiduciary duty displaced the need for the enrichment to be at the expense
of the plaintiff:
251 Breach of confidence can serve as an example here. See Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 2
De G. & Sm 652, involving private royal etchings and Peter Pan Mfg. Corp. v. Corsets
Silhouette Ltd. [1963] 3 All ER 402.
252 has to be noted here that 'market' is an elastic concept. The market is defined broadly in
unfair competition cases in order to weigh the interests of all market players. Conversely the
market has been defined narrowly by the Commission in deciding whether there was abuse of
a dominant position in Article 86 cases, although this may be changing. See V. Korah "EC
Competition Law and Practice", Fourth ed. (1994) Sweet & Maxwell at 68-75.
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competition'.
Unfair Competition
Passing of f Malign	 Injurious falsehood Other
competition
In the diagram above the term unfair competition is used as
a broad term under which several causes of action operate. As
far as badges of trade are concerned, passing of f and
injurious falsehood are the most clearly well defined causes
of action. In the sub-category 'Other', defined and circum-
ferenced causes of action, i.e. other economic torts, that
fall within the field of unfair competition, but which do not
bear relevance on the field of badges of trade, are repre-
sented. Breach of confidence is a cause of action that falls
within this category.
'	 .My sub category of malign competition deals with, as of
yet, not clearly defined causes of action. The law in this
field progresses on a case by case basis and its fundamental
principles are not clear. As far as badges of trade are
concerned, questions of the protection of advertising
campaigns and formats for TV programs or marketing exercises
spring to mind as examples of cases for which protection
under this category could be sought. The distinguishing
element, however, is the absence of a recognised variety of
damage, so that relief under passing off can not be obtained.
In my category of 'malign competition' a form of unfair
competition different from passing of f was recognised in the
United States. The Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of
unjust enrichment into the law of unfair competition in the
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INS case. 253 Rudolf Callmann noted 256 that the court's
consideration, that the appropriation of another's assets in
order to reap where one has not sown constitutes unfair
competition in business, 255 in essence seeks to prevent unjust
enrichment.
The introduction to the field of unfair competition of
restitutionary principles has several advantages.
a) First of all it provides a legal frame work to give shape
to the area of malign competition.
b) Secondly it serves both as a contrast and an augmentation
to the action in passing of f.
c) In the third place it offers the possibility to break away
253248 US 215 (1918).
254R. Callmann: "He Who Reaps where he has not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of
Unfair Competition" [1942] 55 Harv.LR. 595 at 597.
255248 US 215 (1918) at 239-240:
The fault in reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant as
against the public, instead of considering the right of complainant and
defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves. The right of the
purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratui-
tously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with
complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to
transmit that news for commercial use, in competition with complainant which
is what defendant has done and seeks to justify, is a very different matter. In
doing this, defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has
been acquired by complainant as the result of organisation and the
expenditure of labour, skill and money and which is saleable by complainant
for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is
endeavouring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating
to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the
process amounts to an unauthonsed interfeienca-with the-normal operation
of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is
to be reaped, in order to divert a material proportion of the profit from those
who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with
any part of the expense of gathering news. The transaction speaks for itself,
and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair
competition in business. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material
Out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in
the same field, we hardly can fail to recognise that for this purpose, and as
between them, it must be regarded as quasiproperty, irrespective of the rights
of either as against the public.
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from concepts of property as the basis for an action of
malign competition.
3.3.1 Legal Frame Work.
The broad and general principle of unfair competition has
been one too idiosyncratic for the common law courts to
embrace. 256
 The determination of what is fair and unfair in
the market is thought to be beyond the capacity of the courts
to determine. Despite the fact that unfair competition as a
legal norm has been dismissed, it can still serve as an
overall description of certain types of market behaviour. A
notion of unfair competition makes it possible to classify
passing off as a form of unfair competition and contrast it
with the sub-category of malign competition. Only through the
use of a generic conception of unfair competition does the
possibility for portrayal and analysis of malign competition
arise. If notions of 'fair' and 'unfair' have to be dismissed
in this analysis, unjust enrichment is the nearest generic
conception257
 that helps to shape the boundaries of this part
256Moorgate Tobacco Co. v. Phi/lip Morris lid. [No.2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 with a survey of
English cases.
257See P. Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1985) Clarendon Press, Oxford,
revised ed. 1989, who at 18-19 describes the reluctance with which the principle for unjust
enrichment at the expense of another has been treated by the English courts:
The judges' unwillingness to use the language of unjust enrichment is based
on a fear of uncertainty. They suppose that the word 'unjust' would invite
appeals to abstract conceptions of justice derived from whatever moral and
political values might best suit a party's case.
.[W]hatever adjective was chosen to qualify 'enrichment', its role was only
to identify in a general way those factors, which according to the cases
themselves, called for an enrichment to be undone. No enrichment can be
regarded as unjust, disapproved or reversible unless it happens in
circumstances in which the law provides for restitution. The answer to the
fear of uncertainty is not to reject the word but to deal firmly with any
argument which attempts to detach it from the law.
1
98
of unfair competition law.
3.3.2 Contrast and Augmentation to Passing Of f.
Because badges of trade are the subject of this research, the
action of passing of f, being part of the law of unfair
competition itself, serves as a point of reference for malign
competition. The combination of requirements that shape the
tort of passing off and the law of restitution may prove to
be the method to shape an action of malign competition.
By contrast, passing off is a recognised tort that provides
relief for damage resulting from confusion caused by the
defendant. An action in malign competition may provide a
remedy in cases where confusion and/or damages are absent.
3.3.3 Property Theories Abandoned.
As was shown above in section 2.1.1 concepts of property are
not really suitable as a basis for claims in the field of
unfair competition law in general and especially where a
transcendence beyond well recognised tortious actions is
sought. The law of unjust enrichment can deal with one of the
problems underlying the use of property doctrines to support
an action in unfair competition. In the field of quasi-
property, the only way to describe a business asset as
property is if the protection awarded to that asset grants it
a certain status of exclusivity. The nature of these rights
He furthermore asserts that the rejection of the generic conception means that there is no
description or image to elaborate and analyze.
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in unfair competition cases, however, does not provide the
status of exclusivity at the start of the proceedings. 258 In
most cases it remains very much to be seen whether the claim
of the plaintiff that his business asset has been
misappropriated stands up in court. The status of exclusivity
is the result of a judgement in favour of the plaintiff. This
means that there is only exclusivity ex post which leads to
a consequential approach. 259 By contrast, in traditional
concepts of property, exclusivity works ex ante. Furthermore
a full property right gives a right to the owner that should
protect his interest against interference from the rest of
the world. This means that a property right places the
interest of the plaintiff on a presumptively higher level
than that of the defendant. If business assets were to be
perceived as property, the plaintiff's right to prevent
other's from appropriating his business asset would be
258See F. Cohen: "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" [1935] 35 Col.LR
809-849, where he at 815 observes the circular logic underpinning the notion that business
assets of value are property:
One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his product has
induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol, form of
packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is
property; the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties
who seek to deprive him of his property.
259H Havighurst: "The Right to Compensation for an Idea" [1954] 49 Nw.ULR 295-318 at
305, where he describes the link between property concepts and benefits derived from the
appropriation of ideas:
[Tihat benefit has come to him (the defendant) not because he has obtained
property, but because the plaintiff has rendered him a service... If the
contribution of an idea is regarded simply as a service for which recovery is
to be allowed on a theory of quasi-contract, it might seem that there remains
only the factual determination of the value of the service accepted by the
defendant in putting the idea to work. This, in the eyes of most courts, would
give too free a rein to juries. By introducing the property concept and setting
up a test with respect to when a particular idea qualifies, the court achieves
a greater measure of control. It may thus seem that the property concept has
no integrity of its own. The issue with respect to whether a given idea is or
is not property has no meaning apart from the result which it is desired to
achieve... Likewise as applied to ideas generally 'property right' is a
rationalisation of a desired result.
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elevated to a higher status.260
The opposite is, however, true in these types of unfair
competition cases. As is clear from the terminology itself,
unfair competition deals with shaping a competitive
environment. In this environment awarding rights to one party
over another does away with the competitive principle from
the outset, since monopolistic rights would give one party
certain immunities from competition. Curbing competition on
the basis of property rights can therefore only occur when a
property right is recognised prior to any infringement claim.
Curbing competition on the basis of unfair competition
principles is possible in those cases where there is a
recognised cause of action such as passing off, or in those
cases where the scale of acceptable competitive 'imbalance'
is tipped out of equilibrium; 261 and has become unfair.
Otherwise building upon other's achievements is perfectly
acceptable within a competitive market mechanism. If one
wants to assess whether competition is in any way unfair, so
that competition has lead to an improper competitive
imbalance and the acceptable progression from other's
achievements has been overstretched, the interests of all
contestants in the competition game have to be weighed. Equal
standing, without a priori assumption of rights, for all
260F. Cohen: "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" [1935] 35 Col.LR 809-
849 at 815:
Courts are not creating property, but merely recognizing a pre-existent
Something.
261 Competition by nature does allow practices that are detrimental to other competitors. For the
real isation of welfare through competition it is however necessary that some form of equilibrium
is maintained. This equilibrium is built up out of factors such as access to the market, scaling
down dominant positions, protection and encouragement of investment, combatting free riding
etc.
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parties involved is therefore a prerequisite. The law of
restitution does not place any presumption of weightiness on
a claim by either party the way property theories do. It
merely seeks to reverse an unjust situation that has arisen
because one party has enriched himself at the expense of the
other. Because of this principle of reversal, the law of
restitution is a very useful means to restore a distorted
competitive equilibrium. Its effect is corrective 262 of a
situation where someone has taken unfair advantage, by enri-
ching himself at a producer's expense, of the fact that a
producer has chosen to market the benefits of his labour.
Unfair Competition
Passing off	 Malign competition	 Other torts
Unjust enrichment
Other factors	
- I
The situation thus becomes that unjust enrichment principles
can be used in order to provide a basis for malign
262• Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property arid the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, where at 171-177 she describes how unjust enrichment can be
interpreted as a corrective justice system that protects the status quo distribution of interests and
advantages from disruption. The basic problem with this approach is that it is based on the
presumption that interests held in the status quo position are justifiable and entitled to
protection.
At 181-183 she therefore proposes a more limited position:
[Tihat an individual has some resources that she ordinarily is not compelled
to make available to others, and that the law ordinarily will protect from
others' acts of compulsion.
From this preposition it follows that others have no right to compel others' labour, so that no
one has a prima facie right to the benefits of another's labour. Legal protection can then be
awarded to those who find that the benefits of their labour are being used by others. If one then
assumes that the labourer is entitled to compensation for his work, the controversy lies in the
question whether pay can be demanded where there is no contract. This is where restitution
comes in.
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competition. Since other principles, like property theories,
can also be used, albeit not independently, to found unfair
competition, 'Other factors' are also included. As soon as a
particular species of market behaviour is categorised in
terms of tort or property rights, it may no longer be
necessary to accommodate it within the category of malign
competition. The element of unjust enrichment may still be
present, albeit in inverted form, not as a basis for action,
but in its remedial character as restitution for a wrong.
3.4 Unjust Enrichment as a Basis: an Action in Malign
Competition.
As was noted before, building upon someone else's
achievements is completely legitimate. If a producer has
marketed a product, he will expect to recuperate his
investment and he will expect the appropriate intellectual
property rights to be enforced. Free riding is something that
in itself is not considered to be wrong. 263 The producer
himself has relied on anterior knowledge that is not his own.
It only becomes problematic if the free rider enriches
himself at the expense of the other that he can be obliged to
pay for the benefits he gains.2
263j Dawson: "The Self-serving Intermeddler" [1974] 87 Harv.LR 1409-1458 at 1412 puts it
universally:
Human beings now alive were not spontaneously generated; merely by living
we reap what we did not sow. For most of the elements that make life worth
preserving no one is ever expected to pay, in part of course for practical
reasons that it would be impossible to discover whom to pay or how much.
264j Dawson: "The Self-serving Intermeddler" [1974] 87 Harv.LR 1409-1458 at 1413. After
having stated that there is a general antagonistic tendency towards intervention in a market
economy to redistribute gains and losses, he notes the difficulty underlying imposing liability
on free riders:
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3.4.1 'Unjust'.
The issue therefore becomes what has to be unjust about an
enrichment so that it warrants restitution? The term 'unjust'
has in this field met with as much controversy as the term
'unfair' where it is applied to competition. 265 Despite the
fact that the term unjust is used to denote the shift in
capital from the plaintiff to the defendant, restitution is
not dependent on the unjustness. 2M The term therefore only
refers to the presence or absence of a legal ground for the
The problems involved in composing tolls for free riders differ somewhat from
those normally raised at the busier intersections between legal rules and
economic behaviour. This is because attention is usually centered on legal
rules whose function is to allocate losses, where it is likely that economic
activity will be deterred or redirected if risks of liability for losses by others
must be assumed. But the issues to be considered here involve restribution
not of losses but of gains.
265j • Dawson: "The Self-serving Intermeddler" [1974] 87 Harv.LR 1409-1458 at 1413,
describing the arguments of the anti-competitive effect of restitution in free riding cases, finds
that restitution can serve as an incentive to engage in gain producing activities despite the fact
that such an additional incentive is usually not needed to induce action based upon self interest:
In the gain-producing ventures of private persons I...] the promotion of self-
interest was the dominant motive, though some of them have the added
feature that a gain to strangers as a byproduct was both forseeable and inevi-
table and was in that sense intended. If restitution were regularly granted in
such situations, of course, the self-seeking producers of gains would be
justified in including among their expectations of reward not only the
advantages to themselves that supplied their primary incentive but the gains
to be recouped from strangers I...] It is true that in some situations the
prevention of free rides may have an anticompetitive effect, as where the
producer and receiver are actual or potential competitors. Usually a refusal to
intervene will not be because competition may be impaired, but because inter-
vention is not needed to provide economic incentive.
266R Posner: "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law" [1981] 10
JLS 187-206, at 189-191, where he describes the corrective justice principle contained in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics that underlies tort law also where restitution is concerned. At
191 and 193:
[hf someone injures another wrongfully, he has behaved unjustly irrespective
of his merit, relative to the victim's, evaluated apart from the wrongful injury
itself.
[T]he Aristotelian concept of corrective justice does not tell us who is a wrongdoer
or who has vested rights; all it tells us is that a wrongful injury is not excused by the
moral superiority of the injurer to the victim.
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enrichment. 267 In this sense the term 'unjust' does not bear
any relevance in determining whether the defendant is obliged
to restitute the enrichment he has gained, but describes the
category of cases where recovery is possible.
3.4.1.1 Restitution for Wrongs.
The principle of unjust enrichment does not rely on a wrong
committed by the defendant, although restitution for a wrong
is possib1e. 2
 A wrong in this sense is a breach of duty269
and relies on a primary right. As noted before free riding as
such does not constitute a wrong. And since malign
competition lacks any conception of anterior rights, restitu-
tion for wrongs is not an area of law that can form the basis
for malign competition. We must remember that as soon as a
wrong is recognised, it becomes a tort, disqualifying the
wrong from the ambit of malign competition.
3.4.1.2 Restitution for Enrichment by Subtraction.
Unjust enrichment by subtraction, however, remains a valid
267This is also true for the common law interpretation of unjust enrichment. See P. Birks: "An
Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford at 23. At 99:
'Unjust'..does not look up to an abstract notion of justice but down to cases
and statutes. It is merely a general word expressing the common quality of
those factors which, when present in conjunction with enrichment, have been
held to call for restitution.
268p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 23-24 and at 42-43.
See also Lord Goff and G. Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet and
Maxwell at 69-72.
269p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 313.
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option. And to validly impose an obligation on a free rider
to make a payment where there is no wrongful act, unjust
enrichment by subtraction can prove a sufficient basis.270
Enrichment by subtraction describes those cases in which
value has passed from the plaintiff to the defendant. 271 In
order for the enrichment to become unjust, there are several
contingencies.
3.4.1.3 Non-voluntary Transfer.
The first is that a non-voluntary transfer of the benefit
must have taken place. This can occur when the plaintiff has
made clear that he does not want the benefit of his labour to
be transferred. The plaintiff should in this instance either
vitiate272 the transfer, or qualify the conditions under which
he wants the transfer to occur. If he does not do so, he
takes the risk of losing his labour without return, because
he can become a volunteer by intermeddling in the business
270W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, where at 187-188 she describes the law of restitution as ajustification
for payment in 'reap/sow' cases, because it does not rely on the wrongful act of the defendant.
At 199 she notes that the injustice underlying unjust enrichment for the taking of business assets
revolves around the operatic principle that reaping without sowing should trigger relief. Based
upon the Restatement (Second) of Restitution 1983, forms of unjust enrichment that fall within
this category are those that:
(1) are unearned and unrecompensed; (2) result from the labor or other
resources of plaintiff; (3) are not transferred to the defendant to satisfy one's
legal duty or with donative intent; and (4) occur in contexts where reasons to
deny restitution are absent.
271p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 23.
272p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 101.
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that is not his.2Th An intermeddler forces benefits on others
out of the selfish desire to be recompensed. In essence the
claim for restitution becomes less powerful the more the
plaintiff appears to have chosen to confer a benefit
voluntarily. Vitiation and qualification, therefore, serve as
indicators that the plaintiff does expect to be
recompensed. 274 It is up to the plaintiff to show that he as
a participant in the competitive process has been active to
ensure that the rights he now claims were not up for grabs.2
In order to do so he might have to clearly indicate which
business assets he considers to be his by applying some form
of indication or tag on them. This is because he will
normally be ignorant of the fact that a transfer is taking
place. In order to assure any transfer can be termed non-
273p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 103 on the general notion of intermeddling.
See also J. Dawson: "The Self-serving Intermeddler" [1974] 87 Harv.LR 1409-1458, who
contends that persons who bestow benefits on others in the pursuit of their self interest can still
have a claim under the principle of unjust enrichment. His research however shows that
successful claims in restitution serve to eradicate the difference between the return a producer
was promised and the actual return. It appears that the only successful claimants at the time
were lawyers.
274	 Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, where at 223 she describes intangibles eligible for protection under
her proposed unjust enrichment based tort of 'Malcompetitive' Copying. According to her an
intangible must be clearly bounded and marked as owned. Only if the claimant makes clear a
transfer is not voluntary, can he claim the enrichment is unjust. At 225-226:
Only if the defendant knows that he is about to use something owned by
another for which the owner would request payment ..., will he be able to
defend himselLfrom unwanted incursions.jnto his pocketbook. Ihe
defendant's choice to use an owned product that is marked clearly with a tag
indicating the likely price vitiates most arguments that he would be worse off
after paying the plaintiff than he would have been had he not used the
product at all ... Only a defendant who knows that he will be using an
intangible in which another claims an interest will have the ability to seek the
creator's consent before using it.
275W Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-28 1, at 223 and 225. Her suggestion for a requirement of clearly bounded
and marked intangibles might prove essential for a plaintiff to base his claim for restitution on
non-voluntary transfer.
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voluntary, producers could be expected to mark their products
and assets by means of tags.
In view of such a demand, however, producers will simply
start tagging everything, just to make sure.276
In those instances where the plaintiff does intend a benefit
to be transferred upon any other party, he can qualify the
transfer so that it becomes conditional. By tagging the
appropriate business resources the plaintiff does in essence
qualify any possible transfer by making clear that he does
expect to be recompensed. In this way a producer of
intellectual property works who markets his product without
stating that he does not want to see certain benefits
associated with it alienated without his consent is said to
voluntary transfer that benefit. 27'7
 In this approach the mere
fact that one engages in business activities means that one
takes the risk of transferring benefits upon others.
The marketing of a product without a tag claiming an interest
would then amount to an implied license to copy. There is
even authority to suggest that licenses can be implied in
cases where control has not been exercised. In Betts v.
Willmott2T8
 it was held that where a British patentee had
himself marketed his product abroad, he could only prevent
their import into Britain if he had attached a clear and
276The placing of TM in a circle is already widespread practice. The producer wants to confer
the message that he thinks the mark, slogan or other badge is his. So far the symbol means
nothing but: "We think this is our trade mark even if you do not think so".
277W Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 194.
278(1871) 6 Ch. 239.
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express embargo. 279 It was held that it was within the control
of the patentee to extend his rights in the patent and that
when that control had not been exercised, a license was
implied.
Despite striking similarities, however, the situation with
tagging is different in one crucial respect. A license can
only be implied if control can be exercised. Where there is
a patent right, control can be exercised on the basis of this
property interest. Conversely in cases of tagging, the only
power a claimant can exert is the application of his tag on
the product. This however only amounts to an aspiration to a
property interest. The truth is that there is no property
right to support the claim and control can not be exercised.
This also exposes another problem with tagging, and that is
the aspiration to a property interest. The inclusion of a
requirement for tagging in proposed legislation for the
protection of reserved creations, together with calls for
registries for these claims, 280 demonstrate that there is a
clear danger that tagging tries to elevate the claim in an
asset to a property right.
It is submitted that it would go too far to assume that
failure to qualify or vitiate equals voluntary transfer
because it can not be said that the plaintiff, by
participation in the market, intended the benefits of his
2 The theory of exhaustion of rights has to the largest extent rendered this dictum void. See
in this respect W. Cornish: Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied
Rights" Second ed. (1989) Sweet & Maxwell at 165-167.
280See for French proposals C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual Property on Procrustes' Bed:
Observations on a French Draft Bill for the Protection of 'Reserved Creations'" [1992] 12 EIPR
438-444; and for Dutch proposals "Rapport Studiecommissie Bescherming Sweat of the Brow-
prestaties" Vereniging voor Auteursrecht December 1993. See 6.3.2.2 and 6.5.2.3 below.
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business assets as gifts. Despite the fact that implied
consent to transfer might be a crude result of a failure to
qualify, clarity for the defendant and the freedom to copy in
the market do make qualification and vitiation warranted. The
tagging of assets can in this sense only serve as proof that
the enriched party knew there was an outstanding claim. As we
will see later it is the knowledge on the part of the
defendant and not the tag that forms the element in the
determination whether the defendant has been unjustly
enriched.
3.4.1.4 Free Acceptance.
This does not mean, however, that in case of voluntary
transfer the chances for restitution have evanesced. The
conduct of the defendant in the taking of the benefit is also
of importance. 281
 In this second contingency restitution is
possible in those cases in which the defendant has freely
accepted the benefit where he knows these benefits are not
being offered to him without charge and where he has chosen
not to decline. 282
 Even if the producer has not vitiated or
281 y Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 194-195:
[T]he defendant is also a 'doer' - he has chosen to make a mold of boat hull
designs, to copy the book for mass sale, to use the recent improvements in
the automobile engine as a model for the car he is designing, or to market
futures contract that makes reference to the famous average. Between two
active knowledgeable parties - two 'doers' - it is more difficult to say where
entitlements should lie. The creator's efforts appear still to give her a
marginally stronger claim than the user's, but the difference between them is
not sharp.
282J Wade: "Restitution for Benefits Conferred without Request" [1966] 19 Vand.LR 1183-
12 14, at 1198, stating the general principle that a defendant can not be held liable if he had no
opportunity to refuse the benefit bestowed upon him. If notification is given, or if an
opportunity to choose whether or not to take the benefit arises after the plaintiff acted, the
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qualified the business assets subject of transfer, he can
still be restituted283 when the defendant has appropriated the
benefit where he had the choice not to do so.2
3.4.1.5 Passive Free Acceptance.
Acceptance can be active or passive. In the latter instance
a benefit must be bestowed upon the defendant while he is
standing by and chooses to acquiesce. This is an improbable
scenario for nialcompetitive behaviour, since a competitor is
not going to surrender his competitive edge by passing on his
business assets gratuitously, and if he were to do so,
intermeddling285 would not only be odd, but also highly sus-
defendant can be held liable.
283p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford. At 104 and 266 he shows why free acceptance is a ground for restitution and how the
defendant's position is weakened even against the position of a plaintiff who has taken the risk
of disappointment and intermeddling. At 104:
Once a defendant has failed to use an opportunity to reject a benefit, his
position is weak even against a risk taking volunteer. For when he begins to
say that the plaintiff chose to run the risk of disappointment he is immediately
trumped by the reply that if he had spoken there would have been no risk to
run.
It is the augmented weakness in the defendant's claim in free acceptance as opposed to the
inherent weak claim of the plaintiff, that tilts the balance in favour of the plaintiff. In this sense
the emphasis is on the active or passive role of the defendant in his relationship to the plaintiff.
This is also recognised by W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse" [1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 213-214 and she concludes:
{TJhe driving force between the new misappropriation cases may not be the
strength of the plaintiff's claim, but rather the weakness of the defendant's.
2 This is contrary to the view of W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property
and the Restitutionary Impulse" [19921 78 VLR 149-28 1, who at 203 states that she thinks that
the active and intentional role of the defendant is not a sufficient premise for liability:
It merely eliminates some of the types of unfairness associated with
compulsion of defendants; it does not eliminate all unfairness, for a
defendant's failure to refuse a benefit is a less reliable indicator of his
preferences than would be an explicit consent to pay.
285 For a description see 3.4.1.3 above.
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pect. 2M One can think of a market participant bestowing an
efficient production, working or marketing method on the
world, which does however rely on support from this
participant. The computer industry with all its various
standards, components, operating systems and application
software can serve as an example here287. Passive free
acceptance in competitive relationships is, however, a
rarity.
3.4.1.6 Active Free Acceptance.
Active free acceptance is a possibility that offers more
perspective for malign competition. The active aspect lies in
the defendant actively acquiring the benefit, which can go
from appropriation to outright copying and actionable
seizure. A successful claim for restitution based on free
acceptance relies, however, on the defendant's knowledge of
the fact that the benefit of the plaintiff's business assets
were not meant to be in the public domain and free for the
taking and that the usurpation was therefore unfair.
The elements that influence the active aspect are:
- Whether the plaintiff can show the transfer was not
286j Wade: "Restitution for Benefits Conferred without Request" [1966] 19 Vand.LR 1183-
12 14, at 1190-1194, stating that only in cases of mistake as to existing circumstances, a plaintiff
may recover if the benefit is conferred gratuitously, where the mistake is to a material fact
inducing the making of the gift.
287The recent battle between IBM's 0S2 and Microsoft's Windows operating systems shows the
willingness of these companies to grant free licenses to hardware manufacturers to sell their
product with either operating system installed on it. In this way the product will find its way
to the consumer, who will find it hard to adapt to another system once he has started off with
one of them. Updates are available later, at additional cost.
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voluntary;288
- The fact that the defendant has accepted where he had the
opportunity to reject or come forward and check with the
plaintiff, but chose to acquiesce;289
- Whether the plaintiff did or did not intend to confer the
benefit of his business asset gratuitously.29°
3.4.2 Enrichment.
The following section contains ways in which tha fact that a
defendant has been enriched can be demonstrated. The first
method of relying on free acceptance is inherent in the basis
for this particular form of action in unjust enrichment. The
second method of showing incontrovertible benefit by either
necessity or the realisation of financial gain are
independent factors.
3.4.2.1 Free Acceptance.
There is one aspect to free acceptance that makes it very
suitable for assessment of the elements mentioned above. This
is the fact that the enrichment is closely linked with free
2 The application of a written warning or claim connected to the marketed product may serve
as an example here.
289Whether a defendant has had an opportunity to reject or make enquiries depends on the
familiarity with the source the benefit emanated from. In combination with knowledge
requirements the opportunity to reject or enquire go a long way in the establishment of liability.
See 7.4 below.
2901n this instance the plaintiff must have had the intent not to transfer the benefit gratuitously,
but has failed to stipulate his intent. It is important that the defendant knows of the plaintiff's
intent. Custom in the market can instill a sufficient level of knowledge in the defendant. Levels
of cognisance will be discussed in Chapter 4 below.
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acceptance. 291 Acceptance of a benefit is more likely to occur
in those instances in which it is of value to the defendant.
It will not allow him to take a position that the business
asset is of less value to him than its real value in the
market and that for that reason he has not been enriched;292
this is the argument of subjective devaluation. Dismissal of
the argument of subjective devaluation lies in the
proposition that the matter of subjective devaluation of an
enrichment can ordinarily be overridden by an objective
measure of what the reasonable man would pay in the
marketplace, whereas acceptance lies in the complete respect
of the freedom of choice of the defendant. If this latter
proposition prevails, claims for restitution could only be
awarded in those cases in which the defendant has freely
accepted. If the defendant has freely accepted the benefit,
he has expressed the choice that the benefit was of value to
him. He can no longer rely on the argument that he was not
enriched and was not aware of any offering that he could
decline.
The nature of the enrichment is also of importance in order
to establish the knowledge. If the enrichment is of a type
for which it is customary in the marketplace that some form
291 p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 266.
292p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 109-i 14, where he looks at the phenomenon that defendants can rely on the fact that
the supposed benefit that is bestowed upon them is not of market value to them because of
subjective devaluation and that he is therefore not enriched.
At pp.116-128 Birks does however analyse more grounds to override subjective devaluation.
The first one being incontrovertible benefit, where no reasonable man would say that the
defendant was not enriched and he also analyses some cases in which no clear test was used,
but where the receipt of the benefit by the defendant was in some way obvious.
Examples are given in 3.4.2 below.
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of compensation is being given, knowledge of a non-intent on
behalf of the plaintiff to surrender his asset gratuitously
can be assumed. The stronger the custom in the marketplace
is, the less the importance of choice on behalf of the
defendant becomes. This goes so far that in cases in which no
reasonable man would say that the defendant was not enriched,
the requirement of choice to reject falls away.293
3.4.2.2 Incontrovertible Benefit.
Incontrovertible benefit is the term to describe the
situation in which no reasonable man would say that the
defendant was not enriched. It can be assessed in two ways.
3.4.2.2.1 Necessity.
The first mode is aimed at the necessity for the defendant to
acquire the benefit regardless of the fact that he has now
obtained it for free. If it can be said that it could be
anticipated that the defendant had to obtain a certain asset
for which the necessary expenditure can now be forfeited,
because he has received it for free, the enrichment is
evident. This again means that the defendant can not rely on
subjective devaluation 294
 and claim the benefit was of no
value to him. The difficulty for the inclusion of this method
to measure enrichment in malcompetition is that it relies on
293p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 116.
294p . Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 117. See also 3.4.2.1 above.
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the necessity for the defendant to incur costs, which he has
subsequently evaded, in gaining the benefit. Because the
defendant would in normal circumstances need to make the
expense anyhow, this method also fails to catch the
completely free ride.
Questions can be raised as to the stringency of the
requirement of necessity in incurring costs. The degree of
necessity can hover between inevitability and probability.295
Necessity can, however, be described as an action exerted by
circumstance. The circumstances of modern business are such
that the reliance on business assets like information, know
how and marketing to gain a competitive edge is great.
It is also true that wholly independent development of
business assets may be overridden by evidence of the ease of
access to knowledge, information and business assets. This
problem is augmented in this information and media age. A
defendant is likely to seek, need and use those business
assets. sharing the same commodities becomes an unavoidable
trend in competition. If probability rather than
inevitability is then used to assess the necessity of the
expenditure, all benefits can be said to be incontrovertible.
295p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 121, where he discusses the range of 'necessity' and its related tension between the
matter of subjective devaluation and the freedom of every man to make his own choice. A strict
and factual test would result in the expense being inevitable for the defendant. He notes that
there is room to choose between a strict or liberal interpretation in the test for necessity:
There is much to be said for not taking too strict a view. For, on the one
hand, it is the common experience of modern life that much expenditure is not
really freely chosen except within the narrowest limits; or, looking at the
matter in another way, we do all value, need and buy much the same services
and commodities.. On the other the phenomenon of subjective devaluation,
though not to be callously overridden..., is not so laudable as to require
jealous defence of the nineteenth-century manner. Common law man has lost
the rougher edges of his individualism.
He then goes on to advocate a system in which a necessity does not equal inevitability.
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A defendant could no longer rely on subjective devaluation,
no matter how common or widespread the use of the asset has
become. If probability is defined too widely, small and
insignificant benefits would lead to enrichment and to a
potential claim. It is therefore important to discount in the
assessment of the necessity of the defendant's expense those
elements that are so common or trivial that they can not be
said to lead to an enrichment.
Conversely the choices of a defendant widen considerably with
increased access to data, so he often has a plethora of
options. What often makes him opt for a certain business
asset lies in his assessment that it would be less costly or
more profitable, because it has already been developed and
tried by someone else. Necessity of expenditure does not,
therefore, obliterate the defendant's choice. On the
contrary, choice is increased. With all relevant data
available to him, it is easier to determine which assets are
common, which assets are original and where there is room for
independent development. Expenses and resources can be
allocated accordingly. Costs associated with screening and
eliminating relevant data also increase, especially where
there is information overload.
This element of increased choice for market participants
demonstrates that independent development becomes harder and
more costly. Such achievements are deserving of protection
against slavish followers. For a defendant it will be hard to
claim that he is not enriched by following a tried and
accepted concept. The probability that the defendant would
not have made the expense to obtain the achievement he has
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now received for free is low, especially in cases where
choices are many.
3.4.2.2.2 Rea].isation of Financial Gain.
Another mode to establish incontrovertible benefit is the
realisation of financial gain 296 based upon the asset. If the
defendant goes on to make money out of the business asset he
can then not say that it was not of value to him, since it
evidently was. Subjective devaluation does not come into
play, because there is a clear case of enrichment.297
3.4.3 Detriment to the Plaintiff.
The plaintiff can only sue if the unjust enrichment has been
at his expense. This means that the plaintiff has lost what
the defendant has gained. 298 This does not, however, mean that
296Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Third ed. (1986) Sweet & Maxwell, 19-23, at 19:
There is much to be said for the view that a defendant should make restitution
if he has been incontrovertibly benefited by the receipt of services which have
been officiously rendered. In our view it is evident that he has been
incontrovertibly benefited if he has made thereby an immediate and realisable
financial gain or has been saved an expense which he otherwise would
necessarily have incurred.
In the Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet & Maxwell, at 22-23 and 26-27 the same is reflected, but the
classification is closer to that of P. Birks.
P. Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford
at 121-124.
297P. Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 124 describes a third, non distinctive category of enrichment that can not be fitted
within the categories of free acceptance and incontrovertible benefit. This is because this third
category is not compatible with the acceptance of subjective devaluation. In these cases Birks
is of the opinion that the court took the opinion that the enrichment was obvious. See for
example Boardman v. Phipps [19671 2 AC 46, where the breach of fiduciary duty displaced the
need for the subjective devaluation test. See 3.2.1 for a description of the case.
298The gain can either be a positive or a negative one. The saving of an expense does in this
view constitute a benefit. See Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Enter-
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loss and gain have to be equal to one another. 2 In this
sense the requirement of detriment does not give rise to much
controversy 300
The importance of this factor is that it qualifies the
previous elements of 'unjust' and 'enrichment' in so much as
it makes a claim for restitution have a foundation. This
foundation can be found in the balance that is upset by the
unjust enrichment. This balance does not point to a prima
facie entitlement in property, but to the social interest in
the security of receipts 301 on the one hand and a claim for
restitution on the other. In the field of competition this
social interest lies in the security for competitors that
assets that are not protected by statutory provisions or the
use of which is not actionable on the basis of common law,
taininents [1952] 2 QB 246.
299Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet & Maxwell, 35-39 at
38 and Third Ed. (1986) Sweet & Maxwell at 25:
LT]here is no necessary equation between what the plaintiff has lost and what
the defendant has gained at his expense.
Or as P. Birks puts it in "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon
Press, Oxford at 132, when he describes substraction:
It signifies only that the plus to the defendant is a minus to the plaintiff.
See what happens if all plusses and minusses on either side are not taken into account in section
6.4.1 below, where erasable enrichment in German law is described.
300The only difficulty appears to arise in the situation in which the defendant has come to the
benefit by means of a third party. See Goff and Jones: "The Law of Restitution", Fourth ed.
(1993) Sweet & Maxwell at 36-38.
Generally speaking there is no cause of action, because a third party has been enriched at the
expense of theplaintiff. For an action to be sucessfuta special relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant has to be present. Such a special relationship may arise in
subrogation and attornment cases in which the benefit was intended for the defendant.
See, however, also P. Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed.
Clarendon Press Oxford at 133-139 at 138:
It must have been possible for the court to say that the wealth would certainly
have accrued to the plaintiff. If it would, then the defendant can be said to
have effected an anticipatory or interceptive subtraction.
301 p Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution", (1989) rev. ed. Clarendon Press,
Oxford at 113.
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are in the public domain and free for the taking. It is this
balance that is upset when the elements of 'unjust',
'enrichment' and 'at the plaintiff's expense' meet.
In malign competition the need for detriment to the plaintiff
will therefore also not surmount the necessity to show that
the augmentation to the defendant is a diminution to the
plaintiff, regardless of what the character of the diminution
is. This points to a position in which it may be of
importance for the determination of detriment to the
plaintiff what the relationship between the parties involved
is. If there is a direct causative chain between enrichment
and impoverishment, the detriment is clear. Otherwise the
fact that there is a competitive nexus between parties can
fully satisfy the detriment requirement. Other competitive
factors, such as the need for a plaintiff to retain some form
of exclusivity, secrecy or confidentiality may also be taken
into account, if this is established by the plaintiff. Even
if there is a competitive nexus between the parties, however,
it remains possible for the defendant to show that the
plaintiff has not been harmed by the conduct benefiting the
defendant.
Conclusion to Chapter Three.
Much of the argument against awarding restitutionary claims
is based upon the notion that whatever is not protected by
statutory provisions or clearly defined causes of action like
passing off, is free for the taking. Any award of a
restitutionary claim will, therefore, upset this freedom to
120
appropriate business assets and competition, because the
competitor has no possibility of knowing what he can or can
not take freely. Professor Gordon contends in her article302
that it is possible to create a cause of action reliant on
tagging, which corresponds with the notion of non-voluntary
transfer. In cases of free acceptance she is hesitant.
It is submitted that the requirement of tagging presupposes
that a plaintiff can exercise control on the basis of
acquired rights. This creates a situation in which a property
claim is already made, before the right is granted. Tagging
can, therefore, only serve as proof of awareness on the part
of the defendant.
Within the law of unjust enrichment, however, restitution can
be awarded in those cases in which there is free acceptance.
It is submitted that it is possible to extend Professor
Gordon's 'tort of inalcompetitive copying' to an action of
302W Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[19921 78 VLR 149-28 1, at 222-223, where she sets out her tort of malcompetitive copying:
A defendant who has violated no independent right shall not be subject to suit
based upon his or her use of an intellectual product created by another unless:
(a) he or she knowingly copies an eligible intangible;
(b) in a context exhibiting asymmetrical market failure;
(Jhis means that a plaintiff who could have bargained in advance, but did not, does not have
a claim.)
(c) takes sales from the plaintiffs actual or expected market; and
(d) the use is of a type and amount not likely to be equivalently valuable to the
plaintiff over the long run.
These might be considered to be requirements of (a) knowing use, (b) asymmetrical
market failure, (c) competitive nexus, and (d) nonreciprocity.
In addition:
An "eligible intangible: is a product that is:
(e) deliberately created or produced by a person or other legal entity in excess
of legal duty and with an expectation of either reward or control; and
(f) clearly bounded and marked as owned, or that is used in a context where the
defendant has the knowledge that proper demarcation would have provided; and
(g) otherwise suitable for trading in a market context where the seller's leverage
is provided by a judicially imposed duty.
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malign competition, in which the acts of the defendant 303 are
predominant in the assessment of unjust enrichment. A
combination of active free acceptance, incontrovertible
benefit and 'at the plaintiff's expense' can safely amount to
malign competition for which relief can be awarded under
unfair competition law. An advantage of an action for malign
competition over the tort of malcompetitive copying lies in
the shift from tortious liability to liability for unjust
enrichment. This makes it possible to rely on the internal
structure of unjust enrichment for assessment of both
liability and remedies in malign competition cases.304
303This would in essence place more emphasis on Gordon's requirement of competitive nexus,
which is aimed at the requirement of 'at the expense of the plaintiff, by coupling them with
the elements of 'free acceptance' and 'incontrovertible benefit.
W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 190.
304See Chapter 4 and 7 below.
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Chapter 4: Cognisance in Malign Competition.
Introduction to Chapter Four.
With the doctrine of unjust enrichment as a feasible
alternative for tortious liability, the action for malign
competition hinges on the level of cognisance the defendant
posesses, so that a truely innocent market participant is not
faced with unexpected claims.
For this purpose a detailed proposal for a general tort of
malcompetitive copying will be described in order to show the
weaknesses that prevail in a system in which the application
of the doctrine of unjust enrichment is modified to protect
market participants against unexpected claims. To this end
proprietary claims by means of tags are relied on to shift
the basis of liability from unjust enrichment back to tort.
This view will be rejected. In order to create safeguards
against unexpected claims, it is submitted that the role
cognisance takes in the action for malign competition in free
acceptance cases for unjust enrichment be strengthened. The
level of cognisance that is necessary for a defendant to make
a real choice with regards to the business risks he is taking
is subsequently assessedIn the azse.ssmenttrust law will be
relied upon. With its underlying principles based on the
doctrine of unjust enrichment, the area of constructive trust
is extemely well suited to use as a parallel.
After a description of the basic principles of the
constructive trust, an overview of the birth and development
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of recognised knowledge types is given in following the
application of the five types of knowledge established in the
English case of Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit V. Societe Générale
pour Favoriser le Dévelopeinent du Commerce et de 1'Industrie
en France SA.305
In order to give a comprehensive overview of the recognition
and application of knowledge types at common law, both
English and New Zealand case law is covered in order to
demonstrate a conservative and a progressive approach.
Subsequently it is submitted that the progressive New Zealand
approach is best suited for application in the action against
malign competition.
4.]. The Establishment of Choice through Knowledge in Free
Acceptance.
Crucial to the restitutionary claim is the knowledge on the
part of the defendant who is about to appropriate something
claimed by another. Knowledge prevents innocent parties from
facing unexpected claims. 306 Knowledge is also deemed to be of
importance for competitive relationships, since it is
important to be able to rely on the free market principle
against impediments to production, product and the
305Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe GénErale [19831 BCLC 325, [19921 4 All ER 161-279
(ChD).
306W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[19921 78 VLR 149-28 1, at 228:
Imposition of a knowledge requirement may seem superficially inconsistent
with the unjust enrichment cases that do not require that the beneficiary
knowingly have chosen to avail himself of the benefit.
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marketing.307
Since the knowledge requirement is deemed to be of immense
importance for any malign competition incorporating unjust
enrichment, strict requirements regarding knowledge are being
imposed on the knowledge requirement of the doctrine of
unjust enrichment. In this respect a link between the
plaintiff and the defendant is proposed by the requirement
that the plaintiff actively instills knowledge in the
defendant by vitiation or qualification of the transfer of
the business asset. 308 This reliance on first hand knowledge
in essence limits the role of unjust enrichment to non-
voluntary transfer, where the plaintiff has to demarcate and
307w. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-28 1, at 229:
We all use ideas, symbols and processes that we did not invent ourselves,
and being sued after innocently basing whole projects on these inevitable
borrowed elements would be likely to interfere significantly with our life plans.
Also valuation here is a difficult issue. Requiring as a precondition for suit that
a defendant knowingly have chosen to copy something that he knows bears
a price tag seems to be a minimal requirement to assure some respect for the
defendant's autonomy and to protect him from being made worse off by
plaintiff's suit than he would be had the 'benefit' never been utilized.
This knowing use requirement means that the defendant must have subjectively known about
the plaintiff's claim and its associated price tag. This narrow definition of knowing use, so
Gordon submits, may not even provide sufficient protection for defendants.
3O8 Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, where at 224-226 she explains the requirement of 'knowing use'. At
225-226:
Only if the defendant knows that he is about to use something owned by
another for which the owner would request payment (and note that an
'eligible intangible' must be demarked as owned...), will he be able to defend
himself from unwantecL incursions into his pockethooLThe defendant's
choice to use an owned product that is marked clearly with a tag indicating
the likely price vitiates most arguments that he would be worse off after
paying the plaintiff than he would have been had he not used the product at
all... Only a defendant who knows that he will be using an intangible in which
another claims an interest will have the ability to seek the creator's consent
before using it.
This knowledge is tied in with the description of an eligible intangible; it should be clearly
bounded and marked as owned. At 257, however, she recognises that the demarcation
requirement may be dropped:
[hf the defendant had available by other means the knowledge provided by
such marking.
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tag the business asset that he claims. If the plaintiff has
done so, the defendant can not deny knowledge of the fact
that he was aware of the risk he was entering in to by use of
the business asset for his own ends.
In the above it has, however, been shown that tagging may
lead to excessive claims and that unjust enrichment by
subtraction can also be based on the principle of free
acceptance. That the defendant knowingly accepted the
business asset is of importance here in order to qualify the
choice the defendant has made. Only if he was able to make a
real choice can the acceptance be deemed a free one. Choice
is, therefore, the crucial element of free acceptance and
knowledge serves to make it a real one. If one now introduces
the requirement of first hand, actual knowledge as the
standard for the defendant to freely accept, free acceptance
becomes nothing more than the mirror image of non-voluntary
transfer. The reasoning would then be as follows: the
defendant has accepted freely, because he knows through the
plaintiff's demarcation and tagging of his business asset,
that he has not transferred it voluntarily. This leads to a
(possible) successful claim for restitution. The choice for
the defendant to freely accept, according to this line of
reasoning, is based on information supplied first hand, so
the defendant actually knows about a non-voluntary transfer.
On the other hand, non-voluntary transfer as a basis for a
restitutionary claim does not look at actual knowledge on the
part of the defendant. If the plaintiff has actively made
clear that he expected to be recompensed for his business
asset, proof of actual knowledge on the part of the defendant
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is immaterial since he ought to have known. Action on the
part of the plaintiff takes away objections of
intermeddling309
 and subjective devaluation. 310
 With non-
voluntary transfer the plaintiff does not have to show that
the defendant actually knew the business asset was claimed by
him. It is enough that the defendant realises that the
benefit belongs to someone. A tag may serve as proof here.
However, in the assessment of whether there is
incontrovertible benefit, the information the defendant has
available to him may lead to the conclusion that the
plaintiff can not possibly have consented to a voluntary
transfer in light of the skill, labour, time and effort the
defendant is saving by appropriating the asset.
In the case of active free acceptance, there is action on the
side of the defendant where he acquires the business asset.
This action is subject to choice, which can range from
appropriation to copying and seizure.
Whether the choice is a real one depends on knowledge. To
rely merely on demarcation and tagging by the plaintiff would
impose a duty on the plaintiff to be active if he wants to
have a claim for restitution at all.
If we now translate Gordon's tort of malcoinpetitive copying
into unjust enrichment terms, it is clear that the tort
relies on Active free acceptance through Non-voluntary
transfer of a tagged asset. This leads to a situation in
which two independent bases for restitution are being moulded
into one. In so doing a subjective knowledge requirement is
309For a description see 3.4.1.3 above.
310See 3.4.2.1 above for a description of subjective devaluation.
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introduced into non-voluntary transfer. And a subjective
knowledge requirement is introduced in active free accept-
ance, which leads to the need for the plaintiff to be active.
The result is a system in which two parties are active and
where the defendant has actively chosen to disregard the
plaintiff's tagging. The logical circle in this form of
restitution based action is complete. If the plaintiff does
not want to transfer his business assets voluntarily, he has
to demarcate or tag his product. The defendant is fixed with
knowledge and has, therefore, been able to make a choice
about running the risk of being faced with action afterwards.
His acceptance has been a free one and he can not say the
business asset was of no value to him. Conversely, if the
defendant has freely accepted, he has made a choice and for
the choice to be a real one he had to have actual knowledge.
The defendant can be so if the plaintiff has tagged his
asset.
The picture that now emerges is that the action of
malcompetitive copying is an algamation of the doctrine of
unjust enrichment and tort. The criteria for liability of the
doctrine of unjust enrichment are used, but the are displaced
by the need for claims on protectable interests (tags) to
include or exclude subject material from its scope of
protection. With its need for defined heads of protectable
interests, the ratio for action of malcoinpetitive copying is
shifted from unjust enrichment to tort. This much is also
clear from professor Gordon's description of the action. As
such the tort of malcompetitive copying displays many
similarities with French and Duch proposals on the protection
128
of reserved creations.311
The amalgamated tort of Malcompetitive Copying:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Action	 Tagging or	 Choice
Demarcation
Knowledge	 X	 Plaintiff's tag
Subjectivated knowledge
Defence	 X	 None
Can not rely on subjective
devaluation or lack of
____________________ 
knowledge
Gordon hints at the possibility of a free acceptance based
form of action, which may arise when the defendant has actual
knowledge by other means than knowledge provided by
demarcation and tagging, but does not provide examples. 312 For
the defendant to actually know that the interests he is about
to use are claimed by another without action from the
plaintiff's side is hard to imagine. For example the
plaintiff can have verbally or otherwise claimed his interest
whilst communicating with the defendant. This situation could
311 See 6.3.2.2 and 6.5.2.3 below for a detailed description of proposals to award protection to
intangibles and achievements on the basis of tags. The tags and claims are subsequently written
into a register.
312W Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-28 1, where at 257 she recognises that the demarcation and tagging
requirement may be dropped if the defendant has acquired knowledge not based on marking.
Examples are not given, but the quality of the knowledge does remain subjective, because at
226 it is argued that:
Only a defendant who knows that he will be using an intangible in which
another claims an interest will have the ability to seek the creator's consent
before using it.
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arise in pre-contractual or confidential relationships. 313
 It
is also possible that the defendant is familiar with the
plaintiff's record where dealings with other competitors are
concerned. In any case if the defendant is to have actual
knowledge, action from the side of the plaintiff is still a
necessity. Otherwise there would not be non-voluntary
transfer. Free acceptance as a separate basis for
restitutionary action can not solely be based on requirements
of actual knowledge
Gordon's ratio for using a narrow definition of knowing use
lies in the notion that an actually unknowing defendant has
been deprived of the opportunity to bargain for the business
asset in advance and has, therefore, not been able to make a
full cost-benefit analysis of the use of the asset and risk
he was taking. In these circumstances, it is argued, 314 it is
unfair to impose liability upon the defendant.
This reasoning is flawed in several ways. First of all as
long as subjective knowledge is required to use any business
asset freely, ignorance is elevated to a virtue. Remaining
ignorant is thus being encouraged, because it offers the
security of not being faced with unjust enrichment claims.315
313H Havighurst: "The Right to Compensation for an Idea" [19541 49 Nw.ULR 295-318, who
at 300 submits that a defendant is held liable for restitution in those cases where he uses an idea
the plaintiff put forth during negotiations in which the defendant either showed an interest or
that were instigated by him.
314W Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-281, at 229:
Requiring as a precondition for suit that a defendant knowingly have chosen
to copy something that he knows bears a price tag seems to be a minimal
requirement to assure some respect for the defendant's autonomy and to
protect him from being made worse off by plaintiff's suit than he would be
had the 'benefit' never been utilized.
315W. Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[1992] 78 VLR 149-28 1, who at 226-227 opines that to allow suit against an innocent defendant
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Ignorance can also be easily feigned.
In the second place, the argument that a full cost-benefit
analysis is absent if the defendant is deprived of actual
knowledge is a paternalistic defence of the defendant, who
after all chooses to participate in the market with all its
associated risks. The question remains why the defendant
should get a warning or a bargaining opportunity handed to
him on a plate. The issue about making a real choice is that
the more information one has about a party with whom one is
bargaining, the more economic the settlement for both parties
will be. It is, therefore, also in the interest of the
defendant to obtain knowledge himself. Remaining an ignorant
market participant is not only bad business practice, it is
also an unconvincing defence if you are an average market
player 316
Furthermore the requirement places undue burden on the
plaintiff in terms of the risks and actions he is taking. It
is the plaintiff who has run the risk, albeit inherent to
market participation, of development and marketing. This is
still in balance with the fact that the defendant is now
using what the plaintiff has developed. Despite the fact that
the plaintiff can make some cost-benefit analysis to assess
the risks he is taking by development of business assets, it
is unfair because he could not seek consent and could not seekio purchase from the plaintiff.
In footnote 299 at 226 however:
Admittedly, allowing suit against innocent infringers might have an indirect
benefit in encouraging some innocents to become less so - it might spark
them to research the question of what is owned and by whom. The rule could
be tailored to treat differently persons who deliberately remain in ignorance
and those who have no means of learning the needed facts. Nonetheless,
making the right to sue valid against innocent infringers would be unfair and,
I would guess, unlikely to encourage significant use of the market.
36For a practical outlook see 7.4 below.
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is by no means a full picture. It may go too far to require
from the plaintiff additional action in order to secure what
he has developed, i.e. make sure that the defendant has
actual knowledge and is able of making a full cost-benefit
analysis. It has to be stressed at this point again that
equal standing of competitors is important. Due to the fact
that a business asset is newly developed and untried, a
developer is merely able of making a cost-benefit analysis
that amounts to a reasonable prognosis of an asset's success.
He can not possibly foresee all the risks he is taking. Why
should the party who subsequently appropriates the business
asset have to be able to make a full cost-benefit analysis of
the suitability of the asset and the risk associated with
appropriating it? Elevating actual knowledge on the part of
the defendant to a requirement distorts the balance between
risk takers in the competitive game.
Finally, the fact that a defendant has no actual knowledge
does not mean that his choice is less real. If liability
could only be imposed on knowledgable risk takers, negligence
would be non existent. It is submitted that knowledge can
safely be made more objective provided that certain elements
are present that should have prompted the defendant to become
less ignorant. When he could have known there was a claim to
a certain asset which the defendant contemplated using, his
knowledge can then be assumed. The choice is a real one and
the defendant has freely accepted to use the business asset.
There are several instances in which a defendant can not
assume that a business asset is in the public domain.
First of all custom in business might tell him otherwise;
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secondly, the defendant may know the source of the business
asset and/or had the opportunity to enquire and thirdly, the
manner in which the defendant seeks to get hold of the asset
may tell against him. These factors influence the choice the
defendant is making about whether or not he is going to use
the asset and, one may cynically add, 317 the way in which he
is going to obtain the asset. But it does not stop there.
Higher demands can be made regarding the acquisition and
investigation of sources of knowledge if the use of the
business asset is likely to result in an enrichment that is
incontrovertible. This proposition can lead to a safe
disentanglement of the link that is made between non-
voluntary transfer and free acceptance in Gordon's model. For
as far as non voluntary transfer is concerned the defendant's
knowledge can be either subjective (he has actual knowledge),
in which case the defendant can not rely on the defence of
subjective devaluation because he has then freely accepted,
or objective (he has constructive knowledge), in which case
the defendant's defence of subjective devaluation can be
countered by either free acceptance or incontrovertible
benefit.	 -
For free acceptance the role of the defendant's knowledge can
be measured objectively by looking at related elements of
enrichment, knowledge (actual or constructive) and choice.
Graphically it looks like this:
317A defendant will take what he thinks he can get away with.
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Malign Competition
The charts below show the two possible grounds for action
under malign competition on the basis of unjust enrichment:
Non Voluntary Transfer and Free Acceptance.
I. Non Voluntary Transfer:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Action	 Tagging or	 None
Demarcation
Knowledge	 X	 Deemed to be
knowledgable.
Obj ectivated
knowledge
Defence	 X	 Subjective
devaluation
Counter	 Enrichment:	 X
-Free acceptance
-Incontrovertible
benefit
a) necessity
b) realisation of
financialgain	 ____________________
In the case of Non Voluntary Transfer the plaintiff has acted
to ensure that the asset can not be thought to be in the
public domain. This means that the defendant knew, or must
have known that the asset was not free for the taking. The
Defendant can now rely on subjective devaluation to show that
he has not been enriched.
The plaintiff can counter this argument by showing that the
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defendant has obtained an incontrovertible benefit by the
transfer. Either because it was necessary for the defendant
to make the expense he has now saved by the transfer, or
because the defendant has realised financial gain.
The plaintiff can also rely on free acceptance to demonstrate
that subjective devaluation is not relevant, because free
acceptance implies that value is placed on the asset. In that
case the action shifts to the active free acceptance
category. The plaintiff's tag serves as proof that knowledge
is present.
II. Free Acceptance:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Passive
Action	 Intermeddling
Defence	 X	 Intermeddling: one
can not give
benefits for free
and then turn
around expecting
to be recompensed.
Counter	 Mistake
In the case of Free Acceptance, the subcategory of passive
free acceptance means that the plaintiff has intermeddled
with affairs that are not his. The-defenlant has notacted at
all; on the contrary, he appreciates the fact that someone
bestows benefits on to him. The suspect nature of this form
of free acceptance means that a plaintiff can only recover
135
what he has transferred gratuitously in case of mistake.318
II. Free Acceptance:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Active
Action	 X	 Choice:
-appropriation
-copying
-seizure
Knowledge	 X	 -custom in
business
-knowledge of
source
-opportunity to
enquire
-form of action
-plaintiff's tag
Defence	 X	 No knowledge
Counter	 Enrichment:	 X
- Incontrovertible
benefit
a) necessity
b) realisation of
financial gain
Constructive	 Constructive
knowledge	 knowledge
318Rtition in case of mistake is only possible if the defendant has knowledge of the fact that
the benefit was transferred by mistake. See Birks: "An Introduction to the Law of Restitution"
(1989) Clarendon Press at 146-173. As to the general principles of contractual mistake see P.
Dobson and C. Schmitthoff: "Charlesworth's Business law" 15th ed. (1991) Sweet & Maxwell
at 82-92.
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In the subcategory of active free acceptance, the defendant
acted by exercising his choice to appropriate, copy or seize
a business asset. For his choice to be real, the defendant
needs to have knowledge of what risks he was taking. Custom
in business, knowledge of the source of the benefit in
question, an opportunity to enquire, the form and nature of
the act and the plaintiff's tag are all factors that can
contribute to the knowledge of the defendant.
Reliance on the absence of knowledge amounts to a position in
which it is argued that a real choice with regards to a cost-
benef it analysis is absent.
This can be countered by the fact that there is enrichment
and constructive knowledge. An enrichment can be shown by the
fact that there is incontrovertible benefit.
The imposition of constructive knowledge may be determined by
factors present in the knowledge category. Since the element
of knowledge is so important the following sections will be
dedicated to knowledge.
4.2 Knowledge.
As is evident from the section above, the notion of knowledge
is central to the determination whether a defendant can be
held liable under the proposed action of malign competition.
Knowledge is the key factor in the determination whether a
defendant can be forced to restore to the plaintiff his
enrichment through the use of the plaintiff's business
assets. Central to the knowledge requirement is the notion
that the defendant must have been able to somehow make a risk
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assessment about the likelihood of being confronted with
legal action after the taking of the benefit. This risk
assessment covers the choice the defendant has to use a
business asset in which an interest is claimed by another.
Knowledge about source and likely price for use enable him to
seek consent before use and enable him to calculate the
benefit connected to the use of the asset. The question is
however what type of knowledge is necessary in this
respect. 319
 In the above an objectivation of the knowledge
requirement has been argued for. In order to determine the
factors that make objectivation possible, various notions of
knowledge that are recognised in a legal sense will be
described first. Trust law, a mode of ownership where manage-
ment and enjoyment are divided between different persons,32°
offers an important parallel in this matter.
4.3 Unjust Enrichment and Trust.
Contrary to an express trust, which is the result of an
agreement between parties and as such part of substantive
law, the constructive trust is a remedial institution,321
3l9	 Gordon: "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse"
[19921 78 VLR 149-28 1, at 225-226, arguing in favour of subjective or actual knowledge:
The defendant's choice to use an owned product that is marked clearly with
a tag indicating the likely price vitiates most arguments that he would be
worse off after paying the plaintiff than he would have been had he not used
the product at all ... Only a defendant who knows that he will be using an
intangible in which another claims an interest will have the ability to seek the
creator's consent before using it.
320D. Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case for a New Approach in English Law" (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, at 2.
321 R Austin: "Constructive Trusts", p. 196-241 in "Essays in Equity", P. Finn ed. (1985) The
Law Book Co. Ltd. at 196:
[Al constructive trust is imposed by operation of law, whereas an express
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providing relief in those situations in which a defendant has
been unjustly enriched. 322 The constructive trust does not aim
to convert a defendant into a trustee, but aims to reverse
the unjust enrichment. 323 It is therefore a specific
restitutionary remedy324 with roots in the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. Central to the idea of the constructive trust as
a remedial institution is the relationship between claimant
and defendant. 325 The fiduciary relationship was long thought
to be the epitome of this connection, analogous to the
express trust to which this interrelational nexus forms the
trust arises out of an intention to create a trust.
See also Goff & Jones: "The Law of Restitution" Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet & Maxwell at 93-
102.
322Restatement on the Law of Restitution, American Law Institute 1936. $ 160:
Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
323A Scott: "Constructive Trusts", [19551 71 LQR 39-50, on the distinction between
substantive law and remedy as contract and quasi-contractual obligation in trust law and the
fiction of conversion of a party into a trustee. At 41:
A contract arises from an agreement between the parties; a quasi-contractual
obligation is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. It is most misleading, I
think, to speak of quasi-contractual obligation as an implied contract, or even
a contract implied in law. This involves the use of fiction, and fictions, though
they may be useful in the development of law in a primitive system, have no
proper place among the sophisticated.
324D Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case for a New Approach in English Law", (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, at 7:
[hf. . .the term restitution is undesirable, then the object of the Courts' use of
this trust can be said to be simply to prevent unjust enrichment.
325D Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case for a New Approach in English Law", (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, at 14-15:
Unjust enrichment entitles the plaintiff to trace. This is the heart of the matter.
A relationship will arise, so that the equitable restitutionary remedies can be
invoked, when title or even posession is withheld from one who has a better
claim; and by means of the equitable remedies this claim secures to the
claimant a prior charge on the res. it is clear, therefore, that the constructive
trust, as a term contains two elements - relationship and tracing. The two are
surety inseparable; relationship without tracing points nowhere, and tracing
without relationship is a random remedy.
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linchpin. 326 It is true that where there is a pre-existing
fiduciary relationship in a form other than express trust,
its breach may result in a constructive trust being impo-
sed, 327 but otherwise it is absent from constructive trust.
This is because the relationship present in constructive
trust is not one of a fiduciary nature, but one of unjust
enrichment. 328 The pre-existing fiduciary relationship is
merely a likely condition for unjust enrichment to occur. In
his work 'The Constructive Trust, The Case for a New Approach
in English Law', 329 D.M.W. Waters330 attempted to bridge the
gap between institutional English legal thinking about
constructive trust, with the fiduciary relationship as its
326D Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case for a New Approach in English Law", (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, at 33-43, explaining the dominant position of the
fiduciary relationship in English law on the basis that the English approach towards the
constructive trust is institutional rather than remedial, thus leading to analogy with the express
trust.
327Restatement on the Law of Restitution, American Law Institute 1936. $ 190:
Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and the
acquisition or retention of the property is in violation of his duty as fiduciary,
he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other.
Breach of fIduciary duty in England does not automatically lead to a constructive trust.
Indemnity and equitable compensation are considered to be alternatives. See R. Austin:
"Constructive Trusts", p. 196-24 1 in "Essays in Equity", P. Finn ed. (1985) The Law Book Co.
Ltd. at 198.
This strengthens the argument that unjust enrichment is the basis for constructive trust and that
the breach of a fiduciary relationship, despite being one of the contributory factors, is not.
328D Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case for a New Approach in English Law", (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, at 14, footnote 3.
329(1964) University of London, The Athione Press.
330For other writings by this author see D. Waters: "The Nature of the Trust Beneficiary's
Interest", [1967] 45 CBR 219-283.
For an appraisal of Waters' work see D. Gruning: "Reception of the Trust in Louisiana: The
Case of Reynolds v. Reynolds", [1982] 57 Tul.LR 89; J. Baron: "The Trust Res and Donative
Intent", [19861 61 Tul.LR 45; L. Brickman and L. Cunningham: "Nonrefundable Retainers:
Impermissible under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law", [1988] 57 FLR 149; L.
Brickman: "Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark?",
[1989] 37 UCLALR 29; H. Schoordijk: "Tracing Constructive Trust, Ongegronde Verrijking",
Zaaksvervanging, (1991) Kluwer, Deventer.
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basis, with a remedial approach where the relationship
between parties is formed by unjust enrichment. The key to
the resolution of this dividing problem can be found in an
intermediate stage that Waters terms the 'ad hoc fiduciary
relationship', 331 for which he found possibilities in Re
Diplock. 332 This approach finds support in the developments of
trust law, 333 where a person who has not been appointed as
trustee can have the liabilities of trusteeship imposed upon
him if his behaviour regarding a trust or fiduciary
relationship leads him to:
1) take it upon himself to act as trustee and commits a
breach of trust or makes a profit from his self-assumed
position.
2) act inconsistently with the terms of a trust so as
to:
a) deal inconsistently with trust property; or
b) knowingly induce a trustee to commit a breach
of trust; or
c) knowingly assist a trustee to commit a
dishonest and fraudulent breach of trust.
3) receive trust property for his own benefit with
notice that it is transferred to him in breach of
331D Waters: "The Constructive Trust. The Case fora New Approach in English Law", (1964)
University of London, The Athione Press, 67-72, at 70:
[Flascinating subject.. .is whether a fiduciary relationship can come into
existence at the moment of, and because of the offence. If it can then English
law is clearly a stone's throw away from recognizing that the principle behind
the constructive trust is the remedying of unjust enrichment.
332[ 1948] Ch. 465.
333Categorised by C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee" [1986] 102 LQR 114-
162.
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trust
A stranger can therefore be held liable as constructive
trustee on three grounds. Two of these, 'Acting
inconsistently with the terms of a trust' and 'Knowing
receipt', include forms of cognisance. A stranger is
accountable if:
a) he has received property that is subject to a trust, and
then knowing of the trust deals with the property in a
way that is inconsistent with its terms;
b) he knowingly induces a trustee to commit a breach of
trust;
c) he knowingly assists a trustee to commit a dishonest and
fraudulent breach of trust;
d) he receives for his own benefit trust property, with
notice that it is transferred to him in breach of trust.
It is important to note that there is a difference in
terminology between sections a-c, which use 'knowledge' and
d, which uses 'notice'. Generally speaking a distinction
between notice and knowledge can be made on the ground that
notice is a more objective term describing a situation in
which a person is to be treated as if he has knowledge for
legal purposes. 335 Notice therefore overlaps the term
constructive knowledge.
334C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", 119861 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291,
at 114-118; See also Goff & Jones: "The Law of Restitution" Fourth ed. (1993) Sweet &
Maxwell at 670-672 for a similar categorisation.
335C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291,
at 121, where the oblique differentiation between notice and knowledge is described.
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4.4 Cognisance.
In the case Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe Générale
pour Favoriser le Dévelopement du Commerce et de 1'Industrie
en France SA, 336 P. Gibson J. classified five types of
cognisance incorporating knowledge and notice:
1) Actual knowledge;
2) Knowledge obtainable but for shutting one's eye to the
obvious (turning the Nelsonian eye);
3) Knowledge obtainable but for wilfully and recklessly
refraining from making such enquiries as an honest and
reasonable man would make;
4) Knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the
facts to an honest and reasonable man (though not the
obtuse defendant);
5) Knowledge obtainable from enquiries which an honest and
reasonable man would have felt obliged to make, being
put on inquiry as a result of his knowledge of
suspicious circumstances
Despite the fact that 'knowledge' is the term that is used,
notions of notice and knowledge are present in these five
336Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe Générale [1983] BCLC 325, [1992] 4 All ER 161-279
(ChD), from which a uniform standard of knowledge should be applied to all categories
emanated.
in the subsequent cases of Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts-Duk&of Manchester v. National
Westminster Bank Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (ChD); Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1992]
4 All ER 385-407 (ChD), [1992] 4 All ER 451-469 (CA); Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd.
[1987] 1 WLR 987 (QB), [1992] 4 All ER 409-449 (CA), [1992] 4 All ER 512-540 (HL);
Cowan de Groot Properties lid. v. Eagle Trust PLC [1992] 4 All ER 700-768 (ChD); Polly
Peck International PLC v. Nadir (No 2) [19921 4 All ER 769-787 (CA), this principle was
acknowledged, but the knowledge standards 4 and 5 were sometimes not adopted, although they
were not dismissed. See G. Moffat and M. Chesterman: "Trust Law, Text and Materials",
(1988) Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, at 611-613.
337Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. SociEte GEnEraie [1983] I3CLC 325, 407 et seq.
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types.
Actual knowledge is the only pure knowledge criterion in this
progression of cognisance types. In types two and three the
concepts of knowledge and notice (constructive knowledge)
coincide. Types four and five revolve around notice
(constructive knowledge) reliant on knowledge of circum-
stances that ought to have prompted the bearer thereof to
obtain knowledge of the facts of the matter. Because of the
use of the term knowledge in all five types, where the
meaning in some of them lies in notice (constructive
knowledge), the exact nature of cognisance required gets
muddled.
A comprehensive account of types of cognisance and the
difficulties of distinguishing knowledge from imposing notice
(constructive knowledge) was made by Charles Harpum,
according to whom it is possible to disentangle notions of
knowledge and notice. 338 Subjective knowledge, 339 failure to
infer, wilful blindness/wilful or reckless failure to inquire
and strict constructive notice can then be distinguished.
Subjective knowledge covers those matters where a person
actually and consciously knows and corresponds with
cognisance form one in the Baden progression.
Failure to infer covers a situation in which a person is
conscious of all the facts relevant to the matter, but fails
338 Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291,
at 121-127.
339C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-29 1,
at 121 contrasts subjective knowledge with actual notice. Someone can be held to have actual
notice of a fact even if he has no subjective knowledge of it and if he has no means of finding
out about it. The example given is the 1925 or 1972 Land Charges Act, Law of Property Act
1925 s.198(1) and the limits imposed on access to the land registry.
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to appreciate this knowledge as to its factual or legal
significance 340
Failure to inquire corresponds to types two and three in the
Baden progression and covers those situations in which
someone 'wilfully shuts his eyes to the obvious" 341 or
'wilfully and recklessly fails to make such inquiries as an
honest and reasonable man would make' •342 His abstinence from
making those inquiries leads to an assumption of his
knowledge, because he could either forsee the obvious or
anticipate the likely outcome. He may not have had actual and
conscious knowledge, but the facts were close at hand or even
staring him in the face and he refused to look. This makes it
impossible to rely on a lack of actual knowledge. Conversely
he can be said to have notice.
Cognisance types four and five fall into the category of
strict constructive notice, which covers the situation in
which a person would have discovered the relevant facts had
he made an inquiry that he ought to have made prompted by his
(subjective) knowledge of either circumstances indicating the
facts (type 4) or circumstances of a suspicious nature (type
5). In these types of cognisance, constructive notice is
pinned on a person on the basis of subjective knowledge of
340Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose [1970] AC 287, 582, Lord Wilberforce; Belmont No. 2
[1980] 1 All ER 393, 412, Goff L.J.; Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v. British Steel
Corp. [19821 Ch. 478, 507, VinelottJ.
341 See in this respect also English and Scottish Mercantile investment Co. Ltd. v. Brunton
[1892] 2 QB 700, 707-708, Lord Esher M.R.:
When a man has statements made to him, or has knowledge of facts, which
do not expressly tell him something which is against him, and he abstains
from making further inquiry because he knows what the result would be - or,
as the phrase is, he 'wilfully shuts his eyes,' then ... [it may be inferredi that
he did know what was against him.
342Belmont No. 1 [1979] Ch. 250, 267, Buckley L.J.
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circumstances suggesting inquiry.
The emphasis in determining under which circumstances
constructive notice can be imposed -in the language used in
the cases knowledge can be imputed- in types four and five of
the Baden progression, is placed upon the knowledge that a
person has of the circumstances surrounding the facts. For
type four a direct link with type two (Nelsonian knowledge)
is made. This is done because the dividing line between prime
information, that is of the relevant facts directly
obtainable in type two, and collateral information which is
available, but only denotes the facts in type four of the
Baden progression, is very thin. 343 An objective test of what
is known about the circumstances can therefore be used to
accept type four as a legitimate form of cognisance, since:
[It is) little short of common sense that a person who actually knows all the
circumstances from which the honest and reasonable man would have
knowledge of the relevant facts should also be treated as having knowledge
of the facts.344
A similar objective test also serves to determine when an
obligation for inquiries arises in type five of the Baden
progression. 345 The knowledge that a person should have is
qualified as knowledge of suspicious circumstances. It is
imperative that the knowledge of suspicious circumstances is
was put in Baden Del vaux and Lecuit v. Société Générale [19831 BCLC 325 that:
The dividing line between Nelsonian and type 4 knowledge may often be
difficult to discern.
344Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Société Générale [1983] BCLC 325. It describes the relation
between type 2 and type 4.
345Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Société GénErale [1983] BCLC 325:
If an objective test is appropriate to let in type 4 knowledge it would be
illogical not to apply a similar objective test in circumstances where the honest
and reasonable man would be put on inquiry.
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factually supported. 346 Whether there are suspicious circuin-
stances can also be determined by using an objective test as
to what is:
(1) the normal conduct of business, 347 (2) the magnitude of
the transaction, (3) the time and opportunity available to
make inquiries and (4) the degree of suspicion which the
known facts would have provoked in the mind of a reasonable
banker -in the Baden case the defendant was a banker-,
allowing for the prima facie presumption that men are honest.
Despite the fact that these types of cognisance are
recognised, it is accepted that constructive notice and
especially type five cognisance is not to be used lightly as
a ground for liability in constructive trust. 348 The reason is
that, where actual notice is absent, a degree of culpability
has to be present to rise to the equitable liability that a
constructive trust imposes. A constructive trust grants the
beneficiaries potent equitable interests in the property that
remain unaffected by a trustee's bankrupcy. 9
 The plaintiff
346Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith (No. 2) [1969] 2 Ch 276, which was relied on in Baden
Delvaux and Lecuit v. Société Générale [19831 BCLC 325:
The relevant knowledge must be of facts not of mere claims or allegations.
347C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291,
at 125, where he notes that in cases of disposition of real property, investigation of title and
inspection of the land is a mere matter of prudence:
As a matter of principle, in dealings with other forms of property, the ordinary
business practices that are employed in such dealings, should be taken as the
yardstick to determine whether a person is oris not fixed with notice.
348Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Société Générale [1983] BCLC 325 at 415, where P. Gibson
J. considered imposition of constructive trusteeship:
It seems to me that there is a sufficient line of authorities to justify treating
a person with type (iv) or (v) knowledge as having knowledge for the
purpose... But in my judgement the court should not be astute to impute
knowledge where no actual knowledge exists.
349The imposition of constructive trust has met with resistance. See R. Goode: "Twentieth
Century Developments in Commercial Law", [19831 3 Legal Studies 283-294 at 292, calling
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does, therefore, obtain a stronger position than were the
liability to arise out of a tort. It is, therefore, remark-
able that counsel in Baden acknowledged that:
the circumstances which give rise to a duty of inquiry and the duties
consequent on the arising of that duty are the same in relation to a claim of
negligence as in relation to a claim that a person alleged to be a constructive
trustee has type 5 knowledge.36°
This means that the degree of culpability that goes in to the
assessment of the duty to make some inquiry was equated with
common law negligence, 351 although the consequence of
liability under constructive trust are more severe. 352 This
has led to a call for limiting acceptable knowledge types
based upon the reasoning that if all the cognisance types of
the Baden progression are accepted, there can be liability
where this is not desirable. 353 This approach however leads to
it invasive. See also D. Hayton: "Personal Accountability of Strangers as Constructive
Trustees" ,[1985] 27 MLR 313-320.
350Baden Del vaux and Lecuit v. Soclété Générale [1983] BCLC 325 at 448.
351 D. Hayton: "The Baden Delvaux Case: Constructive Trusteeship and Constructive
Knowledge", [19831 4 CL 177-179 at 178 perceives this equation as 'sensible'. For an
opposing view see C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [19861 102 LQR 114-
162 & 267-29 1, at 120, 124-125 and footnote 72.
352• Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291,
at 120:
[C]onstructive trusteeship should not be imposed lightly The point requires
emphasis because there has been a regrettable trend in recent years to equate
liability as a constructive trustee with liability in the torts of negligence and
conversion.
353Baden Delvaux and L.ecuit v. Société GenErate [1983] BCLC 325 at 415, P.Gibson J.:
The court should not be astute to impute knowledge where no actual
knowledge exists.
See also D. Hayton: "Personal Accountability of Strangers as Constructive Trustees", [1985]
27 MLR 313-320, who reaches a similar result by simply constraining the level of cognisance
for knowing assistance to types 1-3 of the Baden Delvaux progression by relying on - in his
words - 'actual notice', by which he means Actual knowledge and Nelsonian knowledge. But
using the term 'notice' he also concedes at 320:
Actual notice [meaning knowledgel, pragmatically, must extend to what
would be actual notice to an honest and reasonable man though not the
morally obtuse defendant.
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an entanglement of constructive knowledge or notice, a part
of the logical chain, with the constructive trust, its out-
come. It would be more elegant to leave the acceptable types
of cognisance intact and take the position that the courts
should adopt a measure of care in determining different
party's duties dependent on the circumstances, thus
disentangling constructive knowledge or notice from con-
structive trust. If the types of cognisance are given
independent standing, the combination of cognisance with the
specific circumstances of the case at hand will stand out
clearer in the argument that constructive knowledge or notice
should or should not lead to the imposition of constructive
trust. In the sliding scale of the Baden progression the
facts of the case will gain in importance where knowledge
becomes less actual. Clarity for cognisance type five can
then be achieved by defining in which cases a duty to inquire
arises
354R. Austin: "Commerce and Equity - Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Trust", [1986] 6 OJLS
444-455 at 452:
Rather than arguing in absolute terms as to whether constructive knowledge
should be sufficient for implicating a commercial third party in another's
breach of duty, it would be better to accept constructive knowledge as
potentially sufficient, but to define as narrowly and as precisely as possible
the circumstances in which a particular kind of third party will be under a duty
of inquiry out of which constructive knowledge will flow.
He then proceeds to state that Gibson J's judgement in Baden Delvaux takes the right approach
regarding an objective test for type 5.
See also R. Austin: "Constructive Trusts", in "Essays in Equity", P. Finn ed., (1985) The Law
Book Co. Ltd., 196-24!, at 239-240.
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The Baden Progression
Actual	 Nelsonian	 Eruiries	 lriication	 Suspion
Krledge types
[] Other factors	 Kixidge
This visual display represents the sliding scale of the Baden
progression. The level of cognisance in the defendant is
displayed on the Y-axis. The types of knowledge are set on
the X-axis. The bars represent the total amount of cognisance
that is necessary for liability. Where the type of knowledge
progresses from actual to constructive knowledge, the
importance of other factors becomes increasingly prevalent in
imputing knowledge to the defendant.
Other f actors355 consist of:
1) Shutting one's eye to the obvious.
355The 'other factors' are discussed in greater detail in 7.1 below.
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2) Wilfully and wrecklessly refraining from making such
enquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make.
3) The circumstances which would indicate the facts to an
honest and reasonable man.
4) The obligation to make enquiries as an honest an
reasonable man and suspicious circumstances, consisting of:
a) The normal conduct of business.
b) The magnitude of the transaction.
c) The time and opportunity available to make enquiries.
d) The degree of suspicion the known facts would provoke in
the mind of a reasonable participant in the relevant field
of business.
An added advantage of the recognition of the five types of
knowledge separate from constructive trust is that it is
possible to apply a specific number of cognisance types for
either knowing assistance or knowing receipt. The argument
for making a distinction is that for knowing assistance the
threshold for liability ought to be higher than for knowing
receipt. This is to make the distinction between receipt and
involvement, since for knowing assistance it is immaterial
whether the defendant received property for his own benefit
or only received it in the execution of his duties as an
agent for the trustees or other fiduciaries. 356 It is
therefore stressed that for constructive knowledge or notice
to be applicable, the alleged constructive trustee should
356Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Société Générale [1983] BCLC 325, at 404, P. Gibson J.:
It is important not to lose sight of the requirement that the Court must be
satisfied that the alleged constructive trustee was a party or privy to
dishonesty on the part of the trustee.
See also D. Hayton: "Personal Accountability of Strangers as Constructive Trustees", [1985]
27 MLR 3 13-320, who at 3 19-320 states that mere constructive notice is insufficient in the light
of this criterion.
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have received property for his own benef it. 357 In subsequent
cases based upon Gibson J.'s dictum in the Baden case, 358 the
recognition and applicability of cognisance types is depend-
ent on the level of involvement of the defendant. One would
expect therefore that in cases of knowing assistance much
more caution is applied when it comes to the imputed
knowledge than is the case in knowing receipt. Practice in
England does, however, prove different.
4.4.1 The Baden Criteria in England.
In Neste OY v. Lloyds Bank PLC359 Gibson J's criteria from the
Baden case were accepted for the first time. A constructive
357C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", [1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-29 1,
at 125-126:
As the implications of liability in equity are potentially more serious than those
in negligence, the threshold of liability should be higher.
On the basis of his rejection of the equation of liability in equity with liability for negligence,
Harpum (regrettably with limited reference to P.Gibson J.'s call not to be astute in imputing
knowledge where no actual knowledge exists and so contributing to the entanglement of
constructive knowledge or notice with constructive trust) proposes the yardstick to be practice
in business and whether the person acquires property for his own benefit:
The pattern of inquiries to be followed by a person acquiring property for his
own benefit is usually well known in advance, and provides a simple yardstick
for determining whether a person does or does not have notice of a matter.
This results in eliminating knowing inducement and assistance as a head of liability in
constructive trust matters on the grounds that:
Where a person does not receive property for his own benefit, that yardstick
is absent. In such cases it is suggested that strict constructive notice should
be inapplicable, because otherwise the equation between common law
negligence.. .becomes inevitable. To decide ex post facto that inquiries should
have been made, may place intolerable burdens on persons dealing with
fiduciaries.
358Neste OY v. IJoyds Bank PLC [1983] 2 LLR 658-667 (QB); Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts
Duke ofManchesterv. National WestminsterBank lid. [19921 4 All ER 308-330 (Ch.D); Lipk.in
Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 33 1-362 (QBD), [1992] 4 All ER 409-449 (CA);
Agip (Africa) Lid. v. Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (Ch.D), [1992] 4 All ER 451-469 (CA);
Eagle Trust plc v. SBC Securities Ld [1992] 4 All ER 488-511 (Ch. D); Cowan de Groot
Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [19921 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D); Polly Peck International
PLC v. Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769-787 (CA).
[1983] 2 LLR 658-667 (QB), Bingham J.
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trust was imposed on the bank when funds were transferred
from the plaintiffs to an account held by PSL, a company that
had in the past acted as the plaintiff's agent, but had
ceased trading. The bank knew of the fact that PSL was about
to cease trading and was therefore put on inquiry.360
The case Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts Duke of Manchester v.
National Westminster Bank Ltd., 361 deals with a question of
knowing receipt and imputed knowledge. First of all it has to
be made clear that in this case imputed knowledge was defined
as the actual or constructive notice of an agent that is
imputed to his principal. The judge, Sir Robert Megarry V-C,
also classified the cognisance types of the Baden case his
own way. In his qualification, knowledge type (i) corresponds
with actual notice, where types (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v)
correspond with constructive notice. 362
 The facts of the case
can be described as follows. Under a settlement the future
tenth Duke of Manchester would assign to the trustees of the
settlement all chattels to which he was entitled upon the
death of the ninth duke. The trustees would then make an
inventory of the chattels they considered fit to be heirlooms
and hold the remainder in trust for the tenth duke. The set-
tlement was never made, but the chattels were released, in
breach of trust, to the tenth duke by the trustees or with
the trustees' assent and the duke treated as if they were his
absolute property. Whenever the duke sold any of the
360Neste OYv. Lloyds Bank PLC [19831 2 LLR 658-667 (QB) per Bingham J at 666.
361[1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (ChD), Megarry V-C.
362Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts Duke of Manchester v. National Westminster Bank Ltd.
[1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (ChD) per Megarry V-C at 323.
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chattels, he would keep the proceeds for himself. The
eleventh duke instigated proceedings contending that the
tenth duke had received the chattels on constructive trust.
It was held that the duke's solicitor knew the terms of the
settlement, but the duke himself was not thought to have been
conscious of the fact that he was not entitled to receive the
chattels. Taking into account the consideration of Gibson J.
in the Baden case that 'the court should not be astute to
impute knowledge where no actual knowledge exists', 363 the
judge was of the opinion that no obligation to investigate
the donor's right to make a gift should be placed upon a
recipient3" and that knowledge on the part of the agent
cannot be imputed on the principal so as to fix a donee or
beneficiary with all the knowledge his solicitor has. 365 For
the purpose of imposing constructive trusteeship on the basis
of knowing receipt, the judge doubted types (iv) and (v) of
the Baden categorisation were sufficient, stressing that a
lack of integrity is the underlying criterion in determining
363Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Sociéré Générale [1992] 4 All ER 161-279 per Gibson J at 243.
3 Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts Duke of Manchester v. National Westminster Bank Ltd.
[1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (ChD) per Megarry V-C at 327:
Short of a wilful or reckless disregard of the obvious, it seems to me quite
unreal to suggest that a donee's liability to be subjected to a constructive
trust may depend upon his correctly estimating whether the gift is sufficiently
complex and valuable to require him to employ a solicitor to investigate the
donor's right to make the gift.
At 330 the implication for the cognisance types of the Baden case are given. And it is doubted
whether types (iv) and (v) are sufficient in a case of knowing receipt.
365Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts Duke of Manchester v. National Westminster Bank Ltd.
[1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (Ch.D) per Megarry V-C at 330, stating that this principle should be
distinguished from those situations in which a company is treated as having knowledge its
directors and secretary have.
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the mental state of the defendant.3
The subsequent case of Lipkin Gorman V. Karpnale Ltd. 367 dealt
with knowing assistance and knowing receipt. In this case a
partner named Cass in a firm of solicitors took money from
his own and also a client's account and used it to sustain
his gambling habit. Cass would buy chips at the casino from
the money he took out of both accounts, held with the same
bank. At one point Cass even obtained a banker's draft in
favour of the firm by issuing a cheque drawn from the
client's account in favour of the bank. This draft was
subsequently accepted by the casino as payment for gambling
chips. The bank's manager Mr Fox was aware of the fact that
Cass was cashing cheques at the casino, but did not pass his
knowledge on to the firm. The firm contended that the club
had knowingly received trust property and that the bank had
knowingly assisted in the breach of trust this constituted.
The court at first instance applied the same standards of
knowledge to both knowing assistance and knowing receipt,
3 Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts Duke of Manchester v. National Westminster Bank Ltd.
[1992] 4 All ER 308-330 (Ch.D) per Megarry V-C at 330:
In considering whether a constructive trust has arisen in a case of the
knowing-receipt of trust property, the basic question is whether the
conscience of the recipient is sufficiently affected to justify the imposition of
such a trust.. .Whether a constructive trust arises in such a case primarily
depends on the knowledge of the recipient, and not on the notice to him; and
for the clarity it is desirable to use the word 'knowledge' and avoid the word
'notice' in such cases... For this purpose, knowledge is not confined to actual
knowledge, but includes at least the types (ii) and (iii) of Baden knowledge,
ie actual knowledge that would have been acquired but for shutting one's
eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries
as a reasonable and honest man would make; for in such cases there is a
want of probity which justifies imposing a constructive trust... Whether
knowledge of Baden types (iv) and (v) suffices for this purpose is doubtful; in
my view, it does not, for I cannot see that the carelessness involved will
normally amount to a want of probity.
367Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale lid. [19921 4 ALl ER 33 1-362 (QBD), [19921 4 All ER 409-449
(CA), [19921 4 All ER 512-540 (HL).
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according to the first three criteria of the Baden
3
As far as knowing assistance was concerned, the bank was held
liable as constructive trustee as Mr Fox was either shutting
his eyes to the obvious (type (ii)), or wilfully and
recklessly failing to make such enquiries as a reasonable and
honest man would make (type (ui)). 369 The court subsequently
fixed Mr Fox with knowledge from the date that refusal to
accept that Cass's gambling was a controlled outlay was
recorded. Upon appeal, however, Nay U expressed the view
that the nature of the contractual and confidential relation
between the bank and client limits the exercise of care on
behalf of the bank. A bank is therefore not required to
question the nature of the transaction it is demanded to
perform. He furthermore was of the opinion that an element of
dishonesty or improper conduct had to be shown in order to
make a stranger a constructive trustee. 370 Parker U concurred
368Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. 119921 4 All ER 33 1-362 (QBD) per Alliott J at 349:
I propose to adopt the reasoning and the approach of Megarry V-C in Re
Montagu's Settlement Trusts. He was dealing with a case of knowing receipt,
in which category of constructive trustees the club are said to fall. The bank
on the other hand, fall into the other category by reason of their alleged
knowing assistance to the fraudulent scheme. No suggestion that different
degrees of standards of knowledge should apply in respect of the different
categories of constructive trustee has been made... There are, of course,
differences in the court's approach to the two types of constructive
trusteeship. In knowing receipt, fraud is irrelevant... In knowing assistance,
the stranger to the trust must be proved subjectively to know of the
fraudulent scheme of the trustee when rendering assistance, or shut his eyes
to the obvious, or have wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as
a reasonable and honest man would make.
369Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 33 1-362 (QBD) per Alliott J at 355.
370Lipkin Gonnan v. Karpnale Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 409-449 (CA) at 420 May U stated with
reference to Sachs LI in Carl -Zeiss-Stftung v. Herbert Smith & Co. (No 2) [1969] 2 All ER 367
at 379 and Goff U in Belmont Finance Coip. Ltd. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER
118 at 136:
In my opinion. ..there is at least strong persuasive authority for the proposition
that nothing less than knowledge, as defined in one of the first three ca-
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in the sense that he was of the opinion that the bank could
not be liable as constructive trustee unless it was also
liable for breach of contract. Testing criteria (ii), (iii)
and (iv) of the Baden case, therefore, led to the conclusion
that the bank was not liable. 371 Nichols U agreed with Parker
U regarding the use of the Baden criteria, 372 but dissented
with regards to the outcome which dismissed the possibility
for the firm of solicitors to argue the case on Baden
criteria.
For the knowing receipt case against the club, the court of
first instance held that the club did not have the requisite
knowledge to be deemed a constructive trustee, because Cass's
behaviour was not thought to be unusual in the gambling scene
and the club's manager, despite the fact that he said he knew
that solicitors had access to client's money, was not thought
to have any knowledge of the workings of a solicitor's
firm.3Th
The solicitors' appeal failed, because it was held that the
club had taken the money in good faith, for valuable
consideration and without notice that it had been stolen.
tegories stated by Peter Gibson J in Baden's case, of an underlying dishonest
design is sufficient to make a stranger a constructive trustee of the
consequences of that design.
371Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 409-449 (CA) at 437-438 and 441 per
Parker U.
372Lipkin Gorinan v. Karpnale Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 409-449 (CA) per Nichols Li at 450:
.a plea that a defendant knew or ought to have known that transactions
were part of a fraudulent and dishonest design can be an adequate plea of
knowledge if, but only if, the plea is girded with appropriate particulars of the
allegation that the defendant 'knew' of the matters in question.
373Lipkin Gorinan v. Karpnale lid. [1992] 4 All ER 33 1-362 (QBD) per Alliott J at 351.
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In the case of Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others,37'
liability to account in equity as constructive trustee on the
basis of knowing assistance was the centre of dispute. Agip's
chief accountant, operating from Tunisia, had fraudulently
altered a cheque so as to credit it to the defendant firm's
account with a London bank. The money was subsequently trans-
ferred to another account of the defendant's firm, held by
the same bank and then to a client account with an Isle of
Man bank.
In the judgement Millett J discussed both knowing receipt and
knowing assistance and accepted the Baden criteria. 3 Where
knowing receipt was concerned, Millet J distinguished receipt
of trust property for own benefit and lawful receipt not for
own benef it. 376 Since the facts of the case did not match
either category, knowing receipt was ruled out.
For knowing assistance, Millett J, although he accepted the
Baden criteria, did not agree with Peter Gibson J that knowl-
[1992J 4 All ER 385-407 (ChD), [1992] 4 All ER 451-469 (CA).
375Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (Ch.D) per Millet J at 403
and 405.
376Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [19921 4 All ER 385-407 (Ch.D) per Millet J at
403-404:
[lit is necessary to distinguish two main classes of case under this heading.
The first is concerned with the person who receives for his own benefit trust
property transferred to him in breach of trust. He is liable as a constructive
trustee if he received it with notice, actual or constructive, that it was trust
property and that the transfer to him was a breach of trust, or if he received
it without such notice but subsequently discovered the facts. In either case
he is liable to account for the property, in the first case as from the time he
received the property and in the second as from the time he acquired notice.
The second and, in my judgement, distinct class of case is that of the person,
usually an agent of the trustees, who receives the trust property lawfully and
not for his own benefit but who then either misappropriates it or otherwise
deals with it in a manner which is inconsistent with the trust. He is liable to
account as a constructive trustee if he received the trust property knowing it
to be such, though he will not necessarily be required in all circumstances to
have known the exact terms of the trust... In either class of case it is
immaterial whether the breach of trust was fraudulent or not.
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edge requirements for knowing receipt and knowing assistance
should be the same. 3 He did, however, accept that knowledge
may be proved or inferred from circumstances involving the
various mental states of the Baden categorisation, 378
 and so
disagreed covertly with Megarry V-C in Re Montaqu's Settle-
ment Trusts. 379 He held that two of the three defendants were
at best indifferent to the possibility of fraud and knew they
were laundering money. They were therefore held liable to
account as constructive trustees. Upon appeal Millett J's
judgement was confirmed and it was accepted that the suff i-
cient degree of knowledge was that of knowledge of circum-
stances that would indicate to an honest and reasonable man380
377Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (Ch.D) per Millet J at
404-405:
[T]here is no reason why the degree of knowledge required should be the
same, and good reason why it should not. Tracing claims and cases of
'knowing receipt' are both concerned with rights of priority in relation to
property taken by a legal owner for his own benefit; cases of 'knowing
assistance' are concerned with the furtherance of fraud. In Belmont Finance
Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [19791 1 All ER 118, [19791 Ch 250 the
Court of Appeal insisted that to hold a stranger liable for 'knowing assistance'
the breach of trust in question must be a fraudulent and dishonest one. In my
judgement it necessarily follows that constructive notice of the fraud is not
enough to make him liable.
3T8Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (Ch.D) per Millet J at
405:
According to Peter Gibson J. a person in category (ii) or (iii) will be taken to
have actual knowledge, while a person in categories (iv) or (v) has con-
structive notice only. I gratefully adopt the classification but would warn
against over refinement or a too ready assumption that categories (iv) or (v)
are necessarily cases of constructive notice only. The true distinction is
between honesty and dishonesty. It is essentially a jury question.
3 Agip (Africa) Ld. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 385407 (ChI)) per Millet J at
405:
In Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts (1985) (1992] 4 All ER 308 at
330,...Megarry V-C doubted whether constructive notice is sufficient even in
cases of 'knowing receipt'. Whether the doubt is founded or not, 'knowing
assistance' is an a fortiori case.
380Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [19921 4 All ER 451-469 (CA) per Fox U at 467
the Baden criteria were accepted as being:
...[A]n explanation of the general principle and is not necessarily
comprehensive.
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that a fraudulent design was being committed or would put him
on inquiry as to whether it was being committed.381
Eagle Trust plc v. SBC Securities Ltd. 382 involved a case of
knowing receipt. Under the terms of a takeover involving a
rights issue, the plaintiff's takeover offer to the share-
holders of the target group consisted of shares in itself, or
a cash alternative. The defendant company underwrote the cash
alternative and the rights issue and subsequently underwrote
its liability with a group of underwriters including the
plaintiff's chief executive. The chief executive fraudulently
arranged for the plaintiff to pay the defendant in order to
satisfy obligations arising out of the defendant's sub-under-
writings which included a stake of the chief executive him-
self. The alleged constructive trusteeship arising out of the
defendant's knowing receipt was not made out. Vinelott J
agreed with the assertions of Millet J in Agip383 regarding
knowledge and did not find Megarry V-C's view in Re Montagu's
Settlement Trusts persuasive.3& Vinelott J did however find
381 The facts that should have put the defendants on inquiry were held to be certainly present
when they were advised about the possibility of fraud by a firm of solicitors. See Agip (Africa)
Ltd. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 451-469 (CA) per Fox LI at 457-458 and 468-469.
38211992] 4 All ER 488-511 (Ch.D).
383Eagle Trust plc v. SBC Securities Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 488-511 (Ch.D) per Vinelott J at 494
regarding the assertion that the knowing receipt category covers two sub-categories: a) receipt
for own benefit with notice that it is trust property that was transferred in breach of the trust
and b) lawful receipt not for own benefit, but subsequently misappropriated or dealt with in a
manner inconsistent with the trust, with notice of the trust. And at 497 regarding a pragmatic
approach to the five categories, leaving the distinction between honesty and dishonesty to the
jury.
3 Eagle Trust plc v. SBC Securities Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 488-511 (Ch.D) per Vinelou J at
506:
Megarry V-C thus took at least the tentative view that constructive notice is
not enough to found a claim that a stranger, even a volunteer, who has
received trust property, can be made personally liable to the true owner...
do not think if would be right to found a decision that a statement of claim in
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special circumstances in the fact that a commercial transac-
tion was involved, 385 so that knowledge of the breach of trust
could only be inferred in the absence of any evidence or
explanation by the defendant regarding circumstances in which
an honest and reasonable man would have inferred that the
money was probably trust money and was misapplied. On this
basis the judge held that there were no grounds to hold the
defendant liable.
In Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC 	 the
case was one of knowing receipt involving the sale of prop-
erties at a deliberate undervalue in breach of the trust.
With regards to the knowledge requirements for constructive
trust, Knox J stated that there was consensus between the
parties that for knowing assistance the first three
cognisance types of the Baden categorisation were applicable.
For knowing receipt the case was not so clear, although the
parties were agreed that fraud has not a necessary
the instant case discloses no cause of action solely on the authority of Re
Mon tagu 's Settlement Trusts.
385Eagle Trust plc v. SBC Securities Ltd. [1992] 4 All ER 488-511 (Ch .D) per Vinelott J at
509:
[lJf in the ordinary cause of business, a payment is made in discharge of a
liability to the defendant, the defendant cannot be made liable as a
constructive trustee merely upon the ground that he knew or had reason to
suspect that there had been a breach of trust disentitling the trustee to make
the payment. It must be shown that the circumstances are such that
knowledge that the payment was improper can be imputed to him. In my
judgement, therefore, in a case of this kind, in order to make a defendant
liable as a constructive trustee, it must be shown that he knew, in one of the
senses set out in categories (ii, (ii) or (iii) of Peter Gibson J's analysis in
Baden, that the moneys were trust moneys misapplied; or the circumstances
must be such that, in the absence of any evidence or explanation by the
defendant, that knowledge can be inferred.
[1992] All ER 700-768 (Ch.D).
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ingredient. 387 It was, however, submitted that lack of
integrity on the part of the defendant was an essential
element and that types (iv) and (v) of the Baden
categorisation do not incorporate this and that knowledge
should be confined to the first three. 388 This last approach
seemed to find favour with the judge 389 for the purpose of
this case on the grounds that the case involved a contractual
transaction. 390 This is strengthened by the fact that he
later, albeit reluctantly, did also apply all five categories
when testing the facts of the case 391 and adopt a flexible
387Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [1992] 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox J at 754:
In relation to knowing receipt there was not the same degree of unanimity
between the parties, save that they were both agreed that the subject of the
type of knowledge which is required was one of considerable academic and
judicial controversy and both parties accepted that it was not an essential that
the breach of trust or of fiduciary duty should be fraudulent.
388 Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [1992] 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox J at 754:
For Cowan de Groot and Pinepad it was submitted that want of probity on the
part of the Constructive trustee was an essential element and that the
elements of carelessness involved in categories (iv) and (v) of the Baden
classification were not sufficient for this purpose.
389Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [19921 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox J at 760:
I do not accept the submission made to me that in the case of a knowing
receipt of trust property it is not necessary to establish at least in the case of
a bona fide purchaser for value of trust property that the recipient had actual
knowledge in categories (i), (ii) or (iii) in the Baden case of the breach of the
trust.
390Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [19921 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox J at 760:
The volunteer, such as the tenth Duke of Manchester in the Montagu case,
is not a person who is entering into an arm's length contractual bargaining
transaction and the courts applying equitable doctrines would be more, rather
than less, likely to impute knowledge to a volunteer than a contractual
purchaser, more especially when the subject of inquiry on the latter's part,
such as the question whether the sale to him is at a deliberate undervalue, is
a matter in which his commercial interest is diametrically opposed to that of
the vendor.
391 Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust PLC [1992] 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox .1 at 760 and 761:
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approach towards the Baden categorisation.392
In Polly Peck International PLC v. Nadir (No	 both
knowing assistance and knowing receipt were discussed. Funds
were diverted from Polly Peck International, via a Northern
Cyprus bank's London branch and the Central Bank of Northern
Cyprus to Nadir's account with the Northern Cyprus bank.
This particular judgement dealt with the possibility of
imposing a constructive trust on the Central Bank. On the
matter of the .Baden criteria, Scott U showed a similar
pragmatic approach as Knox J had done in Cowan de Groot.394
In considering the Central Bank's appeal against a Mareva in-
junction, consideration was given to the fact that the judges
in first instance had held that the 'sheer scale of the
payments' should have prompted the Central Bank to inquire.
Scott U held that this argument was not convincing. 395 The
If, contrary to my view it is right to have regard to the categories (iv) and (v)
of the Baden classification, I would still conclude that Mr Samuelson should
not be treated as having the requisite knowledge.
392Cowan de Groat Properties lid. v. Eagle Trust PLC [19921 4 All ER 700-768 (Ch.D) per
Fox J at 761:
I share the reservations expressed by Millett J in Agip ... regarding over
refinement in making the distinctions implicit in that classification or a too
ready assumption that categories (iv) and (v) are necessarily cases of
constructive notice only. In my judgement it may well be that the underlying
broad principle which runs through the authorities regarding commercial
transactions is that the court will impute knowledge, on the basis of what a
reasonable person would have learnt, to a person who is guilty of commer-
cially unacceptable conduct in the particular context involved.
[1992] 4 All ER 769-787 (CA).
394whilst doubting that either category (iii) and (v) will suffice in a case against the bank, Polly
Peck international PLC v. Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769-787 (CA) per Scott LI at 777:
The various categories of mental state identified in Baden's case are not rigid
categories with clear and precise boundaries. One category may merge
imperceptibly into another.
395Polly Peck international Plc v. Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769-787 (CA) per Scott U at
778-779.
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Mareva injunction was lifted, but an injunction to restrain
the bank from dealing with a specific account was upheld.
4.4.2 The Baden Criteria in England, Conclusion.
Both the cases of knowing assistance and knowing receipt show
a wide acceptance for the categorisation made by Peter Gibson
J in the Baden case. Interestingly enough the number of
cognisance types that are accepted as a sufficient degree of
knowledge for the purpose of imposing a constructive trust
increase in the case of knowing assistance. In view of the
fact that in cases of knowing receipt the defendant stands to
benefit himself and can be seen to act out of self interest,
one would expect more knowledge types to be recognised. The
reason for this anomaly must be sought in the fact that a
common element in the knowing assistance cases is the
requirement of fraud. Fraud is not a requirement in the cases
for knowing receipt, since it is not the conduct of the
defendant that is the basis of the liability, but the fact
that the defendant unjustly enriches himself at the expense
of the plaintiff. Yet in knowing receipt cases not only are
the judges very restrictive in the application of the Baden
criteria, they are also seeking to elevate lack of integrity
as a crucial element to knowledge in knowing receipt cases.
This shows that liability in constructive trust for knowing
receipt cases on the basis of the Baden cognisance types has
not yet been completely recognised as an independent
equitable remedy for unjust enrichment cases.
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The situation is different in New Zealand, 396 where the
cognisance types of the Baden case have given unjust
enrichment an independent standing within constructive trust
for the purpose of knowing receipt.397
4.4.3 The Baden Criteria in New Zealand.
In the case of Westpac Banking Corp. v. Savin, 398 the Court of
Appeal embraced the Baden classification as a comprehensive
scale for knowledge requirements. 3 The case dealt with
396For an appraisal of constructive trusts in New Zealand see R. Fardell and K. Fulton:
"Constructive Trusts - A New Era", [1991] 3 NZLJ 90-104.
397Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597-620. See the observations at 599:
In New Zealand the constructive trust has come to be recognised as a device
for imposing a liability to account on persons who cannot in good conscience
be permitted to retain a benefit in breach of their legal or equitable obligations.
It has become a broad equitable remedy for reversing that which is inequitable
or unconscionable.
398[19851 2 NZLR 41-71 (CA).
3 Westpac Banking Corp. v. Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41-71 (CA) at 52-53 per Richardson J:
Earlier judicial debate had centred mainly on the fourth and particularly the
fifth type of knowledge. Peter Gibson J concluded that there was sufficient
authority to treat all five categories of knowledge as material but considered
that only in exceptional circumstances should a Court impute type (5)
knowledge to an agent such as a bank acting honestly on its 'customer's'
instructions. The Judge made it clear that he considered the five types of
knowledge were the requisite knowledge for constructive trusteeship whether
of the 'knowing receipt' category, which up to now I have been discussing,
or the 'knowing assistance' category where the property has not necessarily
passed through the hands of the defendant and, as he pointed out, the
relevant knowledge must be of facts and not of mere claims or allegations
(Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2)) ([19691 2 All ER 367,
[19691 2 Ch 276)). As will shortly become apparent, it is not necessary for
the purpose of this case to express a final view as to the ambit of
constructive knowledge in this class of case. In principle I cannot see any
adequate justification for excluding categories (4) and (5) at least in the
'knowing receipt' class of case and I tend to favour for that class of case the
comprehensive approach adopted by Peter Gibson J which now has the
endorsement of Halsbury ((4th edn) vol 48, para 592).
At 60 McMutlin J accepted type (v) knowledge for a knowing receipt case.
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knowing receipt in a commercial transaction, 400 where the bank
had received the proceeds in a trading account held by Aqua
Marine for the sale of boats by Aqua Marine on behalf of the
boat's owners. Aqua Marine was not entitled to pay the
proceeds of the sale into its trading account, which was
heavily overdrawn. Westpac benefited from the reduction in
the indebtness and when Aqua Marine went into liquidation,
there were no funds left.
It was held that the bank had constructive notice of Aqua
Marine's breach of fiduciary duty towards the owners of the
boat, because the bank was constantly supervising Aqua
Marine's dealings, was aware of the fact that the appointment
of a receiver and liquidator was imminent and was actively
making sure that all cheques were credited to the company's
overdraft at the bank.
In Powell V. Thompson40' the High Court strengthened the link
between unjust enrichment and knowing receipt,'° 2 distinguish
400 Westpac Banking Corp. v. Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41-71 (CA) at 53 per Richardson J:
Clearly Courts would not readily import a duty to inquire in the case of
commercial transactions where they must be conscious of the serious
inhibiting effects of a wide application of the doctrine. Nevertheless there
must be cases where there is no justification on the known facts for allowing
a commercial man who has received funds paid to him in breach of trust to
plead the shelter of the exigencies of commercial life. In this regard there is
a further consideration affecting the receipt of funds in discharge of in-
debtness where, for example, a customer's account with a bank is overdrawn.
Where a creditor is pressing for payment and thus both stands to benefit from
the payment and designs and stipulates for that benefit, it will be less easy for
the creditor to contend that the regular pressures of commercial life must be
taken to have ruled out any need for enquiry.
401 119911 1 NZLR 597-620.
402Powe/l v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597-620 per Thomas J at 615:
The constructive trust, in the English view, was traditionally regarded as a
substantive institution, that is, something akin or similar to an express trust.
An actual or presumed intention on the part of the parties continues to be a
prerequisite to the reallocation of property interests in accordance with Court-
imposed constructive trusts. As a result, the constructive trust tends to be
applied in very narrow circumstances. In New Zealand, on the other hand, the
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ing knowing receipt 403 and knowing assistance 404 on this basis.
constructive trust has come to be recognised as a device for imposing a
liability to account on persons who cannot in good conscience be permstted
to retain a benefit in breach of their legal or equitable obligations... [T]he
constructive trust has become a broad equitable remedy for reversing that
which is inequitable or unconscionable.
403Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597-620 per Thomas J at 607:
Succinctly put, the distinction is that in the 'knowing receipt' cases it is the
fact that the third party gains a material advantage at the plaintiff's expense
which is regarded as 'unconscionable' - in the sense of unreasonable or
inequitable; in the 'knowing assistance' cases it is the behaviour of the
defendant which is regarded as unconscionable. Failure to appreciate this
distinction has led to much of the confusion relating to the type of knowledge
the stranger must posses before being held liable as a constructive trustee.
Peter Gibson J's landmark classification of the various kinds of knowledge in
Baden Delvaux. . .for example, is discussed in the context of both categories...
It results, on the one hand, in the view endorsed by some that the requisite
knowledge to found a constructive trust in a 'knowing receipt' class of case
must contain some element of moral improbity. It has prompted others, on the
other hand, to suggest that the knowledge required of a stranger who is party
to a breach of trust in the 'knowing assistance' type of case should be the
same as it is for the 'knowing receipt' type of case... Once the fundamental
difference in the basis of liability of the two categories is appreciated,
however, the temptation to inflate the knowledge required to constitute
constructive knowledge in the first, and to dilute the knowledge required for
the same purpose in the second, is easily resisted... [T]he knowledge required
to constitute 'knowing receipt' should be appropriate to the basis of liability
in that class of case; that is, the injustice of allowing the defendant to retain
the property which he or she has acquired at the expense of the plaintiff.
Similarly, the knowledge required for there to be 'knowing assistance' needs
to be directly related to the basis of liability in that class of case; the
unconscionability of the defendant's conduct.
404For knowing assistance, see Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v Hawkins [1991] 3 NZLR 700-
739, per Wylie J who, whilst disagreeing with Thomas J regarding his obiter statements on
knowing assistance, did support Thomas J's statements on knowing receipt. At 725 with regards
to Thomas J's conclusion and 728:
[HJis conclusions on the knowing receipt aspect... were founded on the
underlying unconscionability of unjust enrichment. It was this approach which
I think enabled him to pay less regard to some dicta from earlier cases...
I accept, as I should on the basis of Westpac v Savin and Elders Pastoral Ltd
v Bank of New Zealand that the five types of knowledge identified in Baden,
Delavaux apply to 'knowing receipt or dealing' cases but that in 'knowing
assistance' cases while type (i), (ii) and (iii) are relevant in determining
whether or not a constructive trust is to be found, types (iv) and (v) not
displaying a want of probity will not amount to unconscionable conduct and
will not suffice. In practice it is likely, if not inevitable, that lack of probity will
elevate what would otherwise be a type (iv) or (v) knowledge to the level of
types (ii) or (iii).
See also Marshal/Futures vMarsha/l [1992] 1 NZLR 3 16-337 at 325, supporting Wylie in his
assessment of the Baden criteria for knowing assistance.
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Thomas J also accepted all the Baden criteria405 and dismissed
the argument for restraint in applying them to commercial
transaction cases. 406 The two plaintiffs co-owned a home with
their mother, Mrs Powell as tenants in common in equal shares
and when they had left New Zealand temporarily, they had
given their mother the power of attorney for the purpose of
managing their affairs regarding the home, which they failed
to revoke once they returned. In the meantime the mother was
found to be a fraudster by her employer Mr Thompson, whose
accounts she kept. Mr Thompson did not expose her, but did
demand Mrs Powell pay back what she had stolen. In the course
of reducing her indebtness, Mrs Powell sold the home using
the powers of attorney and handed the proceeds of the sale,
405Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597-620 per Thomas J at 608-609 regarding Peter
Gibson J's five criteria and their connection with unjust enrichment:
The last three categories, in particular, serve to highlight the fact that equity
has never permitted a person to escape liability if his or her ignorance is self-
induced or unreasonable. in equity it is enough for the plaintiff to be able to
say that if the defendant did not know, then he or she ought to have known.
Again, bearing in mind the basis of liability, there is no sound reason why the
third party who has been enriched at someone else's expense should obtain
the benefit of an overly sensitive test for it to be said that he or she has the
requisite constructive knowledge. All five of Peter Gibson J's classifications
therefore undoubtedly apply to a person charged with being a constructive
trustee in the 'knowing receipt' class... For myself, however, I would delete
reference to the word 'honest' in the phrases 'honest and reasonable person'
in categories (3) to (5) as honesty - or dishonesty - is not a necessary ingredi-
ent if a constructive trust founded on the unjust enrichment of one at the
expense of another is in issue... I do not therefore, with respect, regard the
observations on this point, such as those of the English Court of Appeal in Re
Diplock [19481 Ch 465, at p 479, and Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Re
Montagu's Settlement Trusts at pp 277-279 as accurately reflecting the
present law... The reluctance of the English Courts in particular to dispense
with the notion that some want of probity is a requisite for the knowledge
which must exist in this class of constructive trust reflects, at least in part,
undue adherence to the dicta contained in past cases.
406Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597-620 per Thomas J at 614 with reference to Lord
Selbourne's dictum in Barnes v. Addy implying that [C]ommerce, to function properly, requires
the latitude inherent in the 'fraudulent and dishonest design', Thomas J. held that:
Such a notion is undefensible. There are not two standards, one for commerce
and the other for ordinary citizens. Nor should the threshold of equity's
tolerance be raised to meet some perceived commercial need.
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including the two thirds share of her children over to Mr
Thompson, who was aware of both interest and Mrs Powell's use
of the powers of attorney. Mrs Powell stayed on as tenant and
paid rent from an account to which the plaintiffs still
contributed, thinking they were repaying the mortgage.
The plaintiff's claim on the basis of unjust enrichment for
two thirds of the money that the defendant received was suc-
cessful. The defendant was held liable as constructive
trustee on the basis of his knowledge.
The link between unjust enrichment and constructive trust
based on knowing receipt for own benefit is strengthened in
subsequent cases. In Lankshear v. ANZ Banking Group (New
Zealand) Ltd, 407 Mr Broadly, one of two partners in a building
development venture, was operating an account alien to the
partnership. This account was overdrawn and the defendant
bank was keen to see the overdraft brought down. Mr Broadley
then persuaded his partner, the plaintiff, to contribute more
to the project. The plaintiff, in anticipation of Mr Broadley
opening an account on behalf of the partnership, paid in the
overdrawn account for the time being. When the project did
not advance, the plaintiff found out about the situation and
refused to make additional contributions, resulting in Mr
Broadley's bankruptcy. The plaintiff brought action against
the bank for knowing receipt for the deposit used to repay
the overdraft and knowing assistance for the surplus funds
that were subsequently spent by Mr Broadley. It was shown
that the bank's manager was aware of the fact that the funds
were meant for the development project. On the basis of this
°[1993] 1 NZLR 481-499.
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knowledge408 the court held the defendant liable as
constructive trustee for knowing receipt, 409 but did not find
in this same degree of knowledge sufficient for liability
based on knowing assistance, 410 since the necessary lack of
probity for knowing assistance was absent.411
In Nirarno v. Westpac Banking Corporation 412 the notion that
unjust enrichment is the basis for constructive trust in
knowing receipt cases was affirmed, thus confirming Millet
J's distinction between receipt for own benefit and receipt
not for own benefit in knowing receipt cases in Agip.413
In order to convert New Zealand Dollars in Pound Sterling,
Nimmo approached Kinetic Investment Services. After Nimmo had
408Lankshear v. ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 481499 per Wallace
J at 493494:
There seems to be substantial agreement that all five categories of knowledge
as expressed by Peter Gibson J in Baden... are relevant in a knowing receipt
or dealing case.
409Lankshear v. ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 481499 per Wallace
J at 493-496. The judge relied on the Baden, Westpac and Powell v Thompson cases. At 496:
El]t is possible to emphasise the concept of unjust enrichment as the unifying
and essential basis for the imposition of a remedial constructive trust in cases
of knowing receipt. That, as I understand it, is the approach taken in Canada
and also appears to underlie the analysis of knowing receipt liability
undertaken in Powell v Thompson...
410Lank.shear v. ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) LId (1993] 1 NZLR 48 1499 per Wallace
.J at 496-497, showing that the distinction between knowing receipt and knowing assistance lies
in the absence of unjust enrichment in latter cases, despite the same degree of knowledge, by
holding that an obligation for the defendant to make inquiries after every cheque that is drawn
is unreasonable:
(Kinowledge. which was vital in relation to knowing receipt liability, is not in
my view sufficient to establish knowing assistance liability concerning the
disposal of the balance of the funds.
4 'Lankshear v. ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 481-499 per Wallace
J at 497:
There is simply no evidence that the bank knowingly assisted Mr Broadley in
a dishonest of fraudulent design to dispose of the balance of the funds.
412(19931 3 NZLR 2 18-239.
413Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson and others [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (ChD).
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transferred the money to Kinetic's on call savings account
with Westpac by means of a cheque, the funds were then moved
to Kinetic's trust account, from which a cheque was drawn and
exchanged for its sterling equivalent by banking it in Kine-
tic's sterling account, which was operated by, amongst
others, Eaton, one of the directors of Kinetic. Eaton went on
to transfer the money to an Australian dollar account with
Westpac, from which he subsequently embezzled the funds by
extracting a signature from his co-director. Kinetic
subsequently went into liquidation. Nimmo sought to reclaim
from Westpac on the basis of constructive trust for knowing
receipt and knowing assistance.
It was held that contrary to the facts in Westpac Banking
Corp. v. Savin, 614 Westpac did not receive the funds for its
own benefit, was not better off as a result of the
transaction and could therefore not be said to have been
unjustly enriched. 415
 Therefore there was no case for knowing
receipt. 416
 The case for knowing assistance was not
successful. Despite the fact that the judge thought that the
bank had been negligent in its failure to seek confirmation
of the authority of Mr Eaton, who was not known at the branch
414 Westpac Banking Corp. v. Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41-7 1 (CA).
415Nimmo v. Westpac Ban/dng Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 2 18-239 per Blanchard J on unjust
enrichment at 225:
I make mention of this because it is probable that unjust enrichment is the
basis for the imposition of a constructive trust in a case of knowing receipt.
416Niiwno v. Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 2 18-239 per Blanchard J at 225-
226, holding with reference to Agip (Africa) lid vfackson [1992] 4 All ER 385-407 (ChD) and
Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (No 2) 4 All ER 769-787 (CA):
I am of the view that in the present case Westpac cannot be said to have
'received' Mr Nimmo's money in the relevant sense of that word and that, if
a constructive trust is to be imposed, it must be because Westpac has
'knowingly assisted' in the breach of trust which Mr Eaton caused Kinetic to
commit.
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in which the Australian dollar account was held, Westpac
could not be said to be dishonest or recklessly dishonest for
the purpose of intposing a constructive trust for knowing
assistance.
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4.4.4 The Baden Criteria; Conclusion.
The cognisance types of the Bac7en case have been widely
accepted for both knowing receipt cases and knowing
assistance cases. The application of type (iv) and (v)
knowledge however has met with resistance in the English
courts, although it is acknowledged that the borders between
the cognisance types do not have to be strictly adhered to.
It is peculiar that English courts seem much more willing to
consider a wider application of the cognisance types in
knowing assistance cases than in knowing receipt cases. The
implications of liability in equity in constructive trust are
severe, so one would expect the reverse. 417 The presence of
fraud seems to make it more acceptable for the courts to go
further in knowing assistance cases than in knowing receipt
cases. And where the possibility of using all the Baden
criteria in knowing receipt cases is discussed, the judges
seem to look for something akin to a want of probity, despite
4l7	 the explanation on page 99 and C. Harpum: "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee",
[1986] 102 LQR 114-162 & 267-291, at 125-126:
As the implications of liability in equity are potentially more serious than those
in negligence, the threshold of liability should be higher.
On the basis of his rejection of the equation of liability in equity with liability for negligence,
Harpum (regrettably with limited reference to P. Gibson J.'s call not to be astute in imputing
knowledge where no actual knowledge exists and so contributing to the entanglement of
constructive knowledge or notice with constructive trust) proposes the yardstick to be practice
in business and whether the person acquires property for his own benefit:
The pattern of inquiries to be followed by a person acquiring property for his
own benefit is usually well known in advance, and provides a simple yardstick
for determining whether a person does or does not have notice of a matter.
This results in eliminating knowing inducement and assistance as a head of liability in construc-
tive trust matters on the grounds that:
Where a person does not receive property for his own benefit, that yardstick
is absent. In such cases it is suggested that strict constructive notice should
be inapplicable, because otherwise the equation between common law
negligence.. .becomes inevitable. To decide ex post facto that inquiries should
have been made, may place Intolerable burdens on persons dealing with
fiduciaries.
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the fact that fraud is not an element of a constructive trust
for knowing receipt case. This is therefore an anomaly which
needs clarification.
In New Zealand, however, the courts are very willing to
accept all the cognisance types of the Baden case and the
complete application of the Baden criteria is more readily
accepted in knowing receipt cases as opposed to knowing
assistance cases.
The crucial difference in this approach can only be explained
by the recognition by the New Zealand judges of the doctrine
of unjust enrichment. It is therefore possible to distinguish
cases in which the defendant has received for his own
benefit, or not for his own benefit. In the former case all
Baden criteria can be applied, whereas in the second instance
the ratio of unjust enrichment is absent per se and the only
possibility for action lies in knowing assistance, with its
separate set of rules.
4.5 Cognisance in the Action against Malign Competition.
So where does this put the action against malign competition?
Both the similarities and differences between the proposed
action of malign competition and the imposition of
constructive trust can be distilled from the above.
The similarity lies in the fact that the doctrine of unjust
enrichment forms the basis for both malign competition and
constructive trust. The difference lies in the nature of the
remedy that is triggered in either case and the fact that
constructive knowledge is applied to trust property. It is
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therefore legitimate to ask oneself whether the application
of constructive knowledge on the basis of the Baden
progression can be transposed to the intangibles that are the
subject matter in cases of malign competition. One can easily
argue that the nature of trust law is completely different
from the law relating to competition.
The justification for the application of constructive
knowledge in malign competition matters lies first and
foremost in the principle of unjust enrichment that is common
to both constructive trust and malign competition. In the
second place we must not forget that the only reason
constructive knowledge is 'applied' to trust property is
because the trust property is the result of the imposition of
a constructive trust. The imposition of the construcitve
trust is the remedy that may result from the application of
constructive knowledge. In other words, the trust property
may not have been trust property prior to the imposition of
the constructive trust.
This shows that the application of constructive knowledge per
se is not dependent on the field of law in which it is
applied. Constructive knowledge is a means to assess the
state of mind of a defendant for the purpose of liability,
independent of the remedy or the resulting property claims.
Subject material does not, therefore, have to form a barrier
for the application of constructive knowledge.
It is, however, useful to see whether constructive knowledge
is also used in cases that bear closer resemblance to malign
competition as far as subject material is concerned.
Exemplary is the provision for contributory patent
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infringement, 418 which extends liability to those who have
assisted in the preparation of an infringing act, but did not
carry out the act themselves. The knowledge is judged
objectively, taking account of what is obvious to a
reasonable person in the circumstances. 419 A similar provision
can be found in copyright cases.420
Conclusion to Chapter Four.
In this chapter we have covered the problem of placing
liability on a defendant in cases of active free acceptance
in the action for malign competition. This problem emanates
from the principle that market participants have to be able
to make a free choice with regards to the extent of risks
they take in the marketplace. This is why, especially in
common law systems, judges are reluctant to impose liability
on innocent risk takers.
The freedom of the choice a market participant takes is
dependent on the knowledge this party possessed with regards
to entitlements of others. We have seen that tortious
principles protect only recognised interests that are
subsequently validated by claims of a proprietary nature by
one party in order to exclude others. We also know that
claims to entitlements are not readily recognised unless they
qualify under clearly defined heads of tort.
48Introduced in the 1977 Patents Act, s.60(1)(b).
419For an overview see W. Cornish: "Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks
and Allied Rights" (1989) 2d ed. Sweet & Maxwell at 167-169.
420Disussed in Chapter 5 below.
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Therefore we have proposed that these entitlements are
determined and confined by the principle of unjust enrichment
and the action for malign competition.
In order to determine how to protect the interest of innocent
market participants, we have discussed a model proposed by
Professor Gordon called 'malcompetitive copying'. Professor
Gordon proposes to overcome the problem surrounding innocent
risk takers by amalgamating the principle of unjust
enrichment with the need for a tag or demarcation placed by
the plaintiff around the intangible he claims. With a claim
in place, the defendant actively knows that by his
appropriation he takes the risk of being faced with a claim
for unjust enrichment for 'malcompetitive copying'.
Whilst not dismissing the value of a tag or demarcation as a
way to infer knowledge in a defendant, it is submitted that
active knowledge is not a necessary prerequisite for imputing
knowledge. Constructive knowledge is equally suited to make
a full risk - benefit assessment and a real choice.
We can conclude that the requirement of tagging, due to its
reliance on claims to interests in intangibles, shifts the
rationale of the action for 'malcompetitive copying' back
from unjust enrichment to tort. As such the tort of
malcompetitive copying displays many similarities with the
French and Duch proposals for the protection of reserved
creations, as these proposals also rely on tagging.
It is submitted that reliance on constructive knowledge in
the proposed action for free acceptance-based malign
competition, does not alter the basis of the action. The
principles and constraints of unjust enrichment remain intact
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in their application.
In order to determine the extent to which constructive
knowledge can be relied upon to impose liability, we have
looked at the constructive trust as a parallel in the common
law world. We have seen that, despite the difference in
remedies, the character of the constructive trust is the same
as that of the principle of restitution and that both are
based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
In the search for the level of cognisance that is sufficient
for liability, we have seen that there are five knowledge
types, moving from active to constructive knowledge in a
sliding scale. We have seen the difficulties and controversy
surrounding the use of the lowest two types of knowledge in
England and contrasted it with the recognition of the last
two types of knowledge in principle in New Zealand. We have
shown that there is a discrepancy between the recognition of
cognisance types between knowing receipt and knowing
assistance cases of constructive trust in England. We have
also shown that the ratio for the recognition of more
cognisance type for knowing assistance than for knowing
receipt is not sound. As shown this is a result of the
introduction of fraud into the assessment of liability, which
shifts the rationale for the action away from unjust
enrichment. We can conclude that the New Zealand approach,
where this anomaly does not exist, is more satisfactory.
It has furthermore been submitted that the cognisance types
are universally applicable and we can conclude that there is
no reason to deny the application in the action for malign
competition.
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Chapter 5: Cognisance in Intellectual Property Law.
Introduction to Chapter Five.
In this chapter English copyright cases that involve the use
of constructive knowledge criteria are discussed. The reason
is that English law involving the constructive trust is
skewed by the need to establish fraud. This chapter serves to
demonstrate that principles of constructive knowledge are
applied in intellectual property law without the need to
establish fraud. As such it strengthenes the case for the use
of constructive knowledge criteria without fraud. It also
serves to bridge the gap that otherwise exists between trust
law and intellectual property law.
5.1 Constructive Knowledge and Copyright.
The defendant's state of mind and his knowledge, be it actual
or constructive, is critical not only in constructive trust
cases but also in copyright cases. Since copyright bears
closer resemblance to unfair competition law than the area of
constructive trust, it is important to see how the
defendant's state of mind is assessed. It is also useful
because, unlike the constructive trust, copyright cases are
not skewed by fraud.
The 1988 copyright Act contains provisions that make it an
infringement commercially to exploit copies which the
defendant knows or has reason to believe to be infringing
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copies. 421 These provisions do not deal with people who
themselves cary out direct infringements of copyright or
authorise others to do so, but with those who commercially
deal in infringing copies.
Secondary infringement of copyright materials covers
importation, 422 possessing and exhibiting in public in the
course of business, selling, letting for hire, offering or
exposing for sale or hire, or distribution in the course of
business or otherwise to such an extent that it prejudicially
affects the owner of the copyright. 423 It also covers the
provision of means for making infringing copies, the
transmission of copyright materials without a licence 424 and
the provision of an apparatus for playing or showing a work
in public. 425 These acts will, however, only be deemed to be
infringing if the defendant possessed some form of knowledge
of the fact that he was dealing with infringing material.
Under the 1956 copyright Act, secondary infringers were only
liable if they possessed actual knowledge. 426 The 1988 Act saw
an expansion of the knowledge requirement, so that the phrase
'knew or had reason to believe' can be taken to include
notice of facts that would suggest to a reasonable man that
421 Sections 22, 23, 24 and 26 all cover forms of secondary infringement of copyright and
require knowledge.
422Copyright Act 1988, s. 22.
423Copyright Act 1988, s. 23.
424Copyright Act 1988, s. 24.
425Copyright Act 1988, S 26.
426Sec G. Dworkin and R. Taylor: Blackstone's Guide to the Copyright, Designs & Patents Act
1988, (1989) Blackstone Press Ltd., at 66.
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a breach of copyright was being committed. 427
 In effect this
is thought to have enlarged the liability for secondary
infringement to a situation in which the alleged infringer is
negligent.428
In this respect the 1988 Copyright Act is an affirmation of
the cautious expansion the courts had already given to the
knowledge requirement for secondary infringement under the
1956 Act.
In Infabrics Limited and Others v. Jaytex Shirt Co. Ltd.429
Whitford J. considered the Australian case of Albert v.
Hoffnung & Company Limited430 when judging a case in which the
defendant had imported into the United Kingdom shirts bearing
a design owned by the plaintiffs. The defendants had seen
this design before when they were going through a portfolio
of the plaintiffs in which the design in question was
included. In considering the plaintiffs' submission that the
defendants, when he was offered the same design in Hong Kong,
427i Cornish: "Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights"
Second ed. (1989) Sweet & Maxwell. At 298 he interprets the phraseology of the 1988 Act in
conformity with the case law regarding knowledge under the 1956 Act.
428(j Dworkin and R. Taylor: Blackstone's Guide to the Copyright. Designs & Patents Act
1988, (1989) Blackstone Press Ltd., at 66.
429[ 1978] FSR 451.
°22 SR (NSW) 75. This case dealt with secondary infringement for importation under section
2(2) of the Australian Copyright Act, Harvey I. at 81:
'Knowledge' in the section cannot mean in my opinion any more than notice
of facts such as would suggest to a reasonable man that a breach of the
copyright law is being committed. In this case very few people in the world
would have knowledge in the sense of being able to prove in a court of law
the facts necessary to show infringement, namely, the proof of the execution
of the assignment from Stern & Co. to the plaintiff which was executed in
New York and the absence of giving notice and payment of royalties to the
plaintiff. Something less than that must be required by the Act. In my opinion
knowledge means notice, which would put a reasonable man on inquiry. In my
opinion the defendant company had that from the time of the first statement
of claim on them.
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'should have been put on inquiry, and should have made
inquiries, and by making none he chose to turn a blind
eye' 1 431 the judge followed Devlin J. 's three point test as to
degrees of knowledge, of which shutting ones eyes to an
obvious means of knowledge is the second, formulated in
Taylor's Central Garages v. Roper, 432 but he was not satisfied
that the defendants should indeed have been put on inquiry.
In Australia the Supreme Court of New South Wales
distinguished the similar importation case of R.C.A.
Corporation v. Custom Cleared Sales TTY Ltd. 433 from Albert V.
Hoffnung & Company Limited. 434 In considering Harvey J.'s
431 [1978] FSR 451 at 466.
432(195 1) 115 JP 445. In this criminal case the appellants were charged with permitting the use
of a public service vehicle without a road service licence. Devlin J. considered the types of
knowledge that the prosecution have to prove at 449:
There are, I think, three degrees of knowledge which it may be relevant to
consider in cases of this sort. The first is actual knowledge, and that the
justices may infer from the nature of the act that was done, for no man can
prove the state of another man's mind, and they may find it, of course, even
if the defendant gives evidence to the contrary. They may say: 'We do not
believe him. We think that was his state of mind.' They may feel that the
evidence falls short of that, and, if they do, they have to consider what might
be described as knowledge of the second degree. They have then to consider
whether what the defendant was doing was, as it has been called, shutting
his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge...
The third sort of knowledge is what is generally known as constructive
knowledge. It is encompassed by the words 'ought to have known' in the
phrase 'knew or ought to have known.' It does not mean actual knowtedge
at all; it means that the defendant had in effect the means of knowledge.
When, therefore, the case of the prosecution is that the defendant failed to
make what they think were reasonable inquiries it is, I think incumbent on the
prosecutor to make it quite plain what they are alleging. There is a vast
distinction between a state of mind which consists of deliberately refraining
from making inquiries, the result of which the person does not care to have,
and a state of mind which is merely neglecting to make inquiries as a
reaonable and prudent man would make. If that distinction is kept well in
mind, I think justices will have less difficulty in determining what is the true
position. The case of shutting the eyes is actual knowledge in the eyes of the
law; the case of merely neglecting to make inquiries is not actual knowledge
at all, but comes within the legal conception of constructive knowledge.
[1978] FSR 576.
SR (NSW) 75.
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statement in this latter case that knowledge means notice of
facts that would suggest to a reasonable man that a breach of
the Copyright Act was being committed, the Court held that
this did not displace the ordinary standards of proof of
knowledge so that they would be replaced by constructive
knowledge. 435
 It was, however, also held that knowledge may be
inferred on a defendant on the basis of facts of the case
affecting the state of mind of a defendant. In this sense
knowledge may be inferred on the basis of the understanding
which can be expected of persons active in the line of
business in question and the absence of obstacles to the
acquisition of the relevant knowledge. 436
 The court calls this
type of knowledge actual knowledge. 437
 Actual knowledge thus
becomes qualified so as to include other cognisance types. In
Politechnika Ipari Szovetkezet and Others v. Dallas Print
[1978J FSR 576 at 578:
Taken out of context the language would justify this conclusion, but the case
before Harvey J. was between a well known importing firm and a well known
musical house. [It was] concerned with transactions involving persons to
whom copyright and its various incidents would be well known.
436[19781 FSR 576 at 578:
It seems to us that the principle is more accurately put by saying that a court
is entitled to infer knowledge on the part of a particular person on the
assumption that such a person has the ordinary understanding expected of
persons in his line of business, unless by his or other evidence it is convinced
otherwise. In other words, the true position is that the court is not concerned
with the knowledge of a reasonable man but is concerned with reasonable
inferences to be drawn from a concrete situation as disclosed by the evidence
as it affects the particular person whose knowledge is at issue. In inferring
knowledge. a court is entitled to approach the matter in two stages: where
opportunities for knowledge on the part of the particular person are proved
and there is nothing to indicate that there are obstacles to the particular
person acquiring the relevant knowledge, there is some evidence from which
the court can conclude that such a person has the knowledge. However, this
conclusion may be easily overturned by a denial on his part of the knowledge
which the court accepts, or by a demonstration that he is properly excused
from giving evidence of his actual knowledge.
[1978J FSR 576 at 578:
In our opinion, the knowledge which has to be proved is actual not
constructive knowledge.
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Transfers Ltd. 438 Dillon J. referred only to the heading of
R.C.A. Corporation v. Custom Cleared Sales TTY Ltd. 439 and
concluded that actual knowledge had to be proven for
secondary infringement. If construed narrowly, actual
knowledge does not take into account that actual knowledge
may also encompass other means to obtain the relevant
knowledge. Deliberately refraining from making enquiries or
shutting one's eyes to the obvious would be excluded from the
acceptable cognisance types if actual knowledge were not
qualified.
The full holding on knowledge from R.C.A. Corporation v.
Custom Cleared Sales TTY Ltd. 44° was however referred to in
Hoover P.L.C. V. George Hulme Ltd. 441 and its contents were
accepted as the proper means of establishing the defendant's
state of mind.
In Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Others v. Robinson
and Others442 Scott J. refers to R.C.A. v. Custom Cleared
Sales443 and Whitford J.'s citation in Intabrics V. Jaytex'"
of the dictum from the judgement of Harvey J. in Albert v.
Ho.ffnung & Company Limited445 and defines the meaning of
actual knowledge. As in the R.C.A. case he states that actual
438[19821 FSR 529.
[1978J FSR 576.
°[1978] FSR 576.
441 11982] FSR 565 at 568-579.
44211986] 3 All ER 338.
'[1978J FSR 576.
[1978J FSR 451.
SR (NSW) 75. at 81.
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knowledge has to be proven for secondary infringement. Within
actual knowledge he then goes on to include the situation in
which a person who deliberately refrains from inquiry and
shuts his eyes to what is obvious. 446 This qualification of
knowledge seems to indicate that the R.C.A. decision did find
more favour with Scott J. than the Infabrics case, where
knowledge was defined in a more open ended way so that it
could also include constructive knowledge.
It is clear from these cases that for the purpose of
assessing the defendant's frame of mind in secondary
infringement cases under the 1956 Copyright Act knowledge
comprises actual knowledge and shutting one's eyes to the
obvious. The terms used in the 1988 Act are thought to be
instilled with the same uieaning.447
It is important to remember that the defendant in secondary
infringement does not infringe by direct violation of
copyright material, but by aiding in the distribution of the
infringing materials and thereby commercially exploiting
them. The wording of the 1988 Copyright Act limits the
accepeted cognisance types to impose liability to what the
defendant 'knows or had reason to believe'. In view of the
restraints of the Act, the reason for the refusal of the
judges to fix defendants with knowledge on a constructive
basis seems to find its reason in economic reality, where
judges do not want to restrict trade by imposing heavy duties
44611986] 3 All ER 338 at 363.
447w. Cornish: "Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights
Second ed. (1989) Sweet & Maxwell at 298.
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on those in the retail or hire business.8
Conclusion to Chapter Five.
In this chapter we have explored the use and recognition of
knowledge criteria in cases of secondary copyright
infringement. It has been shown that the application of such
knowledge criteria is not alien to the field of intellectual
property law and that, unlike in many constructive trust
cases, fraud is not a requirement.
Secondary copyright infringement does not involve direct
violation of copyright material and for this reason
constructive knowledge is not readily accepted in the
assessment of liability. The definition of actual knowledge
is, however, wide and also includes Nelsonian and type three
knowledge from the Baden scale. This means that only the pure
constructive knowledge types are dismissed.
448R C.A. v. Custom Cleared Sales 119781 FSR 576, dealing with infringing video tapes. At
580:
It was suggested that Scallan should be treated as having knowledge because
of his failure to adequately supervise the company's retail outlets This, in our
opinion, is to apply the doctrine of constructive knowledge which...is not
proper.
Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Others v. Robinson and Others
[1986] 3 All ER 338 also dealt with infringing video tapes. At 364:
Unless a defendant has some degree of specific knowledge about a specific
tape, his general knowledge that a tape is quite likely to be a pirate does not,
in my judgment, fix him with knowledge, sufficient for the purpose of s.
16(3), that the tape was made in breach of copyright. A person who sells or
lets on hire video tapes does not, in my judgement, have to undertake the
task of checking his stock in order to protect himself from liability.
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Chapter 6: Malign Competition in Perspective.
Introduction to Chapter Six.
This chapter covers the proximity of the proposed action for
malign competition to existing practice in selected
jurisdictions. With the doctrine of unjust enrichment at the
heart of malign competition, we will look at the way in which
unjust enrichment is incorporated in these jurisdictions.
Subsequently we will discuss in detail the state of unfair
competition law and ask ourselves whether a synthesis between
unjust enrichment and unfair competition law has already
taken place, as it would facilitate the acceptance of an
action for malign competition.
The jurisdictions discussed in detail are France, Germany and
The Netherlands, whilst the United Kingdom and Israel are
added in contrast when considering the extent to which a
synthesis has already taken place.
6.1 Malign Competition, Recapitulation.
In the outline on unfair competition laws, 449 we considered
the content of the general clause as a benchmark, before
exploring possibilities for the law of obligations, most
notably the theory of unjust enrichment, as the foundation
for the law of unfair competition. This is especially true
449See Chapter One above.
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where unjust enrichment has developed from the remedy of
restitution for a wrong to an independent form of action. At
the level of legal method and legal rule, we have seen that
unjust enrichment can overcome problems associated with
property theories and objections against judges taking policy
decisions. The concept of constructive knowledge is available
to overcome objections against imposing obligations on third
parties, or strangers. Furthermore, we have seen that
constructive knowledge is not alien to intellectual property
law. Where does this leave the synthesis between unjust
enrichment and unfair competition: 'malign competition'?
6.2 Unfair Competition and Unjust Enrichment.
In order to establish whether my proposed action for malign
competition is feasible in a European context, the current
legal situation regarding unfair competition and unjust
enrichment is in various Member States of the Community is
described. As we will see a partial synthesis between unjust
enrichment and unfair competition has already taken place,
albeit not fully acknowledged or designated.
6.2.1 Failback on the Law of Obligations.
In those systems in which the general clause is contained in
a lex specialis on unfair competition, this failback is
sometimes indirect, as in Germany and Austria through the
principle of bonos mores, or direct, as in Belgium, where the
law on unfair competition is linked with the Civil Code.
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In civil law countries where unfair competition is based on
a general provision in the Civil Code this link between
unfair competition and the law of obligations is much more
clear. The general provision that is conunonly used is the one
defining a tort. Apart from tort, however, the principle of
unjust enrichment is also relied upon.
Having started from a common law perspective, the situation
in civil law will be mapped out. Two major systems can be
distinguished, namely the German and the French. Furthermore
the situation in The Netherlands will be analysed. This
country has the youngest civil code in the Conununity. As
such, the Dutch Civil Code may serve as an example in the
harmonisation of civil codes in the Conununity.45°
It is of importance to note at this point that in the
following description of various acts of unfair competition
two categories must be distinguished, the first being acts of
competition that are considered unfair per se. Liability in
tort is established on the grounds that the act in question
fits a description of a tort recognised in jurisprudence.
Acts creating confusion, slavish imitation and misleading,
deceptive and slanderous statements fall into this category.
Prima facie liability is accepted on the grounds of the act
itself and an injunction can follow automatically. Extremely
high demands are not placed on proof of damage for the
450The European Parliament has put the creation of a European Civil Code on the agenda in its
decision of 26-&1989 OJ C 158/400 f.
It is anticipated that a harmonisation of unfair competition provisions within the Union will
facilitate the inception of a European Civil Code. See W. Tilmann: 'Der gewerbliche
Rechtsschutz vor den Konturen eines europäischen Privatreschts" [1993J 4 GRUR mt. 275-279,
who notes that the harmonisation of competition laws as a species of trade related private law
increases common standards in private law and Civil Codes. The latest example of this
development is the Dutch Civil Code of 1992.
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purpose of establishing liability in damages.
The second act is one that is a legitimate form of
competition per Se, and which becomes tortious because of
additional elements. Broadly speaking this category is one
where appropriation of a business asset takes place. Here
proof of damage is generally the basic component for the
establishment of prima tacie liability.
6.3.1 Unjust Enrichment: Prance.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment in France is not based on
a statutory provision, but has evolved through jurisprudence
from a remedy to an independent cause of action. 451 In its
famous case Boudier, the Court of Appeal elevated the
principle of unjust enrichment to law. The formulation was,
however, extremely general, 452 stating nothing more than that
the principle serves to offer relief for a situation in which
one has been enriched at the expense of another.
Qualification duly followed in a subsequent case, 453 when the
45t For an overview see B. Starck: "Droit Civil", 2 ed. H. Roland and L. Boyer Librairies
Techniques at 629-643.
452Patureau-Miran v. Boudier 15 June 1892 [1892] D. 92, 1 ,596; S. 93, 1, 281.
Attendu que, cette action, dérivant du principe d'equité, qui defend de
s'enrichir au detriment d'autrui, et n'ayant ete réglementée par aucun texte
de nos lois, son exercice n'est soumis a aucune condition déterminée; qu'il
suffit, pour (a rendre recevable, que le demandeur allègue et offre d'établir
('existence d'un avantage qu'il aurait, par un sacrifice ou un fait personnel,
procure a celui contre lequel ii agit.
453Cour de Cassation 12-5-1914: S. 1918, I, 11:
Attendu que l'action de in rem verso, fondée sur le principe d'équité qui
defend de s'enrichir au detriment d'autrui, doit étre admise dans tous les cas
00, le patrimoine d'une personne se trouvant, sans cause legititime, enrichi
aux depends de celui d'une autre personne, cette dernière ne jouirait, Pour
obtenir ce qui lui est dO, d'aucune action naissant d'un coutrat, d'un quasi-
contrat, d'un délit ou d'un quasi-délit.
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requirements of absence of a justifiable reason and
subsidiarity were introduced. The latter requirement means
that an action for unjust enrichment is not available if
another form of action is available to the impoverished, thus
preempting an entitlement on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Further limitations followed, so that the requirements for
the action can now be summarised as follows:
on an economic level, there has to be a correlation between
the enrichment on the side of the defendant and the
impoverishment on the side of the plaintiff;
on a judicial level, there is the requirement that the
enrichment is unjustified (sans cause), which is designed to
indicate that the enrichment is not based on a contractual
relationship between the parties, between the enriched party
and a third party, or on a legal right of the enriched party
against a third party. Furthermore another action has to be
absent, or it will preempt a claim under unjust enrichment.
Starck454 identifies two obstacles that will render a claim
for unjust enrichment not actionable. The first obstacle
appears when an impoverishment is the result of one's own
fault. The second, and related, obstacle arises when there
has been interineddling 455 and the shift of assets has taken
place in the plaintiff's own interest and at his own risk, or
of his own accord and uncalled-for.
454B. Starck: Droit Civil", 2 ed. H. Roland and L. Boyer Librairies Techniques at 629-643.
455 My translation. For a definition see 3.4.1.3 above. For an explanation of the principle see
J.P. Dawson: The Self-serving Intermeddler" [19741 87 Harv.LR 14.09-1458.
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6.3.2 Unfair Competition; France.
Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code govern civil
responsibility and have been the basis for the development of
the law of unfair competition. 456 The criteria that have to be
satisfied in Art. 1382 are twofold. First of all there has to
be a wrong ('faute') committed by the defendant. In the
second place this wrong must have resulted in actual or
potential damage to the plaintiff. Art. 1383 includes also
negligence as a way of doing wrong. It has been said that in
unfair competition cases this wrong consists of a breach of
busines moral that is characterised as the principle of
-'457brotherhood, fraternite
The law of unfair competition is therefore based on a wrong.
Two distinct subsets have been recognised: 'concurrence
déloyale' and 'concurrence parasitaire' •458 where concurrence
456For an historical overview see V. Venturini: "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
in France", (1971) A.W. Slijthoff at 126-159.
457P. Le Tourneau: "Le parasitisme dans tous ses états" [1993] 42 RDS 310-414, at 310:
The brotherhood between competitors extends to a fellowship between all the
participants in economic life as a consequence of the fact that that they are
driven by an avaricious goal.
La fraternité entre concurrents so prolonge par une confraternité entre tous los intervenants des
lors qu'ils agaissent dans un but intéressé.
458A third category is recognised by some authors as an abuse of a right. See G. Dassas: "The
New French Trademark Law and the EC Harmonisation Directive. Part 2" [1991/92] 12/1
TMW 22-24 at 24, when discussion the Ritz case.
See Charles of the Ritz v. The Ritz Hotel, the Supreme Court of Paris 16 December 1982, PIBD
1982, 312, 111-271, 11983] EIPR D-124, in which Charles of the Ritz, an American
manufacturer of beauty products, lost an infringement action against the Ritz hotel, when it
started using the mark 'Ritz' on similar products. The tables were subsequently turned on
Charles of the Ritz and its trade mark was cancelled on the basis that the benefit that the little
known American producer would derive from associating with the well known Ritz hotel
amounted to parasitic behaviour.
In Hotel Ritz v. Cizarles of the Ritz, Cass, 27 May 1986, the Court de Cassation held that
Charles of the Ritz could use 'Ritz' and 'Charles of the Ritz' for cosmetics and fragrances,
because there was no abuse of a right according to the rules on civil responsibility.
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déloyale addresses issues of interference with and
obstruction of competition, concurrence parasitaire is
applicable in cases of usurpation of the plaintiff's
distinctive achievement to the defendant's benefit.
Concurrence déloyale therefore relies on a competitive nexus
between plaintiff and defendant, where concurrence
parasitaire does not. 459 Despite the fact that relief was
granted for dilution on the basis of concurrence déloyale in
the Omega case460 in the absence of a direct competitive
relationship, later case law established the necessity for
the parties to be in direct competition with one another.461
Leaving prevention of confusion aside, 462 this means that
cases of another nature, such as dilution cases, have to be
tried under the separate head of parasitic competition. 463 The
lack of a competitive nexus between parties precludes
dilution and similar cases from trial under the head of
'concurrence déloyale'.
The difference between concurrence déloyale and concurrence
459J. Le Tourneau: "Le parasitisme dans tous ses états" [1993] 42 RDS 310-414.
460CasS 3.2.1959, JCP 1959 1111000, R1PIA 1959, [1959] GRUR mt. 299, protection was
granted for the watch manufacturer against use of his mark on dissimilar goods. See B. Dutoit:
"Unlautere Ausnutzung und Beeintrachtigung des guten Rufs bekannter Marken, Namen und
Herkunftsangaben. Die Rechtslage in der Schweitz und in Frankreich." [1986] 1 GRUR mt. 1-
6.
46l Pontiac Paris 8.12.1962, Dalloz 1963, 406 and Nobel -B ozel Cass 6.1.1969, Dalloz 1969,
454., where protection under concurrence déloyale for similar marks on dissimilar goods was
confined to those cases in which there is a serious likelihood of confusion, leading to dilution.
' 2Cartier v. Plaget, Baume and Mercier Paris 19.11.1981, [1985] RIC 28 is a case of slavish
imitation of a watch, where relief was granted on the basis of confusion leading to dilution.
463See for example the use and registration of American Express for clothing, Paris 21.02.1989
RDPI n° 26 1989, 110, as referred to by G. Dassas in "The New French Trademark Law and
the EC Harmonization Directive. Part 2." [1991/92] 12/1 TMW 22-24 at 24.
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parasitaire is however not always clear.4M In the Decoras
case465 parasitic behaviour was presented as a subset of
'concurrence déloyale'. In this case a wine carafe in the
stylised form of a duck was the subject of dispute. The
subsistence of copyright could not be proved. Animal shapes
were held to be in use since antiquity and the carafe of the
plaintiff and defendant were not sufficiently similar. Relief
on the basis of 'concurrence déloyale' was nevertheless
granted, because the general form of the carafe had been
slavishly copied, as was inferred from the fact that the lack
of functional necessity for the particular shape reduced the
defendant's product to that of a degenerate version of the
one marketed by the plaintiff.
By marketing this version in the wake of the plaintiff's
product and avoiding the costs of conception, manufacturing
and those necessary to determine consumer demand on the
market, the defendants were able to offer their product at a
substantially lower price. This appropriation of the fruits
of the labour and economic risk undertaken by someone else
was held to amount to parasitic behaviour constituting
concurrence deloyale . In doing so the Court of Appeal
4 See P. Le Tourneau: "Le parasitisme dans tous ses étatf [1993] 42 RDS 310-414 at 313-
314, where he notes that the traditional distinctive elements of confusion and competitive nexus
are no longer applicable. According to Le Tourneau the jurisprudence shows that if magistrates
are confronted with particularly 'shocking' examples market behaviour, they tend to make a
judgement based on 'stained' moral arguments and term the behaviour to be parasitic.
According to Le Tourneau the judgements are short in explanation and are not justified by
argument. The only forms of 'concurrence parasitaire' he feels he can support, therefore, are
the clearly defined types of behaviour where someone's notoriety is usurped by another and
where someone's product or technique is usurped by another. This latter category is described
as slavish imitation.
' 5See Decoras and L 'Esprit du yin v. Art Metal and Marinoni Aifredi, Paris 13.6.1991, [1991]
PIBD 510 111-655.
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observed that this principle went beyond the traditional
requirement of confusion, denigration and subversion.4
In Decoras parasitic competition only indicates the type of
behaviour and does not detach parasitic behaviour from
'concurrence déloyale' on the basis that there is no
competitive nexus. This would have been impossible, since in
Decoras there is a competitive nexus. 'concurrence
parasitaire' is thus presented as a subset of 'concurrence
déloyale', that merely describes the behaviour of the
defendant.
We now return to the rule that the absence of a competitive
nexus precludes cases from being tried under 'concurrence
déloyale' and gives 'concurrence parasitaire' an independent
status. It could be inferred from the Decoras case that the
presence of a competitive nexus leads to a classification of
such cases as 'concurrence déloyale', where 'concurrence
parasitaire' serves as a mere description of the defendant's
behaviour. This is however not the case.
In Mars Alimentaire v. Aegan Trade CY and Istanbul Gida Dis
Ti caret ,467 Mars brought an action for trade mark infringement
and 'concurrence déloyale' against the defendant, who had
marketed his candy bar under the mark Metra in packs of three
of 300 grams, just like Mars did. In first instance all
claims were rejected and on appeal large parts of the initial
466Paris 13.6. 1991, [19911 PLBD 510 111-655:
Qu'iI s'est approprié les fruits des effets et des risques economiques assumes
par autrui;
Que ce comportement parasitaire est constitutif de concurrence déloyale,
celle-ci ne pouvant se réduire a Ia triade confusion, dénigrement,
désorganisation.
46TParis 17.5.1993, [19931 PIBD n° 550 111-522, [1993] 12 EIPR D-282-283.
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judgement were upheld. The case for trade mark infringement
was rejected on the basis that the marks were different in
appearance and pronunciation, so that confusion was not
likely. The claim in 'concurrence déloyale' was aimed at the
similarities in the external appearance of the products,
which consisted of packages of 300 grams in sacks with a
window in zig zag across the bag and a representation of mini
bars. The court considered that there was no risk of
confusion between the two. Furthermore the court considered
that Mars should not be allowed to appropriate and monopolize
a genre and method of packaging that is common in commerce
and a claim for 'concurrence déloyale' was dismissed
accordingly. On the parasitic question, however, the court
did find grounds for an injunction. Mars did provide evidence
of the fact that it had been selling five and three packs
since 1973 and that in 1985 it had changed its weight from
250 to 300 grams. No reason, technical or otherwise had been
advanced by Aegean and Istanbul for marketing their product
in the same type of three packs of exactly 300 grams. The
court held that by selling a similar product in the wake of
that of a competitor, the defendant had taken advantage of
the success Mars had made of its presentation over a period
of sixty years, which had led to a 42% market share in
Europe, and that this profiteering amounted to 'concurrence
parasitiare'. 4 In contrast to the Decoras case, the Mars
4 Paris 17.5.1993, [1993] PIBD n° 550 111-522:
[Em réatité Istanbut et Aegan ont entendu ainsi, pour vendre un produit
semblable a celui antérieurement commercialisé par Mars depuis soixante ans
selon Ia documentation, demarquer les presentations de I'entreprise qui détient
42% du marché européen (Le Nouvel Economiste du 13 avril 1990) afin de
tenter de profiter du succès de ce concurrent; que cette pratique parasitaire
est fautive.
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case does make a distinction between 'concurrence
parasitaire' and 'concurrence déloyale'. The absence of
distinction in Decoras and presence of distinction in Mars
can be explained by the fact that, despite the fact that they
both deal with the appearance of products, the nature of the
alleged infringement is slightly different. In factual
circumstances comparable to the Decoras case, the
appropriation of the appearance of the product could lead
primarily to confusion as to the product itself. If the
integrity of the product's shape is not protected, it could
in turn lead to confusion as to the source. Where prevention
of confusion is the prime reason for protection, 'concurrence
déloyale' is the basis for liability. If the factual
circumstances do not amount to a tort, due to lack of
confusion or absence of damage for instance, the additional
factor of parasitic behaviour can still tip the scale and
relief is available. This is where 'concurrence parasitaire'
can be mixed with 'concurrence déloyale'.
In factual circumstances comparable to the Mars case however,
the appropriation of the shape amounts to the taking of a
concept of packaging. Protection would not reflect the
prevention of identical copying and the confusion it would
bring about, but much more the protection of an achievement
that lies in the sphere of goodwill, reputation or marketing
effort. This is where the basis for liability can be found in
'concurrence parasitaire' alone.
Where the argument of a competitive nexus is used as a way to
categorise dilution cases as actionable under 'concurrence
parasitaire' as a separate and independent form of unfair
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competition, in cases where product shapes are involved, the
necessity for a competitive nexus does not appear as a factor
for classification at all. Despite the common denominator of
a competitive nexus and parasitic behaviour, the Mars and
Decoras cases display a situation in which the line between
'concurrence déloyale' and 'concurrence parasitaire' is not
distinctly drawn by the courts. The lack of clear
categorisation might seem to be an irrelevant lack of
consistency, but when it comes to remedies, it turns out to
be an unfortunate anomaly that makes the principle of
'concurrence parasitaire' vulnerable to excessive claims and
leaving it open to criticism.469
6.3.2.1 Unjust Enrichment & Unfair Competition, a Partial
Synthesis.
In order to demonstrate what is meant by the vulnerable
position of 'concurrence parasitaire', the partial synthesis
in France between unfair competition and unjust enrichment
has to be described.
For the assessment of damages in intellectual property cases,
French law relied on the principle of unjust enrichment.470
In unfair competition cases it is doing the same. 471 This form
of application of the principle of unjust enrichment is one
469See 7.4 below.
470Until legislation provided otherwise, damages in patent cases were assessed in this way.
See J.P. Stenger: "Juris-classeur, Brevets" vol 1, J.M. Mousseron ed. (1992) Editions
techniques. Fasc. 440 at 9.
471 E. Agostini: "Observations sous Paris" JCP 1986 vol II 20712.
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of restitution for wrongs, but the administration of
restitution has become equivocal. This has led to the
question whether the principle of parasitic activity is being
confused with unjust enrichment.4
This is especially true since the emphasis has shifted from
unjust enrichment as a restitutionary remedy, where
restitution is offered as a remedy for a wrong triggering the
relief, to an independent cause of action.
Despite the fact that an action for unjust enrichment is
recognised as such, preemption comes up once more.4Th Now it
is the law of unfair competition and what is covered by it
that could preempt a claim in unjust enrichment. This shows
that while the principle of unjust enrichment may be a
doctrine which is used in order to assess damages on a
restitutionary level and may even be in the back of the minds
of the judges when assessing parasitic competition cases, it
is however not the axiom that defines the scope of
'concurrence parasitiare'. A claim in unfair competition and
a claim in unjust enrichment are different in nature. Where
unfair competition, with its tortious character, allows for
full compensation, unjust enrichment only allows for recovery
of the enrichment the infringer has made or the
impoverishment the plaintiff has suffered. Tort is based on
the central notion of conduct that is actionable per se or on
proof of damage. It can be argued that in the absence of such
4 M. Goudreau: "Protecting Ideas and Information in Common Law Canada and Quebec"
[1994 8 IPJ 189-216 at 210. This position can be supported in Canada by the case of
Promotivate International Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers lid. 23 D. L. R. 4th 196; [1985111
EIPR D-202, where unjust enrichment was incorporated in unfair competition law.
4ThM . Goudreau: "Protecting Ideas and Information in Common Law Canada and Quebec"
[19941 8 IPJ 189-216 at 210.
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conduct, an action for unjust enrichment may be available.474
The cases on 'concurrence déloyale' and 'concurrence
parasitaire' show that a partial synthesis between the law of
obligations, in the form of the principles of unjust
enrichment, and unfair competition law has already taken
place, albeit unqualified and without edifice.
This lack of categorisation leads to a situation in which
'concurrence parasitiare' falls squarely between unfair
competition and unjust enrichment. To establish whether the
plaintiff has a case, the principles of unjust enrichment are
relied upon. Subsequently however the actions of the
defendant are held to be tortious. This results in the
punitive nature of the relief provided, which is comparable
to unfair competition cases.4Th Much of the resistance to
'concurrence parasitaire' can be explained on grounds of
excessive remedies. It is therefore submitted that courts
should steer clear of mixing two mismatched elements. The
relief provided in parasitic competition cases that rely on
the principle of unjust enrichment in practice should consist
of nothing more than recovery and in the more severe cases an
injunction, as in pure unjust enrichment cases.
474A. Lucas: "La Protection des Creations Industrielles Abstraites", (1975) Librairies
Techniques at 266-268 puts it even more generally in that he claims a role for unjust enrichment
when another remedy is absent. This requirement is satisfied when there is no culpable conduct.
For a descriptive account see also M. Goudreau: "Protecting Ideas and Information in Common
Law Canada and Quebec" [1994] 8 IPJ 189-216 at 212.
47'51n the Decoras case, the defendant was ordered to pay damages of 80000 F and in the Mars
case 200000 F was awarded.
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6.3.2.2 The French Draft Bill on Reserved Creations.
In the wake of the French judgeinents on parasitic
competition, a draft bill for the protection of 'reserved
creations' was presented in 1992.476 It would have amounted to
an enactment of the principle that any creation that is
capable of being exploited for profit resulting from
intellectual work, constitutes a proprietary interest
qualifying for legal protection on a temporary basis. The
draft requires that an indication of reservation be added to
the work, by means of inscription or by means of a notice,
for it to qualify for protection. Considerations of certainty
for third parties are advanced to support this requirement.
This draft bill attracted the criticism of placing inordinate
restrictions on the public domain. A limitation of
susceptibility for protection to subject matter of economic
value was advocated. 4
 Further objections were raised against
the lack of distinction between protection against public and
private use and the general broad scope of the legislation.'78
'76See C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual Property on Procrustes' Bed: Observations on a French Draft
Bill for the Protection of 'Reserved Creations'" [19921 12 EIPR 438-444, also published in
French as "La propriét intellectuelle dans le lit de Procruste: observations sur la proposition
de loi du 30 juin 1992 a Ia protection des creations réservées" Recueil Da]loz 1993, II
(Chronique) 4-8.
7'C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual Property on Procrustes' Bed: Observations on a French Draft Bill
for the Protection of 'Reserved Creations'" [1992J 12 EIPR 438-444 at 438.
478C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual Property on Procrustes' Bed: Observations on a French Draft Bill
for the Protection of 'Reserved Creations'" [1992] 12 EIPR 438-444 at 442, whilst praising the
principles underlying the Bill:
From the point of view of legal technique, the broad and approximate
borrowings from the solutions of copyright, crossbred with a little parasitic
use of patent law, result in a hybrid system of protection that is vague but
violent...
It may be concluded that this Bill, with its lack of shades of grey and its
extremely broad scope, would constitute the ruin of existing intellectual
20].
It may be argued that these objections may be overcome by
fine tuning the legislation and explaining the generalities
along parallels that can be drawn with other legislation
covering intellectual and industrial property, 479 as was
indeed proposed in the memorandum accompanying the Draft
Bill.
In this sense the proposed legislation and the objections
raised against it uncover the problems of codification of
otherwise transient and trivial subject material. It shows
that it is hardly possible to legislate exhaustively for any
other than well defined concepts such as confusion,
denigration, subversion and dilution. In order to create
certainty in the law, matters should be dealt with in extreme
detail. References to parallels with and general principles
of other intellectual property legislation are not enough
when the text of the legislation addresses subject matter in
a non-comprehensive, broad way. The ratio for protection does
not say anything about the subject matter that is dealt with.
It is in fact the other way around. Subject matter such as
trade marks, patents, designs and copyright materials, by
their distinct and diverging nature determine very much the
principles that govern their protection. Incentive to invent
and recuperation of an investment for example shape the
characteristics of the finite patent protection for an
invention, but are not transposable to the infinite
protection for a trade mark. A lot of identifiable and
property.
479The doctrine of searching for parallels between transient and trivial subject matter and
intangibles protected by intellectual and industrial property legislation is the prevalent doctrine
in The Netherlands and is applied in a restrictive manner. See 6.5.2 below.
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transient subject matter may be treated analogously to
intellectual property assets, but this does not make it a
protectable property asset. Here lies the danger of throwing
a wide cloak of legislative protection around undefined
subject matter, so disassociating transient and trivial
subject material from the general rules governing the law of
obligations and unfair competition law. Where subject matter
is taken out of the sphere of the general law of obligations
and general unfair competition provisions and is legislated
for by means of a special provision, however general the
description, the more the protection that is attributed to
this subject matter will be detached from the law of
obligations and general rules concerning unfair competition.
Where boundaries for the scope of susceptible subject matter
are not unequivocally set by legislation, statute will come
to the aid of those who wish to seek protection by giving
their achievement a cachet of property. Subject matter will
start leading its own life as property and will attract
unwarranted protection.
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6.4.1 Unjust Enrichment; Germany.
As seen in chapter 3.2, the German law on unjust enrichment
is contained in the civil code (BGB) •480 Where §812 describes
the general principle, S817 BGB provides that the recipient
of the benefit of a performance is obliged to restitute if,
in receiving the benefit, he violated a legal prohibition or
good morals. 481 The broad provisions of unjust enrichment also
allow for restitution in unfair competition cases. 482 Despite
the generality of the terminology, the law of unjust
enrichment in Germany is a highly structured field of law due
to the extensive academic writing that led to its
conception 483
480Article 8 12-822 BGB.
481 For an overview see B. Nicholas: "Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil law and Louisiana
Law" [1962] 36 Tul.LR 605-646 at 611-617; J.P. Dawson: "Erasable Enrichment in German
Law." [1981] 61 BULR 271-314; and B. Dickson: "The Law of Restitution in the Federal
Republic of Germany: A Comparison with English Law." [1987] 36 ICLQ 751-787; R.
Zimmermann and I. De Plessis: "Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified Enrichment"
[1994] RLR 15-43.
4821n German law the concept of a 'reasonable royalty' (angemessene Lizenzgebuhr) is
recognised and is now classified as an expression of the principle of unjust enrichment by the
German Supreme Court. Examples can be found in many instances of infringement. BGH 12
January 1966, [1966] GRUR 375, 'MeJ3mer-Tee II'; BGH 6 March 1980, [1980] GRUR 841,
'Tolbutamid'; BGH 24 November 1981, [19821 GRUR 301, 'Kunststofflzohlprofll If; BGH 18
December 1986, [1987] GRUR 520, 'Qzanel No.5 (1)'; BGH 22 March 1990, [1990] GRUR
1008, 'Lizenzanalogie'; BGH 22 April 1993, [1993] GRUR 757, 'Kollektion Holiday'.
483See J.P. Dawson: "Erasable Enrichment in German Law" [1981] 61 BULR 271-314, at 273-
277, where he concludes:
One does not find here the phenomenon that has transformed other large
sectors of German law - a great overlay of new standards and rules produced
by the courts, case law developed under the mantles of the 'good faith' and
'good morals' that are supplied by the so-called 'general clauses.' In this
sector, supposedly controlled by a transcendent equity, the rules are
administered not with discretion and finesse but with unyielding rigor in single-
minded pursuit of one overriding aim, that of ensuring that restitution
remedies will never extract more than their ultimate net gain from those who
had been unjustly enriched but did not know their enrichment was without
legal ground.
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A basic distinction is made between receipt by means of a
transfer 'Leistung' by another and receipt in another manner.
In the first instance the transfer is a conscious effort with
a particular purpose in mind. Liability for unjust enrichment
is accepted in this case when the purpose of the transferor
has been defeated and the legal ground for the transfer falls
away.
When receipt takes place in another way, three situations are
discerned; 'Verwendung' when unauthorised expenditure on
someone else's property has been made, 'RUckgrif' in the
fulfilment of someone else's debt and 'Eingriff' in cases of
encroachment .
This last situation is the most important for our purposes.
With the 'Eingriffskondition' liability is based on
interference with a right. It is for the court to decide
whether the legal order has ascribed the right to the
plaintiff and whether the encroachment on that right brought
about a transfer of something that should have gone to
someone else. It is therefore not necessary for the defendant
to have committed a wrong.485
The doctrine is pervaded by the notion, contained in §818
BGB, that restitution for unjust enrichment shall consist of
no more than the net gain which the enriched party obtained
and that, in case of the enrichment being acquired by someone
4&R Zimmermann and J. De Plessis: "Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified
Enrichment" [1994] RLR 15-43 at 25:
Broadly stated, Leistungskondition, Ráckgriffskondition and
Verwendungskondition are quasi-contractual in nature, while the
Eingriffskondition provides quasi-delictual and vindicatory relief.
485R. Zimniermann and J. De Plessis: "Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified
Enrichment" 11994] RLR 15-43 at 26-27.
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unaware of the fact that the enrichment was unjustified, the
requirement for restitution shall not exceed the net gain
surviving at the time the enriched party became aware of the
fact that it had been unjustly acquired. This means that the
liability arising out of unjust enrichment can diminish or
even be erased completely reflecting the possibilities of
loss or depreciation of the asset that was acquired. 4 This
principle was introduced with the aim to protect those whose
enrichment was obtained innocently. This makes it of
importance to establish at what point someone can be fixed
with knowledge, for in its turn knowledge fixes liability.
This means that as soon as the enriched party is aware of the
fact that the benefit he has incurred may be unjustified,
liability can no longer diminish or vanish. Instigation of an
action by the plaintiff is enough, regardless of the merits
of the case.487
Knowledge is also of importance to determine the extent and
scope of liability. As such §816 BGB allows for an account of
profits made as a result of the enrichment. This type of
liability can, however, only be enforced against those who
have consciously enriched themselves at the expense of
another by committing a wrong. This makes the liability one
that is restitution for a wrong, where the wrong has to be
proven independently. The mere fact that the defendant knew
that an action in unjust enrichment is likely to succeed does
not extend his liability beyond reimbursement of the deprived
'R. Zimmermann and J. De Plessis: "Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified
Enrichment" [1994] RLR 15-43 at 38-40.
4878 18(4) BGB.
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party.
In the third place knowledge has been and still is to a large
extent of importance for the question of whether an
obligation in unjust enrichment arises in the first place.
Here the state of mind of the defendant is of importance to
assess whether the defendant was aware of the fact that a
benefit was conferred on him to which he was not entitled.4
Awareness is in this sense construed widely, but is
overshadowed by the principle that the knowledge is required
to fix the otherwise erasable enrichment obtained by an
'innocent' receiver. This leads to a direct link between the
general provision of §812 BGB and the limitation of erasement
contained in §818 BGB, through which the principle of
erasement dominates the establishment of liability.
The requirement that the enriched party's knowledge has to be
actual knowledge to fix liability leads to a position in
which liability never exceeds the receiver's ultimate net
gain. Where the gain is hard to establish or non existent,
liability has been erased. 490
 Since any liability based on
4 J.P. Dawson: "Erasable Enrichment in German Law." [1981] 61 BULR 271-314 at 310-312
exemplifies this principle with the case of Pilfered Plane Ride BGH 1971 NJW 1971, 609,
where a youngster extended his airline trip from Munich to Hamburg with a return flight, due
to a lack of visa, to New York without paying for this last leg of the journey. As a minor he
could not be sued on contract and liability was imposed on the grounds of unjust enrichment,
despite the fact that no augmentation in the estate of the teenager could be shown. It was held
that he should be treated as if he had saved the airfare that other passengers had paid, because
the boy was aware of the fact that the airline was rendering him a service to which he was not
entitled.
489jp Dawson: "Erasable Enrichment in German Law." [1981] 61 BULR 271-3 14 at 278.
"90J. p . Dawson: "Erasable Enrichment in German Law." [1981] 61 BULR 271-314. Who
exemplifies at 312-313 the anomaly this overpowering principle brings about with a case (.1W
1911, 756 (RG 1910)) involving a drilling contract for a specified depth. The plaintiff did not
proceed to drill to the required depth, due to a breach of contract by the defendant. At the time
the defendant acquired the would be benefit, he did not know he was incurring a liability to
remunerate and was 'innocent'. The plaintiff's action in unjust enrichment was dismissed. It was
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knowledge resembling constructive knowledge means that the
receiver was previously 'innocent', the liability is always
open to erasure and the net gain on the part of the defendant
might be zero. Liability can be erased491 without any regard
for the plaintiff's loss.
Recent developments point to a separation of the assessment
of liability on the basis of §812 from the assessment of the
extent of liability on the basis of §818.492 This would make
liability based on constructive knowledge possible, but the
extent of liability will still be subject to erasure.
held that the incomplete hole did not add to the value of the land, so that the defendant had not
been enriched. He was therefore freed from liability. Seen in historic perspective, this leads
Dawson to conclude at 314:
It will be much harder to change the underlying misdirection that was given
to the German law of restitution by the Code provision that concentrates
attention and concern on those virtuous persons who were unaware that
gains they were receiving were by law unjustified. This one-sided view came
from the nineteenth century Pandectists who revealed in this way their tender
hearts, hidden behind a stem façade. The view was one-sided because it took
no account of the other side in what has for centuries been conceived as a
two-sided relation - enrichment acquired at the expense of another. This
ancient conception of enrichment has never required that the loss and the gain
must coincide, but for the enrichment to be considered unjust, it will ordinarily
be essential that the 'other' be in some way deprived. Nor does it seem that
the theorists who conceived this special protection for the pure of heart could
have given much thought to the sources from which restitution claims
ordinarily arise. Most claims are brought to recover gains that the one
enriched had originally requested in an attempted exchange that had
miscarried, or had simply taken without any contract at all, but that in either
case had come from the other, the loser...
An encompassing principle of exoneration that ensures against any loss all
those who do not know that the gain they desired aud acquired at another's
expense will have to be restored, therefore seems to show a basic though
well-meaning confusion of thought.
491 B Dickson: "The Law of Restitution in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparison
with English Law." [1987] 36 ICLQ 75 1-787 at 785 lists the three limitations of the defence:
1) The defendant has disposed of the net gain after he learned about the lack of justification.
2) The defendant used the gain to save expenses he would otherwise have incurred. 3) The sum
paid by the defendant to obtain the net gain is disregarded, so that the enrichment is not lost if
he paid more for it than its worth.
492R Zimmermann and J. De Plessis: "Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified
Enrichment" [1994] RLR 15-43 at 39-40 point out that the practical application and theoretical
justification of the separation of liability from the extent of liability remains controversial.
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6.4.2 Unfair Competition; Germany.
German unfair competition law 493 is highly regulated by
specific provisions contained in the Act against Unfair
Competition (UWG). Two general provisions 494 however form the
basis for an extensive body of case law. §1 UWG works as an
umbrella article under which it is possible to award
supplementary protection of industrial property rights once
a breach of 'good morals' has been established. As such the
requirement to pay damages as a penalty for breach of good
morals is an importation into unfair competition law of the
principles of the German Civil Code, where in §826 this
link is firmly established. 496 Supplementary protection is
however subject to preemption from intellectual property
legislation and will only be awarded in exceptional
circumstances.
493See 1.2.2.2 above.
494Section 1 UWG:
Any person who, in the course of business activity for purposes of
competition, commits acts contrary to honest practices, may be enjoined from
these acts and held liable for damages.
Section 3 UWG:
Any person who, in the course of business activity for purposes of
competition, makes deceptive statements concerning business matters, in
particular concerning the nature, the origin, the manner of manufacture, or the
pricing of individual goods or commercial services or of the offer as a whole,
concerning price lists., the manner or the source of acquisition of goods,
concerning the possession of awards, concerning the occasion or purpose of
the sale, or concerning the size of the available stock may be enjoined from
making such statements.
495 A general provision describing tort.
496w Gloy: "Die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts und seiner Nebengebiete" in
"Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hundertjahrigen
Bestehen der Deutchen Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer
Zeitschrift", F.K.Beier, A.Kraft, G.Schricker and E. Wadle ed. (1991) VCH, 855-896 at 884.
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6.4.2.1 Slavish Imitation and Other Forms of Appropriation.
As far as the facts of the case are concerned, the scope of
§1 is confined to those cases in which there is direct
reproduction, or imitation, identical copying, or similar
imitation and imitation of technical or aesthetic products.497
Furthermore the scope of protection is limited by concepts
such as confusion with regards to origin, exploitation of
reputation and obstructive practices. 498 Demands are also made
with respect to the subject material. For cases of slavish
imitation - be it whole or partial reproduction - of
products, 499 or appropriation of goodwill, advertising and
other achievements, a minimum level of commercial originality
or distinctiveness is required.50°
In cases of direct reproduction and identical copying, courts
are willing to find 'special circumstances' quite readily,
because there is a lack of creative effort on the part of the
497For a comparative overview of German, Italian, French and Spanish law see J.M. Otero
Lastres : "Zur Rechtsfigur der skavischen Nachahmung" [1986] GRUR mt. 232-239.
498HC Salger: "Germany, Passing Off: Protection against Imitations under the Unfair
Competition Act" in "WIPO Guidebook: Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and
Switzerland", B. Rüster ed. (1991) Matthew Bender at 6-7, §6C.
4 For slavish imitation see K.H. Fezer: "Weube erbsrechtliche Schutz der unternemerischen
Leistung" in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum
hundertjahrigen Bestehen der Deutchen Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift", F.K. Beier, A .Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed.
(1991) VCH, 939-970 at 961-964.
500BGH 27 January 1983, (1983] GRUR 377-379 'Bro,nbeer-Muster' (The case dealt with
copying of a blackberry design on cloth), in which the Supreme Court considered that copying
as such is not prohibited, but that a level of commercial originality provided an additional
circumstance of fact that could render appropriation tortious. See in this respect also BGH 6
February 1986, (1986] GRUR 673 'Beschlagprogramm', in which the same was considered for
a line of furniture fittings and mountings that gave a uniform finish to the products.
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defendant. 501 In cases of imitation, the proximity between
original and copy is of importance, as well as the question
whether the original actually served as a model for the
imitation. Knowledge on the part of the defendant is a
requirement in this matter. Marketing of the product prior to
the alleged imitation will lead the courts to infer knowledge
on the part of the defendant, since the original is assumed
to be known to the respective trade. The requirement of
commercial originality or distinctiveness of the subject
matter interlocks with the knowledge requirement in this
respect. A defence based on unconscious imitation is
therefore not available.502
Once these subjective requirements that determine whether
actionable parasitic behaviour has in fact been committed
have been satisfied, the objective requirement of confusion
still has to be satisfied. Here several limitations are
applicable.
German law distinguishes between confusion as to the
products, or achievements, and confusion as to the source
from which the product or achievement emanates. 503 Leaving
systematic large scale copying aside, similarity between
products leading to the possibility of confusion between the
501 See V. Emmerich: "Das Recht des unlautereri Wettbewerbs, 3 ed. (1990) C.H.Beck
Verlag, 145-160, especially at 154-156.
502i Emmerich: "Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs", 3 ed. (1990) C.H.Beck Verlag,
at 148.
503J.M. Otero Lastres: "Zur Rechtsfigur der skavischen Nachahmung" [1986] GRUR hit. 232-
239 at 235 and P. StrObele: "Verwechslungsgefahr und Schutzuinfang" in "Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht in Deutschland, Festschrift zum hundertjahrigen Bestehen der
Deutchen Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift",
F.K. Beier, A. Kraft, G. Schricker and E. Wadle ed. (1991) VCH, 822-854 at 822-824.
211
products themselves does not lead to actionable confusion.
Only the risk of confusion of the public as to the source of
the product in question satisfies the requirements. Confusion
as to source can consist of actual confusion, or an
impression of an organisational or business connection. This
restriction has a far reaching implication in that it leads
to a confinement of the scope of protection for cases
involving exploitation of another's reputation to similar
products and marks. 504 Successful dilution 505 cases506 , for
example, were decided on the basis of missed licensing
opportunities on the basis of famous marks. This reveals that
the act of exploitation of another's reputation as such is
considered to be fair conduct in business. In order to
establish liability an additional factor has to be present.
That additional factor can be found in the damage that is
likely to occur when licensing opportunities are lost.
In Rolls-Royce, an advertising campaign by Jim Beam whiskey
featuring the bonnet of a Rolls Royce was held to exploit the
fame of the automobile's mark. In the Dimple case the Supreme
Court (BGH) held that there was a case for dilution where the
use of the mark Dimple was on perfumeries on the basis that
cosmetics were, albeit not similar to whisky, of a class that
504See M. Lehmann: "Die wettbewerbswiedrige Ausnutzung und Beeinträchtigung des guten
Rufs bekaniner Marken, Namen und Herkunftsangaben" [1986] GRUR mt. 6-17. For the
protection of famous marks see also H. Ruijsenaars: "Die Verwertung des Wettbewerbs
bekannter Marken durch den Markeninhaber" [1988] GRUR mt. 385-394.
505First recognised in the Quick case BGH [1959J GRUR 182-186.
See also G. Schricker: "Protection of Famous Trademarks against Dilution in Germany" [1979]
11 IIC 166.
506BGH 9 December 1982, 11983] GRUR 247 Rolls Royce and BGH 29 November 1984,
[1985] GRUR 552 Dimple.
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could blur the reputation of the whisky. Cleaning and
whetting products were, however, held not to be in that
category. This was because the reputation of whisky could,
due to a lack of similarity between the products, not be
transferred to these products. Exploitation of the reputation
is therefore not possible. Association in the minds of the
public alone is not enough for a successful case and a high
level of similarity between goods is required over and above
the fame of the mark. 507 In Camel Tours 508 relief for the use
by the defendant of the Camel mark for travel services was
denied. The consumer associated the mark with the Orient and
took tours on a camel literally and few people thought of
cigarettes. This might be due to the corporate image that is
portrayed in Camel's well known advertising campaigns,
portraying adventure, exotic and far away countries. 509 For
ornamental burlesque use of a mark on dissimilar goods relief
under §1 UWG is not available. The basis is that the consumer
would not think the plaintiff would ever employ his mark in
507D. Ohigart: "Gebrauch der Marke eines Dritten ohne Verwechslungsgefahr" [1989] GRUR
mt. 211-2 13, who concludes that the Dimple decision entails that protection without likelihood
of confusion, but on the basis of exploitation of another's reputation is possible, even where
the mark is not well known (less than 50% of the population was familiar with the mark). This
leaves scope for development of protection on the basis of dilution.
See for a possible confirmation of this view AIPPI Annuaire 1993/Ill at 5.
508BGH 2 April 1987, [1987] GRUR 711.
509See H. RuijsenaarsflDie Verwertung desWettbewerbs bekannter Marken durch den
Markeninhaber" [1988] GRUR mt. 385-394 at 388, where he tries to get around the decision
by pointing at the practice of licensing, which might lead to a heightened risk of dilution:
But how should the decision be when, for example, licenses had been granted
to producers of exotic drinks and a third party would come with a product
that would not conform to the image of the mark, for example Camel for felt
slippers? In that case I would think the 'danger of dilution' to be more
increased.
Abet wie ware nun zu entscheiden, wenn z.B. Lizenzen vergeben wären an Hersteller von
exotischen Gotränken urid am Dritter kame mit einem Produkt, das nicht mit dem Image dar marke
harrnonisiert. z.B. Camel für Filzpantoffeln? Dann erscheint mir die 'Verwàsserungsgefahr' umso
grãJer.
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such a way, confusion is therefore absent.510
For matters of unfair competition involving the exploitation
of another's achievement confusion and the resulting damage
are the determining factors which render the defendant's
behaviour unfair. Once it is unfair, good morals are offended
and relief in the form of an injunction, compensation or
damages is available. This has left little scope for the
doctrine of unjust enrichment to play a role of importance in
unfair competition matters, other than as a restitutionary
remedy for wrongs. As an independent source for action in
unfair competition cases it is virtually non existent.511
6.4.2.2 Unjust Enrichment & Unfair Competition, a Partial
Synthesis.
Whilst there is limited scope for the establishment of
tortious liability in unfair competition cases, the common
practice of awarding relief on the basis of analogy to
licensing practice 'angemessene LizenzgebUhr' as a remedy for
510B6H, [1986] GRUR 759 'BMW.
511 V. Emmerich: "Das Recht des unlauteren Wetthewerbs", 3 ed. (1990) C.H.Beck Verlag,
at 368:
The dismissive attitude of the practice deserves approval on principle, because
with general permission of this condition for intervention in competition law
there would undoubtedly be the danger that, to the disadvantage of free
competition, new exclusion rights would be created. In a system of free and
fair competition it is however hard to empathize with the idea, that a
competitor should enjoy a so far reaching protection for a position reached in
commerce, that he deserves enrichment claims for infringement.
Die ablehnende Ilaltung der Praxis verdient grundsatzlich Zustimmung. wail bei aulgemeiner
Zulassung der Eingnffskondiktion im Wettbewerbsrecht unverkennbar die Gefahr bestunde, da
schlieBlich zum Nachteil des freien Wettbewerbs neue AusschlieBlichkeitsrechte geschatfen
wUrden. In einem System frelen und fairen Wettbewerbs ist ohnehin due Vorstellung nur schwer
nachzuvollziehen. dali em Gewerbetreibender für die im Wettbewerb cinmal erlangte Position
einen so weitgehenden Schutz genueen soUte, da ihm bel Eungnffen Bereicherungsansprüche
zustehen.
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intellectual property infringement 512 has recently been
expanded to cover unfair competition cases in general.513
Whereas the practice of awarding damages on the basis of an
account of profits or actual damage is subject to proof, the
reward of a reasonable license fee or royalty is based on a
different principle. In many ways payment of a reasonable
license fee is not so much based on proof of damage, but on
restitutionary principles. It is a form of relief which is
awarded on the basis that the defendant has, by his
appropriative actions, eluded the payment of royalties and
has so enriched himself at the expense of the plaintiff. The
fact that the plaintiff would never have consented to grant
a license can make it hard or even impossible to assess the
height of the sum. The lack of licensing practice, or the
presence of a licensing practice deviating from common
practice, could then give the defendant a powerful defence,
since actual damage is impossible to prove, or much lower.
Subsequent case law demonstrates however that the imposition
of 'angemessene Lizenzgebühr' is more far reaching in that
fictitious 'damage' is inf erred regardless of the fact
512BGH 13 March 1962, [1962] GRUR 401-406 'Kreuzbodenventilsacke II! (Patent
infringement); BGH 12 January 1966, [1966] GRUR 375-379, 'MeJimer-Tee It (Trade mark
infringement); BGH 6 March 1980, [19801 GRUR 841-843, 'Tolbutamid' (Patent infringement);
BGH 24 November 1981, [1982] GRUR 301-305, 'Kunststoff-Hohlprofil If (Design
infringement); BGH 18 December 1986, 119871 GRUR 520-524, 'Clzane! No.5 fl)'(Trade mark
infringement); BGH 22 March 1990, [19901 GRUR 1008-1010, 'Lizenzanalogie' (Copyright
infringement).
See the presiding judge at the BGH Frhr. O.F. Von Gamm: "Neuere Rechtsprechung zum
Wettbewerbs- und Warenzeichenrecht" [19891 GRUR 377-388.
513BGH 22 April 1993 [19931 GRUR 757, 'Kollektion Holiday'.
See G. Leisse and F. Traub: Schadensschatzung im unlauteren Wettbewerb" [19801 GRUR 1-
14, who at 11 even provide a formula to calculate various forms of damages.; and also U. Hell
and M. Roos: TM Zur dreifachen Schadenberechnung bei Ubernahme sonderrechtlich nicht
geschützter Leistungen" [1994] GRUR 26-31.
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whether actual damages can be shown. The emphasis has shifted
from payment of a reasonable license fee to payment of a
reasonable royalty.
This development finds its genesis in 1971 in a case where
the slavish imitation of wall sockets was held to be the
basis for liability and calculation of damages of the basis
of lost licensing revenue was perniitted. 514 Since liability in
damages in cases of slavish imitation is accepted on the
basis of analogy with infringement of statutory protectable
interests, the Court also allowed for licensing analogy on
that basis, thus implying a limitation in the application of
compensation assessment on the basis of a reasonable
royalty. 515 In subsequent cases involving bronze jewellery of
leaf and flower design516 and a chestnut knitting pattern,517
neither of which were susceptible to copyright protection,
the analogous nature of slavish imitation as a basis for
liability and statutory protectable interests was underlined.
In the jewellery case the action failed due to the lack of
direct competitive nexus; the trader and not the manufacturer
(the trader's mother) of the jewellery in question brought
action. The chestnut knitting pattern case is complicated due
514BGH 8 October 1971, [1972] GRUR 189-192, 'Wandsteckdose H'.
Please note that slavish imitation forms the basis for liability and lost licencing revenue was
accepted as a means to calculate damages. This is a similar, yet different application of the
norm of loss of licensing opportunity. Loss of licensing opportunity is however used in the
assessment of liability in dilution cases. See 6.4.2.1 above.
55See U. Heil and M. Roos: Zur dreifachen Schadenberechnung bei Ubernahme
sonderrechtlich nicht geschutzter Leistungen" [1994] GRUR 26-3 1 at 29; and Hefermehi's case
comment [1972] GRUR 191-192.
516BGH 18 October 1990, [1991] GRUR 223-226, 'Finnischer Schmuck'.
517BGH 23 May 1991, [1991] GRUR 914-9 17, 'Kastanienmuster'.
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to the fact that it has two defendants. The plaintiff was a
designer in exclusive clothing and sold the chestnut
pullover, manufactured from wool and silk, at a price of 1000
DM. The first defendant was a retailer and the second
defendant the importer of the pullovers with the chestnut
designs in question. At the request of the retailer, the
second defendant imported 1245 of the same pullovers, but now
manufactured from wool and viscose, and sold most of them on
to the first defendant at a price of 82 DM. The importer also
sold some at 71 DM to a third party. The trader sold 501
pullovers at a price of 179 DM before the plaintiff became
aware of the situation. The retailer, without accepting
liability, undertook to pay 15000 DM for the imitation of
another model and paid the plaintiff 4000 DM for the chestnut
design in an attempt to settle and sent 463 unsold pullovers
back to the importer, who remitted money to the retailer. The
importer then sold his total remaining stock of 547 pullovers
at a price of 40 DM to a third party.
The plaintiff submitted that the defendants had slavishly
imitated the design and had thus acted unfairly in the sense
of S 1 UWG and demanded the sum of 35000 DM from the retailer
and 11949 DM from the importer in damages or at least in
unjust enrichment.
In first instance the retailer was ordered to pay 22606,07
DM. The importer was ordered to pay 8889 DM. On appeal the
verdict was quashed and only the importer was ordered to pay
4200 DM on the basis of 'angemessene Lizenzgebühr'' 518
 in
compensation for the 547 pullovers sold after the plaintiff
518The calculation was based on a turnover license of 10% and a price of 76 DM per item.
217
had asserted a claim in the design.
The Supreme Court upheld the verdict and considered several
aspects of liability, knowledge and their relation with
damages and unjust enrichment. As far as the retailer was
concerned, the Supreme Court upheld the consideration of the
Court of Appeal that the 'immoral' behaviour of the defendant
could not be subjectively determined. It considered that for
liability to be accepted on the basis of §1 UWG, subjective
knowledge of those circumstances is required, which, if
objectively recognised, establishes the tortious nature of
violating acts. It is enough that the alleged infringer takes
into account those circumstances that could render his
actions tortious, or if he consciously shuts himself off from
or shirks knowledge. Where liability can be accepted on the
basis that the alleged infringer took into account that his
actions might objectively result in a tortious act, the tort
itself does not automatically presume blame and therefore
also does not automatically lead to the award of damages. For
liability in damages it is necessary to ascribe those damages
to the defendant on the basis of the knowledge that his
actions would be likely to cause damage.
The Court of Appeal had held as a matter of fact that the
plaintiff had not shown that the retailer should have known
had been informed of the fact that the pullover was an
imitation. The Supreme Court therefore held that the Court of
Appeal could justifiably have concluded that the defendant
had not counted on the possibility that his action might be
tortious and that he had not consciously disregarded
knowledge. The Supreme Court also held that lack of knowledge
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due to carelessness was not a sufficient basis for liability
in damages. Prima facie liability was denied on these
grounds, so that also the claim in damages had to fail.
As to the claim in unjust enrichment as a remedy for a wrong,
the Supreme Court confirmed the view that without prima .facie
liability, this action had to fail as well. The Supreme Court
did not therefore have to consider the question whether
guiltless liability, once accepted, could lead to an action
in unjust enrichment.
As far as the importer was concerned, the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and dismissed the
plaintiff's assertion that a designer's honorarium of 30000
DM should have been taken into account in the calculation of
the reasonable royalty. The Court of Appeal's assessment that
such a honorarium is not customary in licensing practice was
not contended and the Supreme Court added that the plaintiff
had conceded the fact that it would only have asked for a
designer's fee if it had not produced the model itself. The
fact that the plaintiff had never and, by his own admission,
would never grant a license in any case, was also taken into
account in this respect.
It is once again important to notice that liability for
damages in slavish imitation cases is established on a basis
of comparability of the legal position with that of statutory
protected intangibles. This means that the subject material
at the centre of the dispute has to be comparable with those
protected by statute. The question whether calculation of
awards could take place on the basis of a reasonable royalty
for other forms of protectable achievements was unclear.
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In the case of Kollektion Holiday, 519 prima facie liability
for slavish imitation of men's upper garments was
established. The defendant had seen the proposed new line of
clothing and had copied it. The Court of Appeal had denied
calculation on the basis of a reasonable royalty on the
grounds that the competitive characteristic nature of the
textiles was relatively low, so that the achievement could
not be compared with those protected by statute.
The Supreme Court relied on the Wandsteckdose II
jurisprudence and held, considering the Kastanienrauster case,
that the calculation on the basis of a reasonable royalty
could be used in all cases where achievements, not protected
by statute, were appropriated. 520 The Supreme Court also
confirmed the view of the Court of Appeal that, once one
particular form of calculation has been chosen, other forms
of calculation are not precluded.521
The practice of awarding a reasonable royalty as an
519[19931 GRUR 757-760.
520u. Hell and M. Roos: "Zur dreifachen Schadenberechnung bei Ubernahme sonderrechtlich
nicht geschützter Leistungen" [19941 GRUR 26-31 from 30 consider the implications of the
extension of calculations for damages on a threefold basis (actual damages, account of profit and
license analogy) from slavish imitation of intangibles comparable to statutory protected
intangibles to all slavish imitation cases and perhaps also breach of confidence, confidential
information and pirating of plans. Despite the fact that some problems in the assessment remain
in the field of know how, they support the general applicability of threefold damage assessment.
52l in this respect also Proftesrechnerl, BGH 18 February 1977, 119771 GRUR 539-543,
in which licence analogy was accepted for unfair appropriation of business secrets; and
Tchibo/Rolex II, BGH 17 June 1992, [1993] GRUR 55-60, which dealt with slavish imitation
of watches and allowed a switch of claim from one form of calculation to another, thus
qualifying Proflesrechner L
See also T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, voldoening van een redelijke gebruiksvergoeding
en winstafdracht bij inbreuk op intellectuele eigendomsrechten" (with and summary in English)
Diss. (1994) Kluwer at 155, who is of the opinion that, If compensation is assessed on a
cumulative basis, the account of profits needs to be subtracted from the reasonable royalty.
This is in my view correct, since it expresses the unjust enrichment nature of the reasonable
royalty.
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alternative of damage assessment displays a partial synthesis
between unfair competition and unjust enrichment law. Despite
the fact that unjust enrichment is recognised in both
literature and jurisprudence as the principle underlying
'angeniessene Lizenzgebühr', it is remarkable that this form
of restitution is placed in the category of liability for
damages. 'Angemessene LizenzgebUhr' is presented merely as an
option in the calculation of damages and its unjust
enrichment nature is therefore obscured.
The general statement that the principle of damage assessment
on the basis of a reasonable royalty is available for all
appropriation cases does on the other hand allow for further
integration of the principle of unjust enrichment in unfair
competition law. This leads to a situation where cases in
which the presence of damages form a main component in the
assessment of prima tacie tortious liability are decided on
the basis of the theory of unjust enrichment. In view of the
rigorous constraints that dominate the field of German unjust
enrichment law, the lack of clear categorisation of the
'angemessene LizenzgebUhr' as anything other than a remedial
form of damages could be explained.
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6.5.1 Unjust Enrichment; The Netherlands.
The principle of unjust enrichment is enshrined in the Dutch
Civil Code. 522 The provision in the Civil code is the
enactment of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Quint/Te
Poe1 523 in which an open system for sources of obligations on
the basis of analogy with statutory protection was
accepted, 524 comparable to developments in surrounding
countries, especially in France. 525 Despite the influence of
French law however, a general action of unjust enrichment
unifying the specific remedies provided by statute was not
accepted by the Supreme Court. In the Civil Code of 1992 a
general provision was finally included, bringing the
522For an overview of the legislation see [1994] RLR 203-207, especially at 205:
Article 6:2 12 of the 1992 Civil Code describes a general action:
1. A person who has been unjustifiably enriched at the expense of another is
obliged, so far as reasonable, to make good the other's loss, up to the amount
of his enrichment.
2. An enrichment shall be discounted to the extent that it is decreased by reason of
circumstances for which the person enriched is not answerable.
3. An enrichment shall be discounted to the extent that it is decreased during a time in
which the person enriched could not as a reasonable person be expected to take into
consideration the existence of an obligation to make good the other's loss. The
calculation of this decrease must include expenses which would not have been incurred
but for the enrichment.
This replaces a similar, albeit not so comprehensibly codified, provision in the old civil code.
523HR 30 January 1959, NJ 1959, 548. For an appraisal of the case see E. Schrage:
"Restitution in the New Dutch Civil Code" [19941 RLR 208-221 at 216-218.
524	 G. Samuel and J. Rinkes: "The English Law of Obligations in Comparative Context"
(199 1) Ars Aequi Libri at 37-40.
525Arguments for introduction of the principle predominantly based on Roman law were swept
away in the wake of utilitarianism. See A. De Savorin Lohman: "Over de regten van den
uitvinder" Themis 1862, at 213-278 and TM Grond en omvang van het regt van schrijver en
uitvinder" 1870 Bijdragen tot de kennis van het staats-, provinciaal- en gemeentebestuur in
Nederlarid, Deel XVI, Nieuwe serie.
Reception analogous to predominantly French developments proved more successful. See M.
Bregstein: "Ongegronde vermogensvermeerdering" Diss. (1927) H.J. Paris; and A. Biegman-
Hartogh: "Ongegronde verrijking" Diss. (1971) Van Gorcum & Co. N.y.
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legislation in line with other European statutes.526
The principle has influenced the shaping of intellectual
property and unfair competition law in The Netherlands. 527 At
a time when a utilitarian approach towards intellectual
property was prevalent, 528 arguments were also raised to
expand the foundation of intellectual property law from mere
service of the common good to concepts of justice. Unjust
enrichment was advocated as the interface that could provide
a determinative tool to shape this foundation. 529 In his
writings on unjust enrichment from 1870, De Savorin Lohman
went even further and described the doctrine as the
determinative factor in the determination of the scope of
protection for the intellectual property rights which was
based on the right to pay for one's labour. 530 This leads to
a position where every enrichment at the expense of another
is unjust, unless a justification can be found. Despite
criticism that this position is too extreme, 531 a qualified
526For a recent appreciation see E. Schrage: "Restition in the New Dutch Civil Code" E1994]
RLR 208-221.
527For a general overview see Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming en Ongeschreven
Intellectual Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 171-174.
528The patent law of the time was abolished, only to be reintroduced in 1910.
529See A. De Savorin Lohman: "Over de regten van den uitvinder" Themis 1862, at 2 13-278
and "Grond en omvang van het regt van schrijver en uitvinder" 1870 Bijdragen tot de kennis
van het staats-, provinciaal- en gemeentebestuur in Nederland, Dee! XVI, Nieuwe serie.
530De A. Savorin Lohman: "Grond en omvang van het regt van schrijver en uitvinder" 1870
Bijdragen tot de kennis van het staats-, provinciaal- en gemeentebestuur in Nederland, Dee!
XVI, Nieuwe serie., 17-47, 52-7 1.
531 See H. Pfeffer: "Grondbegrippen van Nederlansch Mededingingsrecht", (1938) DeErven F.
Bohn N. y., Who at 288-290 expresses his doubts about the practical application of this
principle as advocated by Bodenhausen in [1937J BIE 25 at 29 with regards to slavish imitation.
In Pfeffer's view a cumulation of elements that make up a tort can not be separated, so that an
act can not be assessed on the basis of unjust enrichment alone. His example is that slavish
imitation leads to confusion and the confusion arises out of slavish imitation.
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application of this principle can be found in the doctrine of
slavish imitation.532
More recently the doctrine has been mentioned as the basis
for a form of compensation on the basis of a reasonable
royalty for use in cases where appropriation of intangibles
of intellectual property has taken place.533
6.5.2 Unfair Competition; The Netherlands.
As far as the protection of achievements is concerned, the
general rule is that a competitor is at liberty to use the
efforts of another competitor, as long as there is no
protection under one of the specified Intellectual Property
Acts. The general exception to this rule is that actions that
lead to the creation of confusion in the marketplace are
prohibited. One other exeption stems from the idea that one
can not take inappropriate advantage of the results of the
efforts of competitors. Current classification in The
Netherlands recognises that there are three ways in which it
is possible to profit from or latch on to another's
achievement.534
The first is by means of 'direct exploitation'. This is a
situation in which the achievement of another is incorporated
in the achievement or product that is marketed.
532See 6.5.2.2.1 below for the Supreme court's ruling in Hyster Karry Krane, HR 26-7-1953;
NJ 1954, 90.
533T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, voldoening van een redelijke gebruiksvergoeding en
winstafdracht bij inbreuk op intellectuele eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer at 152-157.
van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming: een tip van de sluier?" [1986] 10 BIE 263 at 269-
270.
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The second is 'indirect exploitation', a situation in which
a substantial element of another's achievement is embodied in
the achievement or product that is marketed.
And finally by means of 'mere profiting or taking advantage'
of someone else's achievement. This is a situation in which
profit is drawn from the fact that an achievement has
significance only because of another's achievement.
The crucial element that makes identifiable subject matter
protectable is the exploitation of it. This means that there
has to be immediate commercial use. For badges of trade the
significance will lie in the use as a distinctive sign or the
goodwill associated with it. 535
 Furthermore, the achievement
is required to be comparable with those that are justifiably
protected. This equation leads to an invocation of the
justifications that underlie protection awarded by the
various intellectual property acts.
The foundation for this doctrine is the rulings by the Dutch
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in Decca/Holland Nautic,536
KPVB/NOS537 , Staatsdrukkerij /Den Ouden 538 and 3MG/Boo gaard.539
In the Decca case the Hoge Raad warned against awarding
protection for achievements comparable to intellectual
property rights. These cases are subsequently referred to as
the 'caveat cases'.
535Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming en ongeschreven intellectual eigendomsrechten',
(1994) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 139 and 181.
536HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987, 191; [1987] 3 EIPR D-50.
537HR 23 October 1987, NJ 1988, 310.
538HR 20 November 1987, NJ 1988, 311.
539HR 24 February 1989, NJ 1989, 701 (Elvis Presley).
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Where the act can only be described as a mere capitalization
on another's achievement, protection of the prior achievement
is not possible, even if this would amount to a loss for the
plaintiff. Only in special cases, 540 on the basis of
additional circumstances, is protection available.541
6.5.2.1 The Caveat Cases.
Common to the caveat cases was that they all involved
appropriation of an achievement that can be categorised as
results of labour, skill and money.542
The facts of the Decca case involved the marketing by Holland
Nautic of specialised equipment to receive signals from a
worldwide network for radio-navigation, called the 'Decca
Navigator System'. The transmitted information together with
a read only memory system in the equipment enables a ship to
calculate its location at sea. In order to maintain the
transmitter network around the world that were owned by
540An example of protection that extends beyond the scope of exploitation is codified in Article
13A of the Benelux Trade Marks Act 1975, where protection against dilution is awarded
through the notion of 'likelihood of association'. This principle has now found its way into
trade mark legislation of the EU member states.
See A. Kamperman Sanders: "Dilution - The Parting of Ways?" [19921 3 MIP 42-43 and "Some
Frequently Asked Questions about the Trade Marks Act 1994" [1995] 2 EIPR 67-74.
van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming en ongeschreven intellectual eigendomsrechten"
(1994) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 180:
This leads to the fact that for this category - otherwise that for the
exploitation of identifiable immaterial objects - only a casuistic approach is
possible. This casuistic approach characterises itself by a weighing of the
'facts of the case'. In contrast with the category of the exploitation of
identifiable immaterial objects, rules have not (yet) been realised for this
weighing process as a matter of principle, and protection on a par with an
intellectual property right can not directly be awarded. (translation)
542D Verkade: "Ongeoorloofde Mededinging" 2' ed. (1986) Tjeenk Willink at 142; Th. van
Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming: een tip van de sluier?" [1986] 10 BIE 263 at 268.
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Decca, it relied on the rental fees that it charged for the
use of the receiving equipment. Since Holland Nautic did not
have the overhead costs of having to maintain these stations,
it was able to offer receivers at a much lower price.
This equipment as such did not infringe any right of Decca's
own receiver since the patent in the receiver had already
lapsed and copyright was not relied upon.
The Court of Appeal held that Holland Nautic committed a tort
by marketing this equipment that is specifically designed to
receive the signals transmitted by stations that belonged to,
or were managed by Decca, without remunerating Decca.
The Supreme Court, however, held that for protection on the
basis of unfair competition it is required that a 'profit is
gained from an achievement of such a nature that it can be
equated to those [achievements] that justify the granting of
such a right'. 543 So in those cases where there is a void in
the legal protection of certain subject matter, the existing
legal provisions may be transposed to fill this void. This is
known as 'ref lexing'. For the subject matter to qualify for
the same protection as is awarded in statutory provisions,
these accomplishments should be comparable by nature,
possibilities of exploitation and risk 5
 to those
achievements protected by an absolute right. The nature of
the exploitation of this achievement then determines whether
there is tortious behaviour. In considering these elements,
the Supreme Court evaluated the plaintiff's and defendant's
position as well as public interest aspects. If there was a
543HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987, 191 at 666.
544Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming: Een tip van de sluier?" [1986] 10 BIE 263 at 264.
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case for Decca, the achievement for which protection was
sought would first of all have to be equivalent to an
absolute right of intellectual property.
This is reflected in the Court's consideration that Holland
Nautic profited from the mere existence, maintenance and
improvements of the Decca Nautic System. This in itself
however did not constitute a breach of any duty of care, even
if Decca were to suffer loss. In order to make it tortious,
other elements needed to be present that make the type of
profiting tortious. In weighing these, the Court came to the
conclusion that Decca had no right capable of attracting
protection in the light of these circumstances.
On Decca's part there were two factors that were taken into
account. First of all, Decca's dependency on the rental of
equipment to sustain its transmission service was deemed to
be a factor inherent to Decca's company structure. This
factor inherent in Decca's company structure was Decca's own
choice and came for the risk of Decca.
In the second place, Decca had held a monopoly right in the
form of a patent for thirty-five years, and during that time
had been rewarded for its inventiveness, labour and
investment. The public interest, represented by security at
sea, was held to be a matter for the coastal states in which
the system was operational. Some states did indeed contribute
to the costs of maintaining the system. On the whole this
meant that Decca's interest was not considered to be large
enough to substantiate a reduction in the freedom of trade
and the possibility for ship owners to acquire a cheaper
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alternative to Decca's receiver.545
This ruling was affirmed in KNVB v. NOS. The facts in this
case were as follows. The NOS (Dutch Broadcasting
Corporation) exercised their right to the freedom of
gathering information 546 , which guaranteed them the right of
access to the football matches that KNVB organised. This was
laid down in a contract between the two parties. They had
arranged for NOS to broadcast up to three minutes of the
football match during playtime, without any compensation. NOS
was also free to compile fifteen minutes of material from
three games each for broadcast at a later hour.
NOS however used the first clause to compile a radio
broadcast program consisting of numerous snippets of three
minutes, thus in essence covering the whole game live.
The KNVB sought relief on the basis that it had a right to
ask for compensation in return for a permission to broadcast
and that the NOS was breaching a duty of care by broadcasting
the match without authorization. In essence this meant that
KNVB was arguing that the matches organised by them
constituted a product of which the exploitation is protected
by Article 1401 Old Civil Code.
The Supreme Court held that profiting from that fact that
545 Compare this to Pres. Rb. The Hague 20-1-1986; KG 1986, 92 (FilmNet) and Ten
Electronics/Esselte Court of Appeal Amsterdam 2-5-1991 BIE 1992, 49 at 166 (FilmNet H).
Facts in both these cases consisted of the marketing of decoders for cable television. In both
instances it was held that undue advantage was taken of the plaintiff's achievement. Just like in
Decca the commercial value of the decoders was wholly determined by the achievement of the
plaintiff, i.e. the investment in and maintenance of the system. The facts were distinguished
from the Decca case on several points, providing additional grounds. Unlike in Decca, the
signal that was broadcasted consisted of encrypted copyright materials, Esselte's monopoly was
not an established one and, due to lack of outside finding, Ten Electronic's behaviour could
jeopardise the existence of Esselte.
546Article 10 Treaty of Rome.
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KNVB organises football matches as such does not constitute
a tort, even if KNVB was to suffer loss from this fact. Again
the Court had to consider whether there was a reason to grant
similar protection as exists in the case of an absolute right
of intellectual property. It was then held that there was no
case of drawing profit from an achievement of such a nature
that it can be equated to those [achievements] that justify
the granting of such a right. The Supreme Court did not want
to grant KNVB an absolute right. KNVB was only granted
protection on the basis of their ownership or user rights of
the stadium. This meant that they could deny NOS access to
the fields, if they were not prepared to compensate. So
although the doctrine for unfair competition was confirmed,
it was held that the achievement of organisation and display
of a football match did not fulfil the minimum requirements
of equivalence.
The refusal of the Court to see in the achievement of the
KNVB an achievement equal to that protected by intellectual
property statutes was heavily criticised. 547 Nothing would
prevent a broadcaster from following the game from a location
outside the stadium, a situation comparable to Victoria Park
Racing. 548 A better solution would have been to hold that KNVB
had established the minimum requirement, but to restrict its
remedies on the basis of freedom of gathering of information.
547Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming: De stand van zaken na KNVB/NOS en StaatlDen
Ouden" [1989] 6 RM Themis 281 at 297; W. Hoyng: "Bescherming(somvang) Anno 1989"
Kiuwer 1990 at 9 et seq.; H. Ruijsenaars: "Wettbewerbsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz für
Sportier? Bemerkungen zur Entscheidungen des Hoge Raad "KNVB/NOS' und des Court of
Appeals (Seventh Circuit) 'Baltimore Orioles'" [1988] 10 GRUR mt. 764-767.
Victoria Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd. v. Taylor and Others (1937) 58 CLR
479.
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In Staatsdrukkerij v. Den Ouden, the State saw one of its
laws being photocopied from the original published by the
State Press. Because of the fact that there is no copyright
in laws549 , the only way for the State to prevent photocopying
was therefore to argue that Den Ouden had committed a tort by
copying the exact typographical arrangement. The State did
not base its claim on confusion, but on the fact that there
is a complete equality between the two products due to
photocopying, that this complete equality is not necessary
and that because of this Den Ouden is able to market its
product against a lower price. The court simply dismissed the
state's claim referring to article 11 of the Authors Act.
Although not expressly stated, this could mean that the
Supreme Court did not see an achievement equalling and
absolute right of intellectual property on the basis that a
statutory provision expressly states that there is no
copyright in the material. The typographical arrangement of
the specific act that was copied was held not to display any
special merit, since it was printed under legal obligation in
the standard State Journal.
This decision has met with criticism, 550 since it overlooks
the possibility that typographical arrangement and layout
could be subject matter capable of attracting independent
protection. It is likely that this possibility was not dealt
with, because the Court of Appeal had already held that Den
Ouden did not gain any advantage over the State printers.
549ArticIe 11 Authors Act.
van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming: De stand van zaken na KNVB/NOS en Staatf Den
Ouden", [1989 6 RMTh. 281 at 293 et seq.
W. Hoyng: "Bescherming(somvang) Anno 1989", (1990) Kluwer, at 8.
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Inclusion of arguments surrounding typographical arrangements
would certainly have resulted in a more satisfactory way of
reasoning. Leaving typographical arrangements and layout as
a category of achievements that is susceptible to protection
as such, arguments of preemption could then be used to
withhold protection in this case. A consideration to the
effect that the preemptive intent expressed in the provision
on statutory materials in the Dutch Copyright Act also
extends to typographical arrangements and layout, if such
arrangements show no merit, or are not distinctive, would
have been preferable.
In BMG v. Boog-aard, the achievements of Elvis Presley as a
performing artist were the subject of conflict. At that point
article 7 of the Rome Convention had not been ratified by the
Dutch Parliament, so there was no absolute right for the
performing artist to prevent unauthorised copying and sales
of records that had been made with his consent. In this case
the Supreme Court held that the subject matter did equate to
an achievement capable of attracting protection as an
absolute right. Making copies did constitute a tort. The way
in which this conclusion was reached displays the greater
willingness by the court to grant protection. It accepted the
conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the achievement was
capable of attracting protection, but rejected its conclusion
that the absence of special circumstances that would render
the way in which Boogaard profited from the achievements of
Elvis Presley at the expense of BMG unfair, prevented BMG
from obtaining relief. BMG won the case.
Although anticipation of the ratification of article 7 of the
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Rome Convention (Positive Reflex) certainly plays an
important role in the making of this judgenient, the mere fact
that sound recordings are copied, immaterial of the fact
whether it involves the same performance as the original, and
marketed, was held to be sufficient reason to grant relief.
6.5.2.2 Exploitation.
Exploitation of achievements involving badges of trade has
led to a distinct areas of unfair competition law.
6.5.2.2.1 The Appearance of Products.
Where the appearance of products is concerned, the doctrine
of slavish imitation551 was developed by the lower courts and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision in Hyster Karry
Krane. 552 It contains a preemptive statement that -provided
statutory rights do not form an obstacle- in principle
everyone is free to use the results of another's labour,
insight or knowledge to produce reliable and useful products,
even if this would lead to unavoidable confusion of the
public. This statement clearly reflects the desire of the
court to keep functional elements 553
 of products in the public
domain. The court then went on to affirm protection on the
551 For an overview see D. Verkade: "Ongeoorloofde Mededinging" 2 ed. (1986) Tjeenk
Willink at 72-93.
552HR 26-7-1953, NJ 1954, 90.
553This is also reflected in the grounds for refusal of registration of shapes as trade marks. See
A. Kamperman Sanders: "Some Frequently Asked Questions about the Trade Marks Act 1994"
[1995J 2 EIPR 67-74.
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basis of a common law right. Imitation of a competitor's
product is not permitted if it was possible, without
impairing the reliability and usefulness of the product, to
walk another avenue and thus prevent confusion. At a later
stage in the development of the doctrine, it was held the
requirement the appearance has to meet is one of
distinctiveness. 554 The level of distinctiveness is not as
high as originality or novelty, 555 but the product has to take
'its own place' in the relevant market. 556 As it is the
appearance that has to be the subject of confusion,
additional distinctive elements or divergent marks do not
alleviate the likelihood of confusion.557
After 1 January 1975 the doctrine lost a large part of its
significance due to the introduction of the Uniform Benelux
554HR 2 1-12-1956; NJ 1960, 414 (Drukbakas) and HR 8-1-1960; NJ 1960 415 (Scrabble).
It is interesting to note that at that time justification was primarily sought in economic
considerations. See W. van der Grinten's casenote to the Drukbakas and Scrabble cases in
[1960-19611 X Ars Aequi 19-24 at 22, or "Jurisprudentie en annotaties Intellectuele elgendom
Ars Aequi 1954-1988" (1988) Ars Aequi Libri at 33:
There is no natural right to protection. Considerations of social efficiency
should be decisive with the rule, just like has happened with the inception of
the patent law. The question, if and to what extent imitation has to be
countered, is in my opinion primarily a question of economical politics, where
economical considerations should prevail. I would classify the imitation as
such as legally indifferent.
Een 'natuurlijk' recht op bescherrning is or niet. Overwegingen van maatschappelijko
doelmatigheid zullen bij do regaling do doorslag moeten geven. gelijk ook bij do totstandkoming
van do Octrooiwet is geschied. Do vraag, of en in hoevorre nabootsing moot worden
tegengegaan. is nsa, mijn mening prima,, een kwestie van oconomische politiek, waarbij
economische overwegingen moeten golden. Do nabootsing op zichzelf zou ik als rechtens
indifferent willen aanmerken.
555 See HR 7 June 1991, 119921 BIE 61-75 (Rummikub).
556HR 15-3-1968, NJ 1968, 268 (Plastic stack platters).
557Verkade D: "Ongeoorloofde Mededinging" 2Il ed. (1986) Tjeenk Willink at 76.
This forms a contrast with English law, where the law of passing off does not provide relief in
so called look alike cases. See Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd and RoHo Inc. v. Wards mobility
Services Ltd [19951 FSR 169, where one of the arguments used to dismiss confusion was the
fact that a different trade mark was used on the defendant's product.
See also A. Firth: "Cushions and Confusion, The RoHo Passing Off Case" [1994J 11 ELPR
494-495.
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Drawings and Designs Act. The Act contains a preemptive
section 14(5) that prohibits an action on the basis of the
common law for acts that only amount to an infringement of a
drawing or design right. 558 The practical use of the doctrine
is now generally confined to products that were on the market
before that date. An example and a possible expansion to this
rule can be found in the case of Borsurnij/Stenman. 559 Steninan
had developed a window remover, the 'ASSAf1ex' and had
enjoyed patent protection in invention in the design.
Borsumij had tried to market window removers manufactured in
Taiwan during the term of the patent, but had ceased after
protests from Stenman. After the patent lapsed Borsuinij
started selling the window removers it had kept in storage
for all this time at a much lower price than the ASSAflex.
Stenman brought an action on the grounds that the window
removers marketed by Borsumij were exact, but inferior,
copies of the ASSAf1ex and that Borsumij could just as easily
have avoided confusion by manufacturing different looking
window removers based on the constructive principle that was
no longer protected, without impairing the reliability or
functionality of the product.
Protection on the basis of slavish imitation was accepted and
upheld in all instances. The Supreme Court rejected the
5581n the Prince tennisrackets case (BenGH 21 December 1990, [1991] BIE 203-217) the
Benelux Court of justice held that action on the basis of acts that are by their nature infringing
according to the Uniform Benelux Drawings and Designs Act, are preempted from protection
on the basis of common unfair competition law. Other acts can only be considered for
protection if the facts of the case, with the exception of those that fall within the description of
infringement within the Act, warrant protection on the basis of unfair competition on the basis
of national law.
559HR 31 May 1991, [1992] BIE 50-60.
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contention that the lapse of patent or design protection
preempts a claim on the basis of slavish imitation,
distinguishing the protectable interests addressed by
protection on a patent or design basis and on the basis of
unfair competition. It also rejected the position that
protection awarded to a design on the basis of unfair
competition should be limited in time to reflect the maximum
term of protection available under the Patent Act and the
Benelux Drawings and Design Act. The Supreme Court considered
that the interests protected by the Acts were of a different
nature to those protected by slavish imitation, making the
clear distinction between protection on the basis of
registration, in which case confusion is not a consideration,
and protection on the basis of the creation of avoidable
confusion. The distinction was expanded to include
appropriation of intangible achievements, where protection is
only available on the basis of analogy with statutory
protected interests, 560
 as opposed to tangible products that
can be subject to slavish imitation.
This train of thought would make it possible to award
protection to unregistered designs and designs for which the
term of protection under the Act, which is an expression of
protection for intangible achievements, has lapsed on the
basis of slavish imitation too, within the confinements of
the opposition against avoidable confusion. Acts amounting to
the drawing of profit from or latching on to another's
reputation or goodwill, all achievements in intangibles, are
560HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987, 191; [1987] 3 EIPR D-50 (Decca).
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therefore preempted.561
6.5.2.2.2 Distinctive means.
For the use of signs capable of distinction, unfair competi-
tion law is of importance in two instances.562
1) The subject matter that is not capable of attracting pro-
tection under one of the special provisions.
Examples:
a) Badges that are used by non-profit organisations.
One can think of names of clubs, societies, governmental
bodies.
b) The use is not on goods or services.
One can think of corporate dress or the layout of shops.
c) The badge does not easily constitute a sign.
Think of nicknames, slogans, lay out and book or film titles.
2) The subject matter is capable of attracting protection
under one of the acts, but there is no relief for the
561 However R. Vriesendorp in his case comment [1991] IER 118, is of the opinion that the
confinement to designs from before the Designs Act is still in force in view of the Prince
tennisrackets decision, a point of view also expressed by Verkade in his case comment NJ 1992,
391.
A critique from A. Quaedvlieg: "Verwarren en onderscheiden, De slaafse nabootsing in een
veranderd intellectueel eigendomsperspectief" [19921 BIE 367-371, with a clarification at 373
points to the defacto monopoly that protection on the basis of slavish imitation brings about,
contrary to the express preemptive statement in the Act. He distinguishes confusion as to
products, which lies in the sphere of design protection and as to origin, which is universal and
the basic-feature of protection against-slavish imitation. He proposes a restriction- in the
execution of slavish imitation to identical reproduction, thus giving effect to protection against
confusion as to origin only.
E. van Nieuwenhoven Helbach in his comment on Quaedvlieg's article [1992] BIE 371-372
rejects this distinction and asserts that the preemption rules still stand.
Both P. Steinhauser in his case comment [1992] BIE 60-61 and H. Cohen Jehoram in [19931
Ars Aequi 680-687 take the distinction the Supreme Court made with regards to the difference
in protected interests to mean that additional common law action in slavish imitation is available
alongside statutory protection.
562D Verkade: "Ongeoorloofde Mededinging" 2d ed. (1986) Tjeenk Willink at 94.
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specific form of reproduction.
If the subject matter is not protected by specialised laws,
protection can be awarded against confusion and dilution.
Confusion cases are quite numerous as far as non-profit
organisations and non-signs are concerned. 563 In the Elkington
caseSM
 the defendant tried to register the name Elkington as
a mark for sewer lids. Elkington was the family name of the
owner of a British manufacturer of sewer lids, with whom the
defendant previously had a licensing contract for the manu-
facture of these lids. The plaintiff was successful in
restraining the defendant from using his name as a mark. And
in the lower courts confusion has also been the ground of
restraint in the case of choirs, 565
 television programmes,566
singles clubs 567
 and student organisations. 5
 In the case of
non-signs advertising, slogans used by a competitor, 569
 titles
of books 570
 and even physical disposition were protected.571
563For an overview see Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming en ongeschreven intellectual
eigendomsrechten" (1994) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 252-279.
SMHR 29 November 1957, NJ 1958, 31, before the 1971 Benelux Trade Marks Act came into
force.
565Pres Rb. Zwolle 20-02-1969, NJ 1969, 448. (Urker mannenkoor Hallelujah/Mannenkoor
Urk); Pres Rb. Haarlem 02-11-1976, BIE 1977, 273 (De Lievertjes).
566Pres Rb. Haarlem 16-10-1974, BIE 1979, 145 (Open en bloot).
567Pres Rb. Amsterdam 19-12-1985, KG 1986, 76 (Swinging Singles).
5 Pres Rb. Dordrecht 27-02-1986, KG 1986 152 (PSOIPSO).
569Rb Utrecht 17-05-1944, NJ 1944/45, 763 (Luckerath).
570Pres Rb. Arnhem 30-10-1967, B1E 1969, 57 (200 Kamerplanten - /100 Kamerplanten in
kleur); relief denied.
571 HR 11-02-1977, NJ 1977, 363 (Mosterdmanneke). The physical disposition consisted of the
bent legs of a person selling mustard door to door. When another mustard seller, whom the
plaintiff previously supplied, starting to feature a bent legged person on his labels, the
curvaturely challenged man successliilly sued.
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In other instances the basis for infringement can not be
found in confusion. Excessive capitalization on the basis of
the reputation of the plaintiff and dilution of the
distinctive character of the badge form the decisive factors.
The disproportionate nature of the advantage the defendant
gains at the expense of the plaintiff and the
disproportionate loss of the plaintiff provides the
additional element that makes the profit drawn from another's
achievement a tortious matter, leading to a position where
undue advantage has been taken of another's achievement.
The criterion of 'association' 572 of the Benelux Trade Marks
Act also provides ample reference and is transposed into the
realm of unfair competition law.
Protection on this basis has been granted for advertising
slogans, STh
 titles of books 574 and the format, colour and
layout of sexTnagazines.STh Despite the fact that it is
doubtful whether dilution in itself consitutes an act of
unfair competition in general, 576 dilution has contributed to
liability on the basis of a level of disproportionality
between plaintiff's gain and defendant's loss. 5 	This
5 As to the meaning of association see Ch. Gielen: "Harmonisation of Trade Mark law in
Europe" [1992] 8 EIPR 262; A. Kamperman Sanders: "Dilution - The Parting of Ways?"
[1992] 3 MIP 42-43 and "Some Frequently asked Questions about the Trade Marks Act 1994"
[1995] 2 EIPR 67-74.
573Hof's Hertogenbosch 08-08-1946, NJ 1946, 672 (Kofa/Tonlo); Hof's Hertogenbosch 24-11-
1955, NJ 1956, 239.
574 Rb. Amsterdam 24-10-1946, NJ 1974, 434.
57'5 Pres. Rb. 's Gravenhage 3 1-10-1974, BIE 1980, 175 (Tum-TumlJum-Jum).
5T6For trade marks and trade names it certainly does, in other instances the issue remains
unclear.
5 D. Verkade: "Ongeoorloofde Mededinging" 2t.d ed. (1986) Tjeenk Willink at 146.
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disproportionality can consist of a whittling away or
tarnishing578 of the image, leading to damage or a
considerable reduction of the reputation. Other forms of
disproportionality are linked with nullifying the commercial
value of the achievement that is taken advantage of and
systematic poaching of customers.579
Due to the broad scope of the Trade Marks Act, extra
protection on the basis of unfair competition law in the
trade mark field is rare. One such instance was a case 58° in
which the plaintiff delivered a shop display bearing the
plaintiff's trade mark 'Def cc' to retailers in which they
could place Fortuin's product: bias binding in single width
rolls. The defendant subsequently produced his product in
packs of the same geometry, so that it could be fitted into
the plaintiff's display case. As a result retailers started
to sell the Hardick Rubi's bias binding from plaintiff's
display. Customers were led to believe that the product was
the plaintiff's or in some way connected with the plaintiff,
even though the defendant had sealed the end of his binding
with a sticker bearing the mark 'Dcx'. Trade mark protection
was not available, since the defendant did not use the mark.
57 The Advertising Code Commission enjoined Peter Stuyversant's advertisement that claimed
that one of its cigarettes contained the lowest tar level of 152 in a test conducted by the Ministry
of Health. The publication of the test results consisted of a warning against smoking with a list
of the tar levels. Peter Stuyversant's positive interpretation of an otherwise negative publication
was held to be misleading. Code Commissie 30-12-1976 "Praktijkboek Reclame- en
Aanduidingsrecht" Verkade ed., Kiuwer VIB, n° 2.
5 Pres. Rb. Amsterdam 25-6-1981, BIE 1983, 193, where the announcement in magazines of
times of transmission of infringing films with frequencies of pirate broadcasters was held to
constitute parasitic competition with the cinematographic industry.
580Hardick Rubi B. V. v. Fortuin B. V. Court of Appeal Arnhem 5-6-1978, NJ 1979, 246, BIE
1979 at 143.
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In first instance Hardick Rubi was ordered not to produce the
bias binding in the particular get up.
Upon appeal, however, it was held that the get up as such
could not be xnonopolised, so that the manufacture of the bias
binding in the particular get up did not amount to a tort as
such. The Court did however come to the conclusion that
additional factors made Hardick Rubi's behaviour tortious.
Consideration was given to the fact that Rubi knew, or should
have known, that the bias binding was going to be sold from
Fortuin's display cabinet and that Rubi did not take steps to
prevent this from happening. The fact that Rubi's trade mark
was present on the product was held not to reduce the
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.581
Since the defendant could not be prevented from marketing his
product in the particular non-distinctive get up the Court
held that the sale and marketing by Hardick Rubi of the bias
binding in the particular get up was prohibited, unless the
defendant had obliged retailers not to sell Hardick Rubi's
bias binding in the plaintiff's display case.
Another example of additional protection by means of unfair
competition law can be, found in the field of trade names that
are not capable of being registered as marks. Here the Law on
Trade Names582 gives explicit effect to the general clause in
581 For an opposing view in the United Kingdom see the judgement in the RoHo case,
Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd and another v. Ward Mobility Services Ltd. [1995] FSR 169, where
the presence of a different trade mark on an imitated product was held to take away confusion.
See also 1.2.1.4 above.
For a description of the case see A. Firth: Tushions and Confusion, The RoHo Passing Off
Cased [1994] 11 EIPR 494495
582	 6 Hnw of 1921 as amended in 1991.
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the Civil Code. 5 This allows for protection against
dilution.5
6.5.2.3 Proposed protection of reserved creations in the
Civil Code.
In 1992 the Dutch society for authors' rights commissioned a
study into the desirability and viability of protection of
reserved creations. 585 The study committee drafted a proposal
for an additional section to article 6:162 of the Civil Code
in order to provide protection for 'sweat of the brow
creations' on the basis of a general tort. Exploitation of an
idea in perceptible form, or an achievement resulting from a
'	 ,
physical, intellectual or economic effort of an other is
classified as a tort, provided the idea or achievement is not
and has not been protected by statute. An exoneration from
tortious liability is given if a reasonable compensation has
been made by prior arrangement and acknowledgement has been
made or withheld, according to the wishes of the 'other',
unless this wish would be unreasonable.5
583Art 6:162 Dutch Civil Code.
5 E. Arkenbout: "Handeisnamen en Merken" diss. (1991) Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle at 38.
585published as "Rapport Studiecommissie Bescherming Sweat of the Brow-prestaties"
Vereniging voor Auteursrecht December 1993. For a similar proposal in France see 6.3.2.2
above. See also C. Elliott: "The Common Law: Unfair Competition and Sui Generis
Legislation. A Time for Reappraisal" 11992] Jan/Feb 20 TMW 25-30 for an Australian outlook.
S&The proposed article 6:162 (4) of the Civil Code:
Leaving the previous sections of this article unaffected, it is considered a tort
to exploit the original idea from another, to which he has given perceptible
form, or of an achievement that is the result of a physical, intellectual or
economical effort of another, whereas the idea or achievement is not
protected by any other special legislative regulation.
This exploitation is not tortious if the other has been paved compensation, fair
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In the report special emphasis is placed on limits to this
general tort. First of all it is submitted that in the
interest of free competition an injunction would be out of
place, so that only a remedy in damages should be
available. 587
 Furthermore the inception of a registry is
advocated, together with a publication journal and tags,
along the lines of a copyright notice, on the product itself.
With reference to Le Stanc's critical evaluation of the
French proposal for protection of reserved creations, 5 the
committee considered a public claim to entitlement to be an
absolute minimum requirement for protection. Special
consideration is also given to the difference between
cultural achievements and cultural ideas. Where cultural
achievements are concerned, the committee sees ample scope
for protection, because of the absence of an economical or
technical necessity for appropriation by subtraction.
It does however see scope for exceptions such as fair use,
quotation rights and exceptio artis.
Where protection of cultural ideas that have been given
in duration and magnitude, and if has been complied with the demands of the
other to either acknowledge or leave out his name or other desired indication,
unless this would be unreasonable.
Onvarminderd hot bepaalde in de vonge leden van dit artikel wordt als onrechtrnatige daad
aangemerkt hat exploiteren van eon oorspronkelijk idee van can ander waaraan doze een
waarneembare vorm heeft gageven. of van can prastatia die het resultaat is van lichamelijke.
geestalijke of economische inspanningen van can ander. terwiji dat idea of die prestatie niet
krachtens enige andero bijzondere wettelijka regaling bescharming geniet of heeft ganoten.
Daze exploItatie is niet onrachtmatig Indian can die ander can in duur en omvang billijkc
vergoedng is betaald en voldaan is san do wens van die ander tot al dan niet vermelding van zijn
naam of andera door hem gewenste aanduiding, tenzij die wens in strijd zou zijn met do
redelijkheid
587"Rapport studiecommissie bescherming sweat of the brow-prestaties" Vereniging voor
Auteursrecht December 1993 at 25.
5 C. Le Stanc: "Intellectual Property on Procrustes' Bed: Observations on a French Draft Bill
for the Protection of 'Reserved Creations'" [1992J 12 EIPR 438-444.
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perceptible form is concerned however, the committee warns
against protection that could amount to a cultural
blockade .
In form and expression the proposal comes extremely close to
the French proposal on protection of reserved creation.
Despite the fact that a lot of objections that were raised
against the French example were taken into consideration,
they are not significantly addressed in the final text. 590
 The
only real addition is the exemption from liability on the
basis of the prior payment of a reasonable consideration. The
description of what constitutes a tort is however equally
broad and does not provide any indication what the criteria
for liability are.
6.5.2.4 Unjust Enrichment & Unfair Competition, a Partial
Synthesis.
As indicated, in The Netherlands liability in unfair
competition cases is based on article 6:162 et seq of the
Civil Code, and leads to tortious liability. Unjust
enrichment as an independent form of action does not play a
role in the establishment of liability.
Elements of unjust enrichment do, however, sometimes
influence the assessment of damages in cases of infringement
of intellectual property rights. In order to uncover these
elements it is necessary to look at the nature and extent of
589"Rapport Studiecommissie Bescherming Sweat of the Brow-prestaties" Vereniging voor
Auteursrecht December 1993 at 27.
590The French proposal is in fact more detailed. See [1992] 12 EIPR 443-444.
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eligibility and assessment for damages.591
In cases of infringement of intellectual property rights,
account of profits can be awarded instead of damages on a
statutory basis. 592 Whereas the grounds for infringement and
resulting injunction are dependent on intellectual property
legislation alone, liability for damages is generally
established on the basis of common law liability. 593 The
tortious behaviour is therefore qualified in the legislation,
but falls back on the law of obligations to establish
liability for damages. 594 Unfair competition law also falls
within the description of what constitutes a tort under
Article 6:162 as an act or omission contrary to proper
behaviour in society. Contrary to an infringement of a right
qualified by statute, which may give rise to injunctive
relief alone, the tort of unfair competition relies on the
presence of damage for its existence.
Liability for damages in cases of statutory infringement and
of the tort of unfair competition can only be incurred when
there is a causal link between defendant's act and damages
incurred by the plaintiff. This causal link is usually
established by a conditio sine qua non, whereby the
infringing act and the resulting damages are intrinsically
591 For a comparative overview of the assessment of damages in intellectual property cases see
T. Deurvorst: Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" diss. (1994) Kluwer.
592Examples can be found for patent infringement (43(3) Rijksoctrooiwet), copyright
infringement (27a Auteurswet) and in article 13A(4) of the protocol for change of the Uniform
Benelux Trade Mark Law.
593T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer at 17-18.
594See 1.2.1.2 above.
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connected. This places the burden of proof for both damages
and the causal link on the plaintiff. This burden has been
criticised595 with the argument that judges are usually
willing to accept the conditio sine qua non if damage has
been established. The second condition is one of
accountability. Article 6:162 (3) of the Civil Code offers
large scope for the imposition of liability, regardless of
whether the defendant is subjectively reproachable. The fact
that a lot of statutory rights are registered, in many cases
shifts the risk to the defendant. Absence of registration,
copyright cases may serve as an example, does not diminish
accountability. 596 The Supreme Court's decision in
Barbie/Sindy597 may prove authoritative.598
The case involved the appearance of dolls, the Barbie from
Mattel and the Sindy from MB and their packaging. The Court
of Appeal599
 had held that the packaging of the Sindy did
infringe that of Mattel on the basis of trade mark law. As to
the copyright in the doll, it had come to the conclusion that
the Sindy infringed the Barbie. Mattel stated that the
requirement for infringement was that the infringing
expression has been derived from the work for which copyright
595T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer at 53-54, where
she advocates a sharing of the burden of proof between plaintiff @roof of damage) and
defendant (j)roof of absence of a causal connection), for which she finds parallels in U.S. and
German law.
596See Chapter 5 above.
597MB v. Mattel HR 21 February 1992, NJ 1993, 164, [1992] IER 89.
5 Th. van Engelen: "Prestatiebescherming en ongeschreven intellectual eigendoinsrechten'
(1994) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 173 makes special mention of this case.
5 Hof 's-Hertogenbosch 28 February 1990, [1990] IER 56.
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is claimed. It was subsequently argued that in addition to a
certain level of similarity, the plaintiff also had to state
and prove upon challenge that this similarity was the result
of a conscious appropriation of the work. The Supreme Court
dismissed this argument on the basis that this would
undermine the protection that the Copyright Act intended to
provide. The Supreme Court did however acknowledge the
possibility for an appeal in special circumstances in the
form of a reasoned defence to the effect that, despite the
similarities with the work that is susceptible to copyright,
the creation is independently achieved and is not the result
of appropriation, conscious or otherwise.
In Erco/Bluesprint60° however, accountability was interpreted
restrictively. 601 Bluesprint had ordered an advertising agency
to design a pictogram, that turned out not to be an original
work. The Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the court in
first instance, that held that Blueprint's omission to assess
the originality of the work did not establish culpability on
its behalf. Blueprint was entitled to expect original work
from the advertising agency and was therefore not liable for
the agency's infringements.602
600Hof Amsterdam 07-05-1990, [1993] Informatierecht/AMI 172.
601Th1s provides T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke
Gebruiksvergoeding en Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994)
Kiuwer at 58-63 with the argument that, in the interest of innovation and economic activity,
liability should be limited to cases in which actual reproachful conduct (wilful conduct or
negligence) can be proved. In the assessment of culpability the notions of the trade should be
decisive. Since this would mean a shift in the advantage of the defendant, she advocates, as a
countermeasure, an alternative to a claim in damages, namely a reasonable compensation for
use of intellectual property intangibles. At 144-157 she shapes this alternative form of
compensation on the basis of unjust enrichment.
6021n his case comment D. Verkade: [19931 Informatierecht/AMI 172 at 173-174, argues that
it is also valid for the new Civil Code. Despite far reaching accountability beyond culpability
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Despite the diverging rulings on liability in the
Barbie/Sindy and Erco/Bluesprint, if is submitted that the
rulings on culpability are reconcilable. The proximity of
plaintiff and defendant in the Barbie case, a competitive
nexus, was absent in Erco. Although liability can properly be
imposed when a competitive nexus is present, the absence of
such a nexus may lead to excessive claims. Where a
competitive nexus puts the plaintiff and defendant in an
antagagonistic position from which constraints on certain
forms of competitive behaviour can be deduced, the absence of
a competitive nexus does not place as many obligations on
parties. If liability would be imposed without sufficient
level of culpability, a form of risk liability would be
exacted that runs unchecked by custom in business and norms
in society that otherwise set the level of culpability in
general and in individual cases.
The third criterion for liability is the existence of damage.
The nature of damages is usually limited to damages actually
incurred by the plaintiff and can consist of loss and lost
prof its. 603 In some instances however the calculation of the
damages does not take place on the basis of actual loss and
an abstract formulation takes place. 604 This means that damage
can be assessed where proof of actual damage is absent, or
to causes that are attributed to the defendant on the basis of the law or views in society, risk
liability was not intended by the legislator.
603Articles 6:95 and 6:96(1) Dutch Civil Code.
604HR 16 June 1961, NJ 1961, 444 (Damaged Telephone Cable).
G. Schut: "Onrechtmatige Daa& (1981) Tjeenk Willink Zwolle at 91-92.
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even where damage has not actually been suffered. 605 Two
different applications for abstract formulation can be
discerned.
In the first instance this method serves as a means of
calculating the level of damage, where liability has already
been accepted. Damages are then fixed at a level that is
customary in business and corresponds with current licensing
practice. Proof of actual deviation from the general practice
is therefore admissible in evidence and may result in
adjustment. In the absence of a competitive nexus or
licensing practice actual damages may be absent and liability
can not be accepted in this scenario.
In the second place the abstract formulation takes place in
the overall assessment of liability, the existence of actual
damage becomes irrelevant, since it becomes fictitious. The
basis for this form of liability consists of the notion of a
reasonable compensation for use of an intangible, but it also
has a punitive element. Dutch Courts have generally resisted
this form of application of abstract formulation of damages
in the assessment of liability.606
605T Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer at 139 concludes
that once liability has been established, damages are estimated at a customary rate, regardless
of the fact whether the plaintiff has actually incurred the expenses. She observes that this
abstraction in the calculation of damages brings about an unjustified enrichment of the plaintiff.
In myopinion this is a very interesting result indeed, since it qualifies an excessive element in
the award of damages. This particular excessive element, that I shall call reverse unjust
enrichment, however, does not feature explicitly in Deurvorst's call for a reasonable
compensation for use.
60&ç Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer at 142-143
explicitly distinguishes these two scenarios and at 145-146 concludes that judges have always
refused to entertain requests for the assessment of damages on a fictitious basis prior to the
establishment of liability, but has found four instances in which the judge has in practice given
effect to abstract formulation to impose liability without proof of actual damage.
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In her dissertation on damages and reasonable compensation
for use for infringement of intellectual property, T.E.
Deurvorst607 sees advantages in a system where liability is
based on the concept of reasonable compensation. 608 Such a
system would provide a solution for cases in which a
competitive nexus or a licensing practice is absent. Fear of
excessive claims and adverse effects of risk liability on
free appropriation and competition, leads her to shift 609 the
main basis of liability for damages from tort to unjust
enrichment law. Action can then be brought cumulatively on
the basis of tort (Article 6:162) and unjust enrichment
(Article 6:212). Presumably to take away reverse unjust
enrichment due to accunimulation, Deurvorst submits that the
various recompenses should be squared. Damages that are
awarded in the form of an account of profits usually reflect
the loss of profits by means of royalties due. This element
607T Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding Voldoening van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en
Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer 146.
608See in this respect also J. Reichman: "Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms" [1994] 94 Col.LR 2432-2558, who proposes the inception of trade organisations
to determine the royalty rate payable to innovators, as well as the terms under which borrowing
of the innovation may take place, during a set period of time. This would mean that innovators
are rewarded during a certain period, but that competitors can not be barred from appropriating
the innovation.
For a critique of this proposal see W. Gordon: "Assertive Modesty" [19941 94 Col.LR 2579-
2593 at 2584, where she expresses her doubts about the ability of market players to come to
'sensible arrangements without wasteful litigation', even if membership of the proposed trade
organisation were mandatory; See also E. Mackaay: "Beyond Property and Monopoly?" [1994J
94 CoI.LR 2630-2641 at 2641; See also D. Karjala: "Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual
Property Paradigm" [1994] 94 Col.LR 2594-2609, who argues that Reichman's proposal to
leave the establishment of a consensus for a solution to market irregularities to negotiation
among market participants fails to recognise that the market irregularities are caused by
'misappropriative methods of copying'.
609The U.S. concept of 'reasonable royalty' and the German concept of 'angemessene
Lizenzgebühr' are inspirational in this respect. T. Deurvorst: "Schadevergoeding, Voldoening
van een Redelijke Gebruiksvergoeding en Winstafdracht bij Inbreuk op Intellectuele
Eigendomsrechten" (1994) Kluwer 149-150.
250
is also present in the concept of reasonable compensation for
use and should therefore be deducted from the amount awarded
in unjust enrichment.
This system is certainly workable where reasonable
compensation on the basis of unjust enrichment serves as a
remedy for a wrong. It eliminates the problem of excessive
damages and the fact that the plaintiff may be reversely
unjustly enriched by damages awarded in the absence of actual
damage.
However, where unjust enrichment serves to establish a prima
fade entitlement to protection and has to form the basis for
tortious liability for both injunctive and compensatory
relief, the shift from tort to unjust enrichment does nothing
to limit claims and entitlements compared to the common law
tort. 610
 This means that additional elements to unjust
enrichment as outlined in the tort of malcompetition are
necessary.
Again only a partial synthesis between unfair competition
laws and unjust enrichment appears to be conceivable at this
point.
610See Chapters 3 and 4 above on unjust enrichment. See also the description of the French
Mars case in 6.3.2 and the resulting problems in 6.3.2.1 above.
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6.5.3 The Synthesis - Conclusion.
The current situation in the various countries demonstrates
a clear desire to allow for protection on the basis of unfair
competition laws as a supplement to the rights vested by
statute. Unfair competition protection addresses problems of
confusion, dilution and slavish imitation of shapes or
formats. We have found examples of all these forms of
protection in the context of a synthesis between unfair
competition and unjust enrichment law in France, Germany, The
Netherlands and other countries.
Differences between these countries in the protection
available exist at two levels.
The first one is the subject matter that can be subject to
protection on the basis of unfair competition law. These
differences are in essence the result of different levels of
adherence to the preemption doctrine. Where French judges in
the Mars611 case award protection to a format, an achievement
in intangible form that lies in the sphere of goodwill and
sweat of the brow, Dutch courts and critics shy away from
protection of similar achievements in intangible form. In the
latter case this is due to the lack of proximity of the
interest that are protected under statute and unfair
competition law. Conversely the Dutch practice of defining
protectable subject material by looking for an analogy in
protectable interests leads to a similarity in subject
material that qualifies for protection on the basis of either
611 Paris 17.5.1993, [1993] PIBD n° 550 111-522, [1993] 12 EIPR D-282-283.
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statute or unfair competition law. 612
 One might very well
argue that in this approach there is even more reason to
apply the doctrine of preemption on the basis of proximity of
the subject material. Remember that the statutory definition
of protectable subject material expressly leaves material
that deviates from the statutory norm in the public domain.
The distinction that is made in the Dutch ASSM1ex 3 case
between the interests reflected by statutory protection and
those represented in unfair competition law proves more
helpful, since a similar distinction can also be used to
explain the difference between concurrence deloyale and
'concurrence parasitaire'in French law. Statutory protection
reflects different interests in that the level of proof for
infringement is lower once registration is obtained and the
cloak of property has been wrapped around an intangible
asset. The aspect of avoidable confusion is taken out of the
equation and consumer interests are only indirectly addressed
by statutory rights.614
With confusion also as the criterion at the heart of German
unfair competition law, French concurrence deloyale and the
Dutch law on slavish imitation and protection of reputation
seem comparable to German practice. Restrictive
interpretation of confusion and the adherence to the source
612The case involving the performance rights of Elvis Presley (HR 24 February 1989, NJ 1989
701) reveals that the subject material is similar to that protected by statute.
613BorswnU /Stenman HR 31 May 1991, [1992] BIE 50-60.
614AS to the decrease of consumer standing in trade mark law see A. Kamperman Sanders and
S.M. Maniatis: "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality" [19931 11
EIPR 406-415, where an integrationalist view on trade mark and unfair competition law is
advocated in order to return to the consumer a central role in trade mark law in order to reflect
all the functions a trade mark performs.
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doctrine in Germany restrict the scope of action.
On the other hand, and this is the second difference,
remedies vary. Here French and German law show a much greater
level of similarity in so far as the principle of unjust
enrichment can be used to provide a remedy where damage is
absent once liability has been established. However where
German law adheres strictly to the principles of unjust
enrichment and offers restitution only, French parasitic
competition law shows that damages are awarded on the basis
of unjust enrichment.
In Dutch law the proof of damage remains a prerequisite for
liability in very much the same way as the law of passing
off. The presumption of the existence of damage is, however,
wide, so that the behaviour and the factual circumstances
determine liability. The prerequisite for damages does
however affect the remedies that are available. Once damage
has been proven in the assessment of liability, the
calculation of the available compensatory relief reflects the
presence of damage, so that relief on the basis of unjust
enrichment is not yet available.
New developments in Israeli law615 show a departure from the
partial synthesis of unfair competition and unjust enrichment
law, in that the action for unfair competition is based on
the law of unjust enrichment. So far only injunctions have
been granted on this basis, but restitution on the basis of
unjust enrichment is quite conceivable. Herein also lies the
difference from German law, where the wrong forms the basis
for the claim in unjust enrichment leading to restitution.
6150n Israel see 1.2.3.3 above.
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The term 'restitution' in the following diagram therefore
reflects both restitution for wrongs and restitution for
unjust enrichment. Where restitution is not used as a means
to assess relief, it is due to the fact that (the likelihood
of) damages form a prerequisite for liability (expressed by
the arrow).
Liability	 Damages Restitu Injunct
tion	 ion
United	 Passing off	 1-Yes	 No	 Yes
Kingdom_______ ________ _______
The	 Unfair	 i-Yes	 No	 Yes
Netherlands	 competition
Germany	 Unfair	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Competition
France	 Concurrence	 Yes	 Not yet Yes
déloyale	 Yes	 Not yet Yes
Concurrence
paras ita ire
Israel	 Unjust	 No	 Not yet Yes
enrichment
Starting with the United Kingdom, 616 the limitations of the
law of passing off make a synthesis, partial or otherwise,
with unjust enrichment impossible In utch law damage is
still a prerequisite for liability. Unfair competition
however has a wide scope, where many forms of behaviour are
tortious and damage is presumed. A shift from damages to
unjust enrichment leading to a partial synthesis can easily
6160n the UK see 1.2.1.4 above.
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be envisaged and is indeed advocated. The principle of a
reasonable royalty for use of an intangible asset might even
go as far as full synthesis between unfair competition and
unjust enrichment law.
In German law the source doctrine rules supreme, confining
the scope of unjust enrichment to confusion. Artificial
constructions, like the loss of licensing opportunity, make
it possible to provide relief beyond the source doctrine in
the most flagrant dilution cases. The fact that unjust
enrichment is relied upon as one of the possibilities in the
assessment of remedies must certainly reflect on the issue of
prima tacie liability in future. The rigid system of German
unjust enrichment law and the conceptual peculiarities of
this area of law might prove an obstacle to a more
substantive synthesis.
French law recognises parasitic competition, both as an
additional circumstance in 'concurrence déloyale' and as the
principal basis for liability in 'concurrence parasitiare'.
Unjust enrichment, albeit inherent in the principle of
parasitic competition is not expressly recognised as such.
This leads to a situation in which the heritage of a
tradition in unfair competition law is expressed in the award
of damages. It is submitted that this is a transgression of
the limits of the principles of unjust enrichment that, once
recognised, should lead to an outcome of restitution.
In Israel unjust enrichment is recognised as a basis for
liability in unfair competition law. So far only injunctions
have been given. It will be interesting to see whether and in
what form pecuniary remedies will be awarded.
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Conclusion to Chapter Six.
In this chapter the proximity of unfair competition law and
unjust enrichment in three jurisdictions has been discussed.
We have looked at the way in which the doctrine of unjust
enrichment is applied in unfair competition law to see
whether and to what extent a synthesis exists.
Several conclusions can be drawn.
(i) A synthesis between unjust enrichment and unfair
competition law does exist on a partial level.
(ii) The place of the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the
law of unfair competition is recognised, albeit in an
indirect way.
(iii)Despite the fact that the doctrine of unjust enrichment
is applied, either to establish liability, or to limit the
extent of the remedy, an integrated application of both
unjust enrichment as a basis for action and the resulting
remedy of restitution is absent.
(iv) The result of the lack of recognition results in
excessive remedies in France or a lack of coherence in the
ratio for liability in Germany and The Netherlands.
(v) There is a clear desire to remedy the anomalies listed
above, as is shown by the proposals for the protection of
reserved creations.
(vi) The proposals for the protection of reserved creations
in both France and The Netherlands display a tendency to
excessive inonopolisation in shifting the ratio for protection
from unjust enrichment to tort.
(vii) The combination of all these factors shows that the
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action for malign competition is not far removed from current
practice. It is however important to recognise that when
applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment, there is a need
to implement the constraints of the action. An action for
malign competition ought therefore to result in the
appropriate remedy of restitution.
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Chapter 7: Malign Competition: Action and Remedy.
Introduction to Chapter Seven.
In the final chapter an attempt is made to integrate all
aspects of the action for malign competition. Factual
situations from cases will be taken in order to demonstrate
how the action provides a sound rationale in the assessment
of liability. Consideration will also be given to the
remedies that are the result of a successful action. The
first part is a recapitulation of the action for malign
competition where the focus is on the action for free
acceptance augmented with constructive knowledge principles
to assess liability. It is also at this point where we will
ask which additional factors make up the additional factors
in the Baden progression.
The subsequent part is the assessment of the action on a
factual case by case basis. The factual circumstances are
taken from several cases that have been discussed in previous
chapters and have been selected to display the maximum amount
of problems that can arise in malign competition cases.
After a short description of the facts, the considerations
are put ina question - answer routine, so as to achieve the
maximum practical result. Due to this practical approach the
conclusions about the working of the action and the problems
that it deals with follow from the examples given. These
conclusions have therefore been included in the text with the
example it emanates from.
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7.1 Malign Competition: From Liability to Remedy.
Now that we have seen that a synthesis, albeit partial,
between unfair competition law and unjust enrichment does
already exist, it is now time to explore the working of
malign competition. As we have already seen liability in an
action for malign competition is based on the principle of
unjust enrichment, leading to a full synthesis of unfair
competition law and the principles of unjust enrichment.
Recapitulating, an action for malign competition starts with
the establishment that something of value has passed by means
of subtraction from the plaintiff to the defendant, by which
the latter has been enriched at the expense of the former.
For the enrichment to be unfair, the enrichment of the
defendant has to be the result of a non voluntary transfer,
or free acceptance of the benefit by the defendant.
In case of non voluntary transfer the plaintiff has been
active in ensuring that it is clear that he does not intend
to lose his assets by subtraction.
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Non Voluntary Transfer:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Action	 Tagging or	 None
Demarcation
Knowledge X Deemed to be
knowledgable.
Obj ectivated
knowledge
Defence	 X	 Subjective
devaluation
Counter	 Enrichment:	 X
-Free acceptance
-Incontrovertible
benefit
a) necessity
b) realisation of
financialgain	 ___________________
Liability in cases of free acceptance exists in two guises.
In the case of passive free acceptance, there is the
difficulty of intermeddling. The defendant is passive and the
plaintiff has distributed benefits freely, and can not expect
to receive restitution. Only in cases of mistake will the
plaintiff be able to take action.
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Free Acceptance:
Plaintiff	 Defendant
Passive
Action	 Internieddling
Defence	 X	 intermeddling: one
can not give
benefits for free
and then turn
around expecting
to be reconipensed.
Counter	 Mistake
Where active free acceptance is concerned, the defendant is
not the passive party, but actively sets out to bring about
the shift in assets from the plaintiff to himself. Central to
this proposition is that the defendant has exercised his
choice in the appropriation of the asset. It is therefore
important that the defendant was knowledgeable of the fact
that his use of the asset constitutes an enrichment at the
expense of another.
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Plaintiff	 Defendant
Active
Action	 X	 Choice:
-appropriation
-copying
-seizure
Knowledge	 X	 -custom in
business
-knowledge of
source
-opportunity to
enquire
-form of action
___________________ __________________ -plaintiff's tag
Defence	 X	 No knowledge
Counter	 Enrichment:	 X
-Incontrovertible
benefit
a) necessity
b) realisation of
financial gain
Constructive	 X
___________________ knowledge
The Baden Progression
263
The principle of
constructive knowledge,
as set out in the Baden
progression can serve as
a means to determine
whether the defendant is
knowledgeable and has
been able to make a free
dI	 N....	 Enq.	 rdc...	 S,.p.d..
K.o.du.tw.
LD	 0	 I
choice.
The defendant needs to be able to make an assessment of the
risks associated with the use of the asset he intends to
appropriate. The knowledge the defendant posessed when he was
making a risk assessment needs to reflect the freedom to make
a choice. This reflects the desire to protect truely innocent
risk takers from being faced with unexpected claims. Only if
the defendant has been able to exercise his free will in
making a choice on the basis of the knowledge he posessed,
can liability be imposed on the basis of knowledge alone.
Where knowledge becomes progressively more constructive,
other factors need to be present to deem the defendant
knowledgeable.
Where other factors need to be considered, the defendant's
choice of the way he goes about obtaining the asset has to be
seen in view of custom in business, knowledge of the source
of the asset and an opportunity the defendant had to enquire
with the plaintiff whether he has any objections to a
transfer of the benefit. The plaintiff then has the
yes	 yes
yes	 yes
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opportunity to raise objections, or offer a settlement.
Other Factors:
Know]. edge
I Source	 Enquire
no	 no
Custom
Choice:	 Appropriati maybe
on
Choice:	 Copying	 yes
Choice:	 Seizure	 yes
Knowledge
Custom &
	 Source &	 Enquire &
Source	 Enquire	 Custom
Choice:	 Appropriati maybe
	 yes	 yes
on
Choice:	 Copying	 yes	 yes	 yes
Choice:	 Seizure	 yes	 yes	 yes
In the assessment of active free acceptance cases, the
interplay between the defendant's choice and factors in the
market determine the elements that make up for the lack of
actual knowledge in the Baden progression. The defendant's
choice can display a development in the level of behavioural
involvement in the taking of the asset at the centre of the
dispute. Where there is appropriation of an asset, the
defendant has incorporated the entire or substantial parts of
the plaintiff's achievement in the creation of his own. Where
there is copying, the independent addition that characterises
appropriation is absent. The defendant has recreated the same
circumstances to achieve the same result the plaintiff has
arrived at, or has replicated the plaintiff's product.
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Where there is seizure, the defendant has expropriated the
plaintiff's asset. Examples of seizure are direct moulding,
decoding or cracking encoded signals, or the circumvention of
copy protection. All these examples point to a situation in
which the defendant has dedicated great efforts to his
encroachment on the plaintiff's asset.
7.2 Malign Competition on a Case by Case Basis.
Let us now look at the working of malign competition by
looking at selected cases from various jurisdictions. The
cases in question are selected because of their factual
situation, legal reasoning and remedial outcome. In looking
at these cases we will discuss the rationale underlying
liability in malign competition as opposed to unfair
competition and we will also discuss the remedies that are
available once prima facie liability has been accepted.
7.2.1 Non-voluntary Transfer.
For an example of non-voluntary transfer we will turn to the
Dutch decoder cases.617
The defendants in both cases were involved in the marketing
of decoders for the encrypted signal of cable television.618
617Pres. Rb. The Hague 20-1-1986; KG 1986, 92 (FilmNet) and (Ten Electronics/Esselte) Court
of Appeal Amsterdam 2-5-1991 BIE 1992, 49 at 166 (FilmNet If). For a description of all
decoder cases see 6.2.1 above.
68Please note that in the United Kingdom the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 in
sections 296-299 expressly provides rights and remedies against devices designed to circumvent
copy-protection, the fraudulent reception of programmes and the apparatuses for the
unauthorised reception of transmissions.
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Q.:	 Is there a case for malign competition for non-
voluntary transfer?
A.: Yes, the plaintiff has encrypted his signal. This
constitutes tagging. In doing so he has taken action
to demarcate his asset. The defendant can therefore
be held to have sufficient knowledge to assess the
business risk he chose to take.
Q.:	 Can the defendant rely on subjective devaluation and
claim that the asset was of no value to him?
A..:	 No, because the defendant can be shown to have
enriched himself at the plaintiff's expense. By
ignoring the fact that the plaintiff had demarcated
his asset, the defendant has accepted freely.
Furthermore there is incontrovertible benefit now
that the defendant has realised financial gain by
selling the decoders.
Can the defendant be held liable just like that? What
if the tag is applied to something that is in the
public domain already?
A.: In that case you may tag all you like, but the
question remains whether the subtraction by the
defendant leads to an enrichment at the expense of
the plaintiff. There must be a public domain defence.
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Conclusion: The defendant might choose to subtract and use
the asset despite the presence of a tag or demarcation on the
grounds of a 'public domain defence'. This highlights the
problem with tagging yet again. 619
 It shows that it is not in
the interest of a plaintiff to tag too much, for it might
give the defendant ample opportunity to demonstrate that what
has been demarcated actually belongs in the public domain.
Is this the end of the story then?
A.:	 Not entirely. The plaintiff can show that what he has
tagged is not really in the public domain. In the
FilmNet cases it could be shown that the distribution
system of which the encryption was breached did
transmit a signal that was susceptible to copyright.
By offering a facility to break in to the
distribution system, the defendants indirectly
contributed to copyright infringement. The defendant
can also not rely on a public domain defence in
malign competition.
Q.:	 What if the signal is not susceptible to copyright?
The transfer may not be voluntary, but does the
plaintiff have any grounds for action left if his tag
does not fully stand up to a public domain defence?
6 We have seen that tagging leads to the creation of monopolistic claims. This shifts the
rationale of any action from unjust enrichment to tort. See 4.1 above for a description of the
importance of tagging in the tort of 'malcompetitive copying'. See 6.3.2.1, 6.3.2.2 and 6.5.2.3
above for a description of the proposals on the protection of reserved creations and their
reliance on registration of claims to intangibles.
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A.:	 No, in that case an action for non-voluntary transfer
must fail.
Conclusion: A plaintiff will be successful in an action for
non-voluntary transfer if his tag or demarcation can
withstand the defendant's public domain defence.
Q.: So the decoder people are successful and people who
transmit encrypted materials that are not susceptible
to copyright, are not. Is this the end of the story
then?
A.: Not quite. The plaintiff can still rely on an action
for active free acceptance. Encryption does
constitute a tag. Despite the fact that the
demarcation can not carry an action for non-
voluntary transfer, it does make the defendant
knowledgeable, so that he has been able to assess the
business risks he was taking. In free acceptance it
is now possible to assess the behaviour of the
defendant in view of what he knew and in view of the
choice he has made in subtracting the asset. In the
decoder cases the defendant chose to break in to the
plaintiff's distribution system. This amounts to a
seizure. The combination of this choice with the
fact that the defendant had actual knowledge make
liability for malign competition on the basis of
active free acceptance possible.
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So what are the remedies that are available in this
situation?
A.:	 An injunction and restitution for the amount to which
the defendant has been enriched, which in this case
will be the financial gain the defendant has obtained
by selling the decoders.
What about the subscription fees the plaintiff has
lost by the fact that there were pirate decoders on
the market?
A.: The action in malign competition offers restitution
only for the part the defendant has enriched himself
at the expense of the plaintiff. It is not a tort.
If the defendant has sold one decoder, he has been
enriched for the amount of the sale. Only this amount
can be taken into account for restitution. If the
defendant has however offered after service, by
constantly adapting the decoder he has sold to meet
changing encryption methods, this would amount to a
subscription. Any revenue derived from the after
service can also be included for restitution.
Q.:	 Is there room for limits to restitution and
injunction, or will an injunction result in a de
facto monopoly?
A.:	 No, the rules of preemption may be applicable where
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remedies are concerned. Time limitation on
injunctions and limitations on the sums eligible for
restitution may be imposed. To describe these
preemptive rules let us look at another case, that
also describes the action for free acceptance in
malign competition in more detail.
7.2.2 Active Free Acceptance.
In order to describe an active free acceptance case we will
now look at the Decca case620.
In the Decca case there was no encryption of the signal. The
signal itself consisted of a series of bleeps and was as
such not susceptible to copyright. There was also the
question of the end of patent protection for the receiver.
This means that there was no tagging or demarcation, meaning
that if action were to be brought under malign competition,
if it would have to be under active free acceptance.
I can see that by copying the plaintiff's receiver,
the defendant enriches himself at the expense of the
plaintiff, but that is not unjust. The patent had
lapsed, so the receiver was in the public domain.
A.: That is correct, but that is not the only way in
which the defendant is enriched. The only value of
the receiver lies in the fact that there is a network
transmitting a signal. The network is maintained by
620HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987, 191; [19871 3 EIPR D-50.
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Decca and the defendant in that case benefits from
Decca's efforts in this respect. The defendant has
therefore appropriated Decca's business assets in
order to gain benefit for himself. He has done so by
latching on to the other's achievement. The defendant
is delivering an achievement that is entirely
dependent on the plaintiff's for its value.
We all base our own efforts on other's achievements,
so we all enrich ourselves at the expense of others.
It is a fundamental aspect of human nature and
cultural and economic development. What is wrong with
the defendant's behaviour?
A.: We are not concerned with what is wrong with the
defendant's behaviour in the sense that we try to
determine whether the defendant's behaviour is
tortious. In malign competition we look at the choice
the defendant has made in the light of what he knew
about the nature of business in order to determine
whether there is liability on the basis of unjust
enrichment. In this case the defendant has
appropriated the plaintiff's achievement whilst he
was aware of the source from which the achievement
emanated and he also had an opportunity to make
enquiries with regards to the upkeep of the
transmission system. The benefit the defendant
derives from selling the receivers without
contributing to the transmission system results in a
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financial gain, so there is art incontrovertible
benefit. Prima tacie liability has to be accepted on
these grounds.
Q.:	 But what about the fact that the patent has lapsed?
Accepting liability in this case would result in a de
facto extension of the patent right.
A.:	 Not quite. The amount of the enrichment only covers
the upkeep and maintenance of the transmission
system. The sale of the receiver as such is not
included in the equation, because it is in the public
domain. Now that the plaintiff has benefited from the
monopoly during the maximum amount of time available
under a special law, he has had time to recoup his
initial investment. For this reason an injunction
would be out of place, for it would result in an
extension of the patent right.
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Injunction assessment
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Conclusion: Prima facie liability can be preempted based on
the fact that time has given the plaintiff an opportunity to
recuperate his investment. Despite the fact that there is
prima .facie liability, an injunction is preempted.
Surely the same principle applies to the remedy of
restitution. Decca did have time to recoup the
investment, so there must be a point where, after a
certain amount of time, this recuperation of the
initial investment in the whole system leaves a
claim for restitution in malign competition subject
to preemption.
A.: This position is sound in principle. Once protection
under a special regime has lapsed and the subject
matter has reverted to the public domain, competitors
wishing to use the material should not be faced with
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pecuniary claims, even if they are restitutionary.
This situation does however change if other interests
are addressed and when the subject material is
different. The patent was granted for the receiver.
The defendant is now free to copy it. The defendant
can however only sell the receiver because Decca has
set up the transmitter system. The interest in both
transmitter system and receiver has however de facto
been the subject of a monopoly. It would therefore be
inappropriate to now distinguish between the receiver
and the transmitter system. This means that after the
lapse of the patent, when the total investment has
been protected by a headstart, preemption must apply
to restitution. We must not forget that the action
for malign competition is based on the law of unjust
enrichment. An injunction would have to reflect this
factor by granting an injunction to prevent the
defendant from obtaining an ongoing incontrovertible
benefit.
Conclusion: Prima facie liability can be preempted on the
basis that time has given the plaintiff an opportunity to
recuperate his investment. The preemption norm is primarily
dictated by time, return on investment and practice. These
are all factors that make up a head start. As such the
preemption norm is a flexible one. In the light of the
factors in the Decca case, the norm is determined by the time
factor that was granted by special legislation. Where such a
clear time limit is absent, it will be up to the courts to
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make this assessment. 621
 Despite the fact that there is prima
facie liability, restitution is preempted.
Restitution assessment
Head start and preemption chart
1W
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nstmen1	 ---- Prempiiat normi
So this ends the action for Decca then?
A.:	 Not quite. There is still the matter of the upkeep
and possible expansion of the transmission system.
Maintenance and/or expansion can increase the
expenditure on investment and lift the expense above
the preemption norm.
Q.:	 Hang on, that is a bit of a deus ex raachina!
A.:	 You may think so, but the defendant has previously
been exempt from making contributions to the system
on the basis of preemption. His enrichment at the
621See in this respect the description of the 'springboard injunctions' at 7.3 below.
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expense of the plaintiff has been exempted from
restitution on this basis. Maintenance and expansion
costs however lead to a renewed enrichment if the
defendant could not be asked to contribute to the
system.
Restitution assessment
Headstart, reinstmerTt and preemption
Time
Invesimenl	 ---- Preemption rrrn
Q.:	 Can you give me an example of a situation in which
this reinvestment norm could be used?
A.:	 Let's look at the Decca case again. As long as the
defendant competes within the boundaries of the old
system, prior to renewed investment, he will be
allowed to do so, but as soon as the defendant
benefits from maintenance or expansion, it leads to
a renewed enrichment. Once there is a renewed
enrichment there also is a renewed claim for malign
competition free from preemptive restraints, provided
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the reinvestment results in substantial improvements
to the existing system, so that there is an actual
case for enrichment on the side of the defendant.622
In all likelihood the plaintiff will ask the
defendant for a contribution prior to the new
investment, in which case the plaintiff will also
have demarcated his asset, leading to a strong
position in an action for non-voluntary transfer.
Even if a tag is absent, the plaintiff still has a
cause of action under active free acceptance, subject
to the choice and knowledge of the defendant.
Conclusion: Decca could be successful in its action if it can
demonstrate it has reinvested in his asset to such an extent
that it results in a substantial enrichment for the
defendant. The reinvestment forms the basis for a continued
shift of benefit from the plaintiff to the defendant well
after the preemption norm. This leads to a renewed enrichment
that is subject to an action for malign competition.
So under malign competition Decca could have been
successful?
A.:	 Yes, Decca could have been awarded restitution for
investments it made after the preemptive term of the
initial head start assessment to keep up the
622Exemplifying this point is the Amended proposal of 4 October 1993 for a Council Directive
on the legal protection of databases (Corn (93) 464 final-SYN 393) [1993] OJ C308/1.
According to Article 9 and 12, the term of protection can be renewed by a substantial change
to the selection or arrangement of the contents of a database.
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transmission system. In the unfair competition case
these costs were attributed to Decca on the basis of
inherent risks of the way in which Decca's company
structure was set up. Whereas this might have been
appropriate in determining tortious liability, it
does not detract from the enrichment in the action
for malign competition. The contributions from states
towards the upkeep of the system on the grounds of
public interest can of course be taken into account
in the determination of the level of enrichment the
defendant has enjoyed at the expense of the
plaintiff. Argued in this light the refusal of
liability could have been supported by the argument
that the enrichment was not at the expense of the
plaintiff. The amount of state involvement is however
not mentioned.
Q. One thing is still not clear. In Decca the head start
preemption norm was the result of the time restraints
set by the special legislation. What if such an
indication for a norm is absent from the start or
what if there has been a case of renewed investment?
7.3 Springboard Injunctions.
Where remedies are concerned the protection of a head start
period is not new, as the so called springboard injunctions
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in English cases involving confidentiality show. 623 In Seager
v. Copydex Ltd., 624 Lord Denning quoted Roxbury J. in the
Terrapin case, 625 who defined the springboard doctrine as
follows:
As I understand it, the essence of this branch of the law, whatever the origin of it may
be, is that a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use
it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential
communication, and springboard it remains even when all features have been published
or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public...
This shows that the springboard doctrine 626 is applicable even
though the material that is subject to confidentiality has
moved into the public domain. The temporary nature of the
springboard injunction makes it extremely suitable for
application in the injunction and restitution assessment,
because it can be used to determine the preemptive norm. In
the Speed Seal case Fox U considered the purpose of the
injunction and the circumstances in which it may be granted:
Whether a plaintiff, in circumstances such as the present, needs protection might
depend on the state of the market. If for example, the only traders seriously competing
in the market are the plaintiff and the defendant Ithe latter being a person who, in
breach of duty to the plaintiff, wrongfully published the information to the world) it may
be a matter of continuing importance to the plaintiff that the defendant should not
623For a description of springboard injunction cases see B. Napier: "Confidentiality and Labour
Law", pp. 109-121 in "Confidentiality and the Law" (1990) Lloyd's of London Press, L. Clarke
ed.
624Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] RPC 349.
625See Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders' Supply Co. Ltd., Taylor Woodrow Ltd. and Swftplan Ltd.
(1960) RPC 128 at 130.
626For reaffirmation of the doctrine see the most authoritative cases: Coco v. A.N. aark Ltd.
(1969) RPC 41; Potters-Ballotini ltd. v. Weston-Baker [19771 RPC 202, where at 206 Denning
MR stressed that the springboard injunction is one of limited duration; Harrison v. Project &
Design Co. Ltd. [1978] FSR 81, in which the time period during which the information was
confidential was assessed. In this case the defendants had constructed a lift according to the
plaintiff's confidential specifications. The defendants were held liable for the period up to the
time when they made modifications to the lift. See at 87-88; Speed Seal Products Ltd. v.
Paddington and another [1986] 1 All ER 91, where an injunction was granted despite the fact
that the information, a patent application, was already public knowledge; Roger Bullivant Ltd.
v. Ellis [1987] IRLR 491, where springboard injunction was granted for the use of a card index
containing addresses which were freely available elsewhere.
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continue to get the benefit of the wrongdoing. If, on the other hand, the publication has
produced a market with a large number of traders, the elimination of one trader (the
defendant) might not be of consequence.627
This quote shows the willingness of the courts to look at the
market in order to determine the scope of the injunction. It
is submitted that market factors and in particular the
particular restrictions that follow from the number of
participants in the market could equally apply to injunction
assessment in malign competition cases. For restitution
assessment the market factors will be of importance to
determine to what extent the defendant has been enriched.
Because there is a remedy in restitution, many market
participants will mean a smaller contribution from each
individual competitor.
Apart from the number of market participants, the market
share of plaintiff, defendant and other market participants
will be important in the determination of what the extent of
the enrichment is and what the scope for an injunction or
restitution is.
7.4 Malign Competition on a Case by Case Basis; Further
Examples.
In the common law world no other case provoked more dismay at
the lost opportunity to develop the law of unfair competition
than the Privy Council's judgetnent in the Cadbury Schweppes
and Pub Squash628 case. In denying the appeal from the
627E 1986] 1 All ER 91 at 95.
628t 1981 1 1 All ER 213, [1981] RPC 429. For a description see G. Dworkin: "Notes on Cases.
Passing Off and Unfair Competition: An Opportunity Missed" [1981] 44 MLR 564; J. Lahore:
"The Pub Squash Case. Legal Theft or Free Competition" [1981] 2 EIPR 54-56.
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decision of Powell J. in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
of 8 August 1979, Lord Scarman considered that the acts of
the respondent did not fall within the requirements for
passing of f, because the relevant misrepresentation was
absent.
The acts of the defendant can be described as taking
advantage of the marketing effort of Cadbury Schweppes, a
company that had successfully launched and marketed its lemon
squash drink by means of an advertising campaign consisting
of images of masculine nostalgia and the old fashioned thirst
quenching qualities of the lemon drink served in pubs of
lore. Pub Squash followed in Cadbury Schweppes' wake by
launching its own lemon squash names 'Solo', supported by an
advertising campaign containing the same imagery. It was
accepted that the respondent had:
[Siet out in a deliberate and calculated fashion to take advantage of the plaintiff's past
efforts in developing Solo and of the plaintiff's past and anticipated future efforts in
developing a market for a product such as Solo, and that in particular the defendant,
by its officers, sought to copy or to approximate the formula for Solo, and chose a
product name and package for the defendant's proposed product derived from and
intended to gain the benefit of the plaintiff's past and anticipated advertising campaign,
and the plaintiff's package for their product.629
Despite the acceptance of factual misappropriation, the
misappropriation was not accepted as a ground for a legal
claim. The misappropriation did not meet the requirements of
the traditional test of passing off, namely the need to show
distinctiveness and misrepresentation. This demonstrates that
the court was of the opinion that the boundaries of the tort
of passing of f could not be stretched. The Cadbury-Schweppes
and Pub Squash case epitomises the search for preconceived
629[1981] 1 All ER 213 per Powell J.
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property interests 630
 in an attempt to minimise the unchecked
growth of monopolies and the perceived detriment to
competition this brings with it:
It is only if a plaintiff can establish that a defendant has invaded his intangible property
right' in his product by misappropriating descriptions which have become recognised
by the market as distinctive of the product that the law will permit competition to be
restricted. Any other approach would encourage monopoly. The new, small man would
increasingly find his entry into an existing market obstructed by the large traders already
well known as operating in it.631
This displays the link that is made between the intangible
property right and the tortious infraction thereof. In
reading Cadbury-Schweppes one can not escape the feeling that
the judges were sympathetic to the plight of the plaintiff,
but felt unable to pass beyond the confinements of tortious
liability and base liability on other grounds than pre-
recognised rights, namely the recognised and distinctive
badge of trade, of intangible property.
This is not strange in view of the French case of Mars
Alimentaire v. Aegan Trade CY and Istanbul Gida Dis
Ticaret, 632
 where the defendant latched on to the plaintiff's
packaging concept for candy bars and was restrained and
ordered to pay damages on the basis of 'concurrence
parasitaire'. Here the link between tort and intangible
property right is broken in order to stretch the confinements
of tort to incorporate parasitic behaviour. The remedies
imposed as a result do in turn lead to the recognition of a
de fct monopoly.
630See in this respect 2.1.1 above on the limits to the role of property as the basis for unfair
competition cases.
631[19811 I All ER 213 at 223.
632Pis 17.5.1993, [1993J PIBD n° 550 111-522, [1993] 12 EIPR D-282-283. See 6.3.2 above.
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How does the action for malign competition change
this?
A.: Let us first look at the Cadbury-Schweppes case,
where the plaintiff's achievement, or badge of trade
consisted of the advertising and marketing effort
surrounding the launch and further promotion of the
'Solo' lemon drink. The defendants latched on to the
advertising concept and launched their drink in the
wake of Cadbury Schweppes', incorporating the same
conceptual imagery in their campaign. In order to be
successful in an action for malign competition, the
plaintiff has to base his action on either non-
voluntary transfer or free acceptance. In cases for
non-voluntary transfer the plaintiff has to
demonstrate he has demarcated his achievement,
indicating to the defendant that he does not consent
with the alienation of his achievement. In this case
the product itself is marked by the mark 'Solo', but
the marketing and advertising effort is not marked,
making this a free acceptance case.
Q.: Could one not could argue that the visual image, the
slogans and the general campaign were so
intrinsically linked to the plaintiff's product that
Cadbury-Schweppes has in effect tagged their campaign
by association with its product and trade marks?
A.:	 This is exactly the point on which the passing off
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case failed. The Pub Squash Co. had sufficiently
distinguished its product from 'Solo'. In effect the
argument presented by Cadbury-Schweppes amounted to
the claim of a property interest in its campaign in
order to stretch the boundaries of tortious
liability. Similarly a claim by means of a tag,
expressly made or otherwise, may seek to establish
some proprietary interest in malign competition
cases. It may therefore have to be discounted in
malign competition cases, even if it has been
expressly made.
Conclusion: Tagging only really works in instances where
physically restricting measures, like copy protection or
encryption and decoding safeguards, 633
 have been taken. In
other cases it is hard to assess a tag or demarcation on its
merits as far as it amounts to a proprietary claim. Tags and
demarcations can however be invaluable aids in the
demonstration of knowledge on the part of the defendant in
malign competition cases based on active free acceptance.
So active free acceptance it is. How does the
plaintiff's claim progress from there?
A.:	 The plaintiff has to show that the defendant has
enriched himself at the plaintiff's expense. In the
Pub Squash case the sales of 'Solo' were some fifteen
percent lower in 1976, after the launch of 'Pub
633S the encryption cases described in 7.2.1 above.
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Squash', than they were in the previous year. By 1978
Solo's share of the soft drinks market had decreased
from eight percent, accumulated in the period before
the launch of 'Pub Squash', to three and a half
percent after the competing product's launch.
Q.:	 Surely this shift can't be completely attributed to
Pub Squash's latching on to Cadbury's advertising
efforts. In the normal cause of competition it is
inevitable that the Pub Squash Co. would capture some
of the market.
A.:	 It is for this purpose that one has to look at the
market and what is a normal entry and growth level of
products in the soft drinks market. In this light the
reduction in sales looks substantial, as does the
reduction in the share of the lemon drink in the
whole soft drinks market. An enrichment of the
defendant does appear to be present.
We are looking at active free acceptance, so the
actions of the defendant are of importance, aren't
they?
A.:	 In active free acceptance it is important that the
defendant has made a choice involving the
appropriation of the plaintiff's badge of trade. In
the Pub Squash case the defendant chose to latch on
to the plaintiff's marketing and advertising effort
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and attempted to permanently associate himself with
the plaintiff's image, resulting in a sustained
decrease in the plaintiff's market share. The choice
the defendant made in latching on to the advertising
campaign amounts to an appropriation of the
advertising concept (the link between the drink and
masculinity) and a copying of the visual image and
slogans ('those great old squashes like the pubs used
'	 •	 .to make and a man's drink ) is one which displays
the action the defendant has taken in obtaining the
benefit.
How do we know that the defendant has made a real
choice?
A.: For the defendant to make a real choice in obtaining
a benefit, he has to be knowledgable of the risks he
was taking in business. In essence it means that the
defendant must have been able to make a balanced
commercial decision, based on reliable information.
If the information is not sufficient or reliable, it
places the defendant in a position in which he could
not have bargained with the defendant or other market
players. This position stems from the premise that
the more information one has about a party with whom
one bargains, the more economic the settlement will
be. 634
 If the defendant has insufficient information
to look for alternatives and insufficient bargaining
634See 4.1 above.
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opportunities with the plaintiff or other market
participants, it would be impossible to hold the
defendant liable for the choice he has made in
obtaining the benefit.
Q.:	 How do we assess the choice the defendant has made?
A.: We look at the form of action the defendant was
taking in light of the amount and quality of the
knowledge he possessed. Knowledge factors involve
the customary practice in business as a whole and the
relevant market in particular, the source from which
the obtained benefit emanated, the opportunity the
defendant had to make enquiries and the plaintiff's
demarcations or tags. In the Pub Squash case all
factors indicate that the defendant knew very well
what he was doing when he appropriated and copied
Cadbury-Schweppes' advertising achievement. The whole
point in latching on to the imagery and concept that
surrounded the 'Solo' drink was the ease of market
penetration in the wake of Cadbury's success. The Pub
Squash Co. had ample opportunity to make enquiries
and was also familiar with the source of the Solo
drink. The fact that they did not enter into
negotiations for a license is in all likelihood due
to the fact that they did not expect to get Cadbury-
Schweppes' consent. This fact does not, however, make
their choice less real. On the contrary, the Pub
Squash Co. must have realised that Cadbury-Schweppes
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was not going to be happy with Pub Squash latching on
to their campaign, indicating that the transfer of
the benefit could not in any way be perceived as
voluntary. This points to a minimum of type three
knowledge on the Baden progression, to say the least.
in combination with the act of appropriation and
copying, liability must be accepted.
Q.:	 What remedies would be available to Cadbury-
Schweppes?
A.: Let us turn to restitution first. As indicated before
it has to be accepted that by entering into the
market for soft drinks and into the market for lemon
squash in particular, 'Pub Squash' would make some
inroads into the market share of Solo , simply
because this similar product has been launched in
competition. With this in mind, the extent of the
defendant's enrichment can be quite easily assessed
in view of the substantial reduction in sales of
Cadbury-Schweppes' product and the overall decrease
in market share. With the constraints of the, albeit
not necessarily balanced, 635 link between defendant's
gain and plaintiff's loss, the restitutionary remedy
will not give additional benefits to the plaintiff.
Conclusion: An aggrieved party will only instigate action if
635See 2.4.2 to 2.4.3 above.
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the loss he suffered due to another's enrichment is severe
enough to run the risk of instigating action. The action for
malign competition will therefore be a much more market
driven action for those who have suffered from unjust
enrichment. With its restitutionary remedy, the plaintiff
will only see the balance redressed for the amount the
defendant has been enriched. The plaintiff will not gain
damages, as he would if tortious liability were accepted.
With only restitution to gain, the 'floodgates of litigation
will remain ajar.
Q.: Which period will be taken into account in the
assessment of the defendant's gain and the
plaintiff's loss? Are there preemptive constraints?
A.: There will be no problem to take into account the
period during which the Pub Squash Co. used its
advertising campaign with which it latched on to
Cadbury Schweppes' campaign. In view of the duration
of Cadbury's own campaign the detrimental effects on
Cadbury's side and the beneficial effects to Pub
Squash's. Once Cadbury's own campaign has ended, it
can not claim a monopoly in the advertising concept
in perpetuity. In that sense the sales effects of the
campaign are decisive. As long as the badge of trade
is identifiable for the purpose of restitution
assessment as that of 'Solo', owned by Cadbury-
Schweppes there is not a problem. Further
consideration can also be given to the effect of an
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injunction.
Will there be an injunction in this case?
A.: In line with springboard injunctions, 636 the
injunction should be of a temporary nature. Such an
injunction would give Cadbury-Schweppes the benefit
of a head start. The term will be dictated by market
considerations and might comprise of the duration of
Cadbury-Schweppes' advertising campaign and the
period shortly thereafter, when the particular badge
of trade used is still being associated with Cadbury-
Schweppes' product. A more finite norm in the
injunction against Pub Squash in particular could be
found in the initial term for trade mark protection
for five years as an absolute maximum. Should the Pub
Squash Co. feel so inclined, it could then use the
concept, since it has payed restitution for the use
of the particular badge of trade. Further restitution
would generally be preempted in view of time
considerations. If a new market entrant subsequently
chooses to latch on to Cadbury-Schweppes' badge of
trade, the case for malign competition, restitution
and injunction assessment would start anew.
Q.:	 How does malign competition change the Mars case?
A.:	 The action for malign competition can change the Mars
636See 7.3 above.
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case in two respects. Fist of all it will change the
rationale on which liability is assessed and in the
second place, if liability were accepted, it would
change the nature and extent of the remedies.
Q.:	 How?
A.: The Mars case was decided on the basis of the tort of
'concurrence parasitaire', consisting of latching on
to a competitor's packaging concept of selling bars
in sets of three with a weight of 300 grammes.
Application of the principles of malign competition
will first require that Mars shows that the defendant
Aegean has enriched himself at Mars' expense. Despite
the fact that enrichment and impoverishment do not
have to outweigh one another, Mars will have a
difficult task to show that there is enrichment and
impoverishment. The consideration by the French judge
that latching on to a concept in the wake of the
launch of a concept by a market leader constitutes a
wrong will simply not do to demonstrate enrichment.
The defendant's behaviour may be described as
parasitic, but as long as there is no enrichment,
there is no action in malign competition.
Q.:	 Parasitic behaviour was even considered to be a wrong
and in other words tortious. How can this be?
A.:	 This is the basic problem where the rationale on
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which the judgement was based is concerned. The
concept of parasitic behaviour in cases where prima
facie entitlements are absent seems to indicate that
we should at least be able to demonstrate that the
defendant has enriched himself in some way or that
the plaintiff has suffered some loss. Unlike Cadbury-
Schweppes, Mars did not demonstrate a decline in
sales on its part and also failed to advance in which
way Aegean had actually been enriched. Instead the
French judge considered that following a market
leader was automatically wrong. Contentious
principles of tortious liability were simply
introduced to gloss over the lack of arguments on
Mars' side. In my opinion the judgenient lacks both
grounds for action and a satisfactory rationale for
liability.
Q.: Isn't this assessment a bit harsh on the part of
Mars? The only grounds for action it had at its
disposal in Fance were 'concurrence déloyale' and
'concurrence parasitaire'. The basis for both forms
of action is tort, so Mars can not have been expected
to argue differently. What if Mars had shown the
necessary enrichment in an action for malign
competition?
A.: Mars might have been successful in that case.
Following a market leader is not sufficient ground
for liability without unjust enrichment, but does
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demonstrate sufficient knowledge on the part of the
defendant. Provided no other reasons, such as demands
from the packaging or tranport industry, for changing
the size, shape and weight of a product other than
latching on to a packaging concept can be advanced,
liability for malign competition could be accepted
along the same lines as in the Cadbury-Schweppes
example I have given. The remedy would then also have
to reflect the fact that liability is based on the
principle of unjust enrichment and has to be
restricted to restitution for the amount of the
enrichment or a springboard type injunction for a
limited amount of time.
Conclusion: The principle of unjust enrichment is not only
determinative in the assessment of liability, it is also a
constraint. Unlike in cases of tortious liability, a real
shift in capital or benefit has to be shown. Failure to do so
will lead to a dismissal of the case.
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Conclusion.
The recognition of a law of unfair competition beyond the
confinements of the prevention of confusion in the market has
proven difficult, especially in the common law world. The
rationale for the protection of badges of trade, achievements
in interests that lack a formal recognition of a right of
property, is seen as ambiguous, arbitrary and fundamentally
unsound.
It has been shown that reliance on property theories, policy
decisions and the application of principles analogous to
traditional intellectual property laws and tortious
principles all go a long way to validate the protection of
badges of trade, but do not give a sound theoretical basis
for the assessment of the existence of liability and what the
scope of the resulting remedies should be.
Property theories lead to circular reasoning, so that an
entitlement can not be assessed independently. The fact that
judges make policy decisions when they intervene on the basis
of their assessment the economic and social results of market
behaviour may be legitimate, but also does not provide
guidance in the determination as to where entitlements should
lie. Principles of tort provide an important means to assess
liability, but rely on both property theories and policy
considerations to shape their boundaries. The boundaries of
tort are therefore often clearly set, especially in the
common law world. Analogy is very helpful when considering
subject matter similar to traditional intellectual property
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rights, but this is also its weakness. The principle of
preemption serves explicitly to deny protection when rights
have not been expressly granted.
In this thesis an attempt has been made to provide a coherent
model, called an action for malign competition, to overcome
these problems associated with the increasingly expanding
monopolies in the field of unfair competition law. It has
been shown that sufficient elements of the action are present
in civil law and even in common law systems, where the
resistance against one general action has been greatest, to
support the proposed action for malign competition. The
action for malign competition has been based on the doctrine
of unjust enrichment augmented with principles of
constructive knowledge.
Contrary to tort, the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the
action for malign competition requires that an actual shift
in benefit has taken place from the plaintiff to the
defendant, whereas the inclusion of the principles of
constructive knowledge require that the defendant has been
able to make a choice with regards to the risks he was taking
in the appropriation of the other's badge of trade. This
means that liability is not imposed lightly.
Also contrary to tort, the action for malign competition
results in a restitutionary remedy. The fact that a plaintiff
can never gain more than his own loss measured against the
defendant's gain, should secure that action is only taken
when substantial interests are at stake.
The remedy of an injunction resulting from a successful
action in malign competition is confined by the principles of
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preemption. This can result in temporary restraints by means
of a springboard injunction to protect a head start in
business.
In providing case based examples of the working of the action
for malign competition I have shown that the action is not
only coherent, but can also be put in to practice.
Rather than relying on elusive notions of fairness in the
market place, the restraints contained in the action for
malign competition: the doctrine of unjust enrichment,
assessment of cognisance, the application of clear preemption
norms, lead to a form of action of which the boundaries are
clear.
With malign competition, fears of ever expanding monopolies
could be subdued. The freedom to copy will still be the
cornerstone of the free market system, because 'rather than
building an increasing range of property rights within or
analogous to traditional intellectual property', only one
limited right remains: to prevent others from being enriched
at your expense.
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Summary.
The increasing efforts within the European Union to harmonise
intellectual property law also lead to the approximation of
some aspects of unfair competition law. Despite these
efforts, common standards for unfair competition law are
still not present.
To find a common legal norm defining the scope of
protection of trade marks and related intangibles in unfair
competition law, similarities and differences between various
national unfair competition provisions are explored in the
light of the Paris Convention.
Setting aside the clear examples of tortious behaviour in
competition, the difficulty surrounding the definition of
clear norms in other unfair competition cases is recognised.
Protection of intangible subject matter on an other basis
than tort can lead to idiosyncratic and circular reasoning.
It is shown that property theories and policy decisions have
to be dismissed as the sole basis in the determination
whether protection is due.
The author describes how a legal concept bearing close
resemblance to tort can overcome these problems. He describes
and argues for an action for "malign competition", based on
the concept of unjust enrichment.
In examining selected legal systems in more detail, several
key aspects of the proposed action appear to be in operation
already, albeit not recognised.
Selected cases from several jurisdictions are subsequently
tested according to the model of the proposed action for
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malign competition. It is demonstrated that the legal
reasoning is more satisfactory, offering a clear norm and
taking away the old idiosyncrasies. Where the outcome on the
basis of the same facts is different, it is shown that this
is the result of a more satisfactory implementation of the
notions of preemption and equitable remuneration than is
currently employed.
The fact that the principle of unjust enrichment is
universally recognised will in the opinion of the author
advance the prospects for future harmonisation.
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